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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts'
Reasonably Certain Terms Requirement:
A Model of Neoclassical Contract Law and a
Model of Confusion and Inconsistency
Daniel P. O'Gorman·

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement'') states that
the formation of a contract requires that a bargain's terms be "reasonably
certain. " It seeks to make this vague standard clearer with the following test:
"The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy."
The Second Restatement then provides comments and illustrations to help
explain the test. This Article shows, however, that the test and its supporting
comments and illustrations create more confusion than clarity.
The confusion stems from inconsistent signals as to whether indefiniteness is
to be assessed as of the time of the bargain 's formation or at the time of the
lawsuit. These inconsistent signals cause farther confusion about the answers
to two more specific questions. First, if only the plaintiff's promise is too
indefinite to enforce does this automatically mean no contract was formed, or
is the defendant's sufficiently definite promise still enforceable as part of a
contract as long as the plaintiff's promise is not relevant to the dispute that
arises?
Second, what is meant by an "appropriate" remedy, and,
specifically, can a remedy be appropriate only if it protects a party's benefit
of the bargain (the so-called expectation interest), or can a remedy be
appropriate if the plaintiff seeks something less, such as damages to
compensate for the plaintiff's reliance on the promise?
The answers to these questions will not only help answer the temporal
question referenced above, but will reveal whether the entity that adopted and
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promulgated the Second Restatement, the American Law Institute ("ALI''),
views the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality--a rule
requiring a bargain to be in a certain form and that can have consequences
contrary to the parties' intentions-or as simply a restatement of other
doctrines designed to enable a court to resolve the dispute before it (or
perhaps a bit of both). In other words, although it is clear that the Second
Restatement sought to relax the traditional certainty requirement, did the ALI
intend to simply minimize it or did it intend to abolish it? The answers to
these questions are important because they will affect how often bargains fail
to be contracts. And if more bargains fail to be contracts because of
indefiniteness, more promisees will have to proceed under an alternative
theory of enforcement, primarily promissory estoppel, a theory under which it
is usually more difficult for promisees to prevail.
Though the answers are far from clear, the better interpretation of the Second
Restatement's reasonably certain terms requirement is that even though it
remains a formation doctrine, whether the bargain's terms enable a court to
determine the existence of a breach should be assessed as of the time of the
lawsuit, thus, it is not a requirement that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently
definite. However, only an award protecting the plaintiff's expectation
interest is an appropriate remedy even if the plaintiff is only seeking
something less, such as reliance damages. The test, therefore, has aspects of
a legal formality while at the same time having aspects of simply enabling the
court to resolve the dispute that arises. In this respect, the Second
Restatement is a model of neoclassical contract law, retaining some of
classical contract law's focus on the moment of contract formation while at
the same time encouraging courts to look at post-formation events to reach a
just outcome in individual cases. But because a formation doctrine cannot
logically look at such events, it is also a model of inconsistency.
"[W]e have tried to be a little more helpful in spelling out what is meant by
[the reasonably certain terms requirement}. "1
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"),
consistent with established law, 2 states as a black letter rule that the
2

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932) ("An offer must be so definite
in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and
performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain."); ARTHUR LINTON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 143 (One Vol. Ed. 1952) ("Vagueness of
expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement,
may prevent the creation of an enforceable contract."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
108 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that to have a contract, an agreement must be definite enough to
be enforceable); JEFFREYFERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS§ 5.11, at289 (2d ed. 2009)
("[T]he terms of an agreement must be reasonably definite in order for an agreement to be
enforced. If the terms are so indefinite that the court would find it impossible to detect a
breach, or, even if a breach could be identified, to frame a remedy, no contract can be
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formation of a contract3 requires that a bargain's terms be "reasonably
certain.'"' "If this minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no
contract at all." 5
The Second Restatement seeks to make this vague standard6 clearer7 by
providing the following test, which, though not part of the Restatement
(First) of Contracts ("First Restatement"),8 was modeled after a Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") provision: 9 "The terms of a contract are
reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 10 The Second Restatement
then provides comments and illustrations to help explain the test. 11
But if the Second Restatement's test and its supporting comments and
illustrations are designed to spell out what is really meant by the reasonably

found." (footnote omitted)); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS§ 39, at
93 (5th ed. 2011) ("It is commonly suggested that, although parties intend to form a contract,
ifthe terms of their agreement are not sufficiently definite or reasonably certain, no contract
will be said to exist."); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS§ 2.9, at
43 (6th ed. 2009) ("[E]ven ifthe parties intend to contract, ifthe content of their agreement
is unduly uncertain no contract is formed.").
3
Although the Second Restatement defines a contract as any legally enforceable
promise, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 ( 1981) ("A contract is a promise or
a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."), including one enforceable as a result of
the promisee's reliance, id. § 90(1), this Article uses the term contract to refer only to a
legally enforceable bargain. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 394 (revised 4th ed. 1968)
(defining contract as "[a] promissory agreement between two or more persons that creates,
modifies, or destroys a legal relation[]" and "[a]n agreement, upon sufficient consideration,
to do or not to do a particular thing." (emphases added)).
4
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981).
5
Id. § 362 cmt. a.
6
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1695 (1976) (recognizing that the U.C.C.'s test for reasonably certain terms,
which is the model for the Second Restatement's test, is a standard, not a rule).
7
See AMERICAN LA w INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[W]e have tried to be a little
more helpful in spelling out what is meant by that (standard].") (remark by Reporter Robert
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's
terms be reasonably certain).
8
See Robert Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J.
302, 308 (1964) (noting that the test provided for the reasonably certain terms requirement is
a new standard for the Second Restatement).
9
See id. (noting that the new standard follows the U.C.C.).
to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(2) (1981); see also Robert E. Scott, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1643 (2003) ("A
contract ... must be sufficiently complete such that a court is able to determine the fact of
breach and provide an appropriate remedy.").
II RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. & illus. (1981).
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certain terms requirement, 12 they fall short of the mark. Despite the good
intentions of the American Law Institute ("ALI"), 13 the test and its
supporting comments and illustrations result in more confusion than clarity.
The confusion stems from the ALI sending contradictory signals as to
whether a court should assess indefiniteness as of the time the bargain was
formed (and thus not consider post-formation events) or at the time of the
lawsuit (and thus consider such events). These inconsistent signals make
the answers to two more specific questions unclear. First, if only the
plaintiffs promise is too indefinite to enforce does this automatically mean
that no contract was formed (the position taken in the First Restatement), 14
or is the defendant's sufficiently definite promise still enforceable under a
contract theory as long as the plaintiffs promise is not relevant to the
dispute? Second, what is an "appropriate" remedy under the Second
Restatement's test? Specifically, can a remedy be appropriate only if it
protects a party's expectation interest, or can a remedy be appropriate if the
plaintiff seeks something less, such as reliance damages? 15
The significance of the answers to these questions can be illustrated with
the following two hypotheticals:
A and B enter into a bargain under which A, an elderly woman, promises
to B, a caregiver, the following: to pay B a specified amount of money; to
provide room and board to B while B cares for A; and to reimburse B for the
reasonable expenses incurred by B in caring for A. In exchange, B promises
to "take care of' A for the next six months. The parties do not discuss what
"take care of' means, and there is no relevant evidence to determine its
meaning other than the express language used. Assume B's promise is not
12

13

See supra note 7.
See Herbert Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 150 (1969)

(stating that the Restatements are "a modest but essential aid in the improved analysis,
clarification, unification, growth and adaptation of the common law"). Professor Wechsler
was the ALI director from 1963 to 1984. Norman I. Silber, Wechsler, Herbert, in THEYALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 577, 578 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). The
ALI promulgated and approved the Second Restatement of Contracts. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Foreword (1981) (foreword written by Herbert Wechsler).
14
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932) ("An offer must be so definite
in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and
performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)).
15
The promisee's expectation interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344(a) (1981). The promisee's
reliance interest is "his 'interest' in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the
contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not
been made .... " Id. § 344(b); see generally Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-56 (1936) (explaining the
distinction between expectation interest and reliance interest).
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reasonably certain under the Second Restatement's test, 16 but that A's
promises are sufficiently definite. Before the time B is to begin performing,
A repudiates the bargain, without justification, for a reason other than the
vagueness of B's promise. 17 B sues A for breach of contract and seeks
expectation damages, not specific performance. Assume the amount of cost
or other loss avoided by B from not having to perform can be determined to
a reasonable certainty primarily because A was going to provide room and
board to B and reimburse B for B's reasonable expenses. A admits
repudiating without justification, but defends on the ground that B's
promise to "take care of' A is vague, and, thus, no contract was formed due
to the bargain lacking reasonably certain terms. B maintains that whether
B's promise is too vague is irrelevant because all the court must do is
determine whether A breached (or repudiated) A's promise and give an
appropriate remedy to B, and A's promise is sufficiently certain to do both
of these things. 18
If the court requires that both parties' promises be sufficiently definite,
A's defense will succeed and the court will conclude that no contract was
formed. 19 If B hopes to enforce the promise, then B will have to establish
the elements of promissory estoppel. 20 If the court requires that only the
defendant's promise be sufficiently definite, then A's defense will fail and
the court will find A liable for breach of contract.
Consider the next hypothetical, assuming that A and B entered into the
same bargain as in the prior hypothetical:
After entering into the bargain, A expends money remodeling a portion of
her house so that she can provide suitable living quarters for B. B was
aware, at the time the parties entered into the bargain, that A would have to
incur these expenses. Before B is to begin performance, but after A makes
the expenditures, B repudiates the bargain, without justification, for a
reason other than the vagueness of B's promise. A sues B for breach of
contract and seeks reliance damages, not expectation damages or specific
performance. B admits repudiating without justification, but defends on the
16

See Dombrowski v. Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the
phrase "take care of' was too vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102
A. 106, 107-08 (Me. 1917) (enforcing an agreement to maintain and care for one of the
parties).
17
These two hypotheticals do not require that a party repudiate. Rather than repudiate,
the party whose performance is due first could fail to perform when performance is due. See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 ( 1981 ).
18
Hypothetical and explanations provided by the author.
19
See Dombrowski, 362 N.E.2d at 258 (holding that the phrase "take care of' was too
vague to be enforced).
20
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (setting forth the elements
of promissory estoppel).
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ground that "take care of' is vague and thus no contract was formed due to
the bargain lacking reasonably certain terms. A maintains that whether B's
promise is too vague is irrelevant because all the court has to do is
determine whether B breached (or repudiated) B's promise (which B clearly
did, irrespective of its vagueness), and although B's promise might be too
indefinite to protect A's expectation interest, A is seeking only reliance
damages. 21
If the court considers an appropriate remedy to be limited to an award
protecting the plaintiff's expectation interest, and assuming the court
concludes B's promise is too indefinite to determine to a reasonable
certainty the position A would have been in had B performed as promised,
B's defense will succeed, and the court will conclude that no contract was
formed. If A hopes to enforce the promise, then A will have to establish the
elements of promissory estoppel. 22 If the court considers an appropriate
remedy to be an award protecting the plaintiff's reliance interest, then B's
defense will fail and the court will find B liable for breach of contract and
award reliance damages to A.
The Second Restatement's answers to these hypotheticals depend on
when the court is to assess a bargain's indefiniteness. If the test directs
courts to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's formation (and
thus to not consider post-formation events), then both parties' promises
must be sufficiently definite because at the time of formation it would not
be known which party will breach. Also, only an award protecting each
party's expectation interest could be considered an "appropriate" remedy
because at the time of formation neither party will have relied upon the
bargain.
If the test directs courts to assess indefiniteness at the time of the lawsuit
(and thus consider post-formation events), then it would not be a
requirement that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite because the
plaintiff's promise might not be relevant to determining whether the
defendant breached or to giving the plaintiff a remedy. Also, an award
protecting the plaintiff's reliance interest might be considered an
"appropriate" remedy if the plaintiff relied upon the bargain and is seeking
such a remedy. Thus, without knowing whether under the Second
Restatement's test the court is to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the
bargain's formation or at the time of the lawsuit, an answer to these two
hypotheticals cannot be provided.
An answer to this temporal question will not only provide answers to
these more specific questions, but will help identify the underlying policies
21
22

Hypothetical and explanations provided by the author.
See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
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served by the Second Restatement's test. If the test directs courts to assess
indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's formation, it views the
reasonably certain terms requirement as a so-called legal formality-a
requirement that a bargain be in a particular form to be a contract and which
at times operates contrary to the parties' intentions. 23 But if it directs courts
to assess indefiniteness at the time of the lawsuit, the test might be viewed
as nothing more than a restatement of other doctrines designed to enable a
court to resolve the dispute before it-such as the requirement that the
plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
breached the contract24-as well as to establish any requirements for the
particular remedy being sought. 25
The ALi's contradictory signals on the temporal issue make it unclear,
however, whether the requirement has just a "formal" aspect or just a
"practical" aspect, or perhaps a bit of each. In other words, though it is well
known that the Second Restatement sought to relax the traditional certainty
requirement, 26 it is unclear whether the ALI intended to simply minimize it
or to abolish it.
The answers to these questions are important because if the reasonably
certain terms requirement has a formal aspect, more bargains will fail to be
contracts than if it has just a practical aspect. 27 And if more bargains fail to
23
See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-92 (discussing legal formalities and noting that
"they operate through the contradiction of private intentions" and that "the formality means
that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be
ignored"); id. at 1692, 1698 (referring to the "sanction of nullity"); Joseph M. Perillo, The
Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L.
REv. 39, 41 n.22 (1974) ("[T]he term 'form' or 'formality' means any manner of expressing
or memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual expression."); Gregory
Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1726, 1743 (2008) ("A legal formality is a type of act, such as the utterance of special words
or the production of a document in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance.").
24
See Pisani v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 710, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the plaintiff in a breach of contract action has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached the contract).
25
See Lands Council v. Packard, No. CV05-210-N-EJL, 2005 WL 1353899, at *8 (D.
Idaho June 3, 2005) ("The burden is on Plaintiffs to establish that the remedy requested is
appropriate."). Of course, the rules applicable to whether a particular remedy will be
granted might include a legal formality, but that would not make the general rule requiring
the plaintiff to establish the appropriateness of the requested remedy itself a legal formality.
26
See Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of

Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the
Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 403 n.129 (1986) (recognizing that the Second
Restatement "relaxed the traditional certainty requirement to provide for 'reasonable'
certainty").
27
Of course, if parties are sufficiently aware of the requirement's status as a legal
formality, more bargains might be saved due to parties setting forth their bargains in greater
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be contracts because of indefiniteness, more promisees will have to proceed
under an alternative theory of enforcement, primarily promissory
estoppel,28 a theory under which it is usually more difficult for promisees to
prevail. 29
As will be shown, though the Second Restatement's treatment of the
reasonably certain terms requirement is not a model of clarity, the best
reading of it is that courts should assess definiteness at the time of the
lawsuit (a practical aspect), but that the test also retains a formal aspect.
With respect to a bargain's terms having to provide a basis for determining
the existence of a breach, they are sufficiently definite as long as they
enable a court to determine a breach in the dispute before it. 30 Thus, this
portion of the test serves a practical purpose, and the plaintiffs promise
being sufficiently definite is, therefore, not a requirement as long as it is not
relevant to resolving the dispute. An "appropriate" remedy, however, is
only one that protects the plaintiffs expectation interest (i.e., full
enforcement of the defendant's promise) even if the plaintiff is seeking a

detail, thereby saving some bargains that would otherwise have failed under the requirement
even if it were not a legal formality.
28
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (setting forth the elements
of promissory estoppel). If the promisee conferred a benefit upon the promisor, the
promisee could sue for restitution instead of seeking to enforce the promise. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 31(1) (2011) ("A person
who renders performance under an agreement that cannot be enforced against the recipient
by reason of ... indefiniteness ... has a claim in restitution against the recipient as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."); id. cmt. d ("If a contract cannot be enforced
because the terms specified by the parties fail to yield 'a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy' via damages or specific performance (U.C.C. § 2-204(3)), a
performing party is entitled to restitution of a prepaid price, or to the value of a contractual
performance for which the performer has not received the promised equivalent."); PERILLO,
supra note 2, § 2.9, at 44 ("If ... the agreement is fatally indefinite, any payments made for
which a return performance has not been rendered must be disgorged and the value of any
uncompensated performance can be recovered.").
29
See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel:
An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 580 (1998) (reporting a low
success rate for promissory estoppel claims). But see Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall

of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It
Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 542 (2002) (disputing Hillman's
conclusion and finding that "promissory estoppel claims succeed at significant rates when
demonstrably weak claims are subtracted"). Even if "promissory estoppel claims succeed at
significant rates when demonstrably weak claims are subtracted," id., such a claim is still
more difficult to establish than a claim for breach of contract because the promisee must
establish reliance on the promise; that the reliance was sufficiently foreseeable; and that
injustice would result if the promise was not enforced. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981) (listing elements of claim for promissory estoppel).
30
See infra Part V.A.
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remedy that would only partially enforce the defendant's promise (e.g.,
reliance damages).
Thus, the Second Restatement's test has both a practical and a formal
aspect. In this respect, it is a model of neoclassical contract law, 31 retaining
some of classical contract law's focus on the moment of the bargain's
formation, while at the same time encouraging courts to look at postformation events to reach a just outcome in individual cases. But because a
formation doctrine cannot logically look at such events, it is also a model of
inconsistency.
Part II of this Article explains the different ways in which bargains are
indefinite. Part III addresses why parties might enter into bargains with
indefinite terms. Part IV provides an overview of the reasonably certain
terms requirement, with a focus on the Second Restatement. Part V
discusses the uncertainty in the Second Restatement's test for reasonably
certain terms and attempts to remove the uncertainty. Part VI explains how
the Second Restatement's test, as interpreted in Part V, is a model of
neoclassical contract law, but also a model of inconsistency. The last part
is a brief conclusion. Parts II, III, and IV are descriptive, and those familiar
with the topics covered in those Parts might wish to proceed directly to Part
V. For those unfamiliar with the topics, Parts II, III, and IV provide
background information that will be helpful when reading the subsequent
parts.
II. WAYS IN WHICH BARGAINS ARE INDEFINITE
An indefinite bargain is one in which the parties have failed to expressly
32
There are
or impliedly agree upon a matter within the bargain's scope.
33
two principal ways in which a bargain might be indefinite.
First, the
bargain might have a gap, which is when the bargain is incomplete because
of an omitted term. 34 Second, the parties might have a misunderstanding

31
See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737,
738 (2000) (referring to the law of the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement as neoclassical
contract law "because it addresses the shortcomings of classical law rather than offering a
wholly different conception of the law").
32
See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 43.
33
Id. § 2.9, at 44-45.
Professor Perillo identifies three categories (gaps,
misunderstandings, and agreements to agree), but, as discussed below, an agreement to agree
is simply a type of gap. Id.
34 Id.
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about what each party believes has been agreed upon.
36
indefiniteness is discussed in more detail below.
35
36
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Each type of

Id. at 44.

A bargain's incompleteness is sometimes divided into two other categories-patent
(or intrinsic) ambiguities and latent (or extrinsic) ambiguities. A patent ambiguity is "[a]n
ambiguity that clearly appears on the face of a document, arising from the language
itself .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 2009); see also PERILLO, supra note 2,
§ 3.10, at 131 n.23 ("A patent ambiguity is apparent on the face of the document .... "). A
latent ambiguity is "[a]n ambiguity that does not readily appear in the language of a
document, but instead arises from a collateral matter when the document's terms are applied
or executed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93; see also PERILLO, supra note 2,
§ 3.10, at 131 n.23 ("[A] latent ambiguity exists when the term appears clear but extrinsic
information makes it ambiguous.").
In the categories identified in this Article, patent ambiguities generally include
ambiguities of syntax, conflicting language, and gaps regarding matters essential to
performance. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93 (providing as an example of a
patent ambiguity when two different prices are expressed in a written agreement); see W.
Way Builders, Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 1, 15 (2008) (stating that patent ambiguities
include obvious drafting errors and gaps). Latent ambiguities generally include vague
words, ambiguities of term, and gaps regarding matters that might not be essential to
performance. See Williams v. Idaho Potato Starch Co., 245 P.2d 1045, 1048-49 (Idaho
1952) (holding that latent ambiguity existed when parties' agreement referred to "pump" and
the term could refer to different types of pumps); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 93
(providing as an example of a latent ambiguity when a written agreement for the sale of
goods states that the goods will arrive on the ship Peerless, but two ships have that name);
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3 .10, at 131 n.23 (referring to the case of the two ships named
Peerless as "[t]he best known illustration of a latent ambiguity"); Riera v. Riera, 86 So. 3d
1163, 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) ("'[I]fa contract fails to specify the rights or duties of
the parties under certain conditions or in certain situations, then the occurrence of such
condition or situation reveals an insufficiency in the contract not apparent from the face of
the document.' ... This insufficiency is ... considered a latent ambiguity .... " (quoting
Hunt v. First Nat'! Bank ofTampa, 381 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980))).
In some jurisdictions, the distinction is relevant to whether extrinsic evidence will be
admitted to give meaning to an ambiguous word or phrase; extrinsic evidence is admitted to
explain a latent ambiguity but not a patent ambiguity. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 33:43, at 1197-98 (4th ed.
2012) ("[T]he distinction remains significant in a number of jurisdictions, the court[']s
ruling that while parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity, it may not be
admitted when the ambiguity is patent."). "According to this view, a patent ambiguity must
be removed by construction according to settled legal principles, and not by extrinsic
evidence." R.T.K., Annotation, Rule that Latent Ambiguities may be Explained by Paro/
Evidence but that Patent Ambiguities may not, 102 A.L.R. 287 (1936). But even for those
jurisdictions that consider the distinction relevant, the practical effect might not be as
significant as commonly thought. See id. ("Even a casual examination of the cases,
however, discloses that such a statement of the rule is too broad. According to the better
view, or the more accurate statement of the true rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible to
show the situation of the parties and all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
them at the time of the execution of the instrument, for the purpose of explaining or
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As the discussion proceeds, it is important to recognize the difference
between indefiniteness in fact and indefiniteness in law. Indefiniteness in
fact means there was a .pap or a misunderstanding when considering the
3
parties' states of mind.
But, as will be discussed below, as a result of
legal rules that will apply in such situations (includin~ so-called "gap
fillers" 38 and the so-called "objective theory of contract"3 ), the law might
not consider the bargain indefinite even though there was indefiniteness in
fact. In these situations, it can be said that even though there 1s
indefiniteness in fact, there is not indefiniteness in law.
Also, it is possible to have a combination of the two forms of
indefiniteness (a gap and a misunderstanding). 40 One party might believe
the parties have impliedly reached an agreement on a particular issue, while
the other party never gave the issue any thought. An example might be a
usage of trade and a bargain between a well-established business and a new
business. The well-established business might believe the usage of trade is
impliedly part of the bargain while the new business, unaware of the usage
of trade, never gave it any thought.
Further, it will sometimes be difficult to distinguish between a gap and a
misunderstanding. The parties might reduce their bargain to a written
document that includes a provision covering a particular topic, but the
parties might not have given the particular provision any thought or have
even been aware of the provision (this might be particularly true in the case
of a form contract).41 Or the parties might have given the provision thought
but not considered how the provision would apply to a particular situation
that later arises.
resolving even a patent ambiguity.").
37
Though it has been sai'd that even "the devil himself knoweth not the mind of men,"
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), the situation
referred to here is one in which the fact finder in a lawsuit concludes (or assumes) that the
parties to the bargain had such a misunderstanding. Fact finders routinely make findings
regarding a person's state of mind, particularly in criminal law cases and tort cases.
38
A gap-filler is "[a] rule that supplies a contractual term that the parties failed to
include in the contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 749.
39
The "objective theory of contract" is "[t]he doctrine that a contract is not an
agreement in the sense of a subjective meeting of the minds but is instead a series of external
acts giving the objective semblance of agreement." Id. at 1178.
40
See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 860, 873 (1968) ("[S]ince at least two parties will be involved, and several persons may
act on behalf of a single party, there may be several different reasons for the omission.").
41
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 12 (2013) (explaining why consumers do not read boilerplate in form
contracts); Perillo, supra note 23, at 60 ("The utilization of standardized printed contract
forms by large industrial and commercial companies has resulted in a situation in which
contracting parties are frequently uninformed as to the content of the printed form.").
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A. Gaps ("Omitted Terms")

A gap exists in a bargain when the parties, at the time the bargain is
formed, do not expressly or impliedly address a particular matter within the
bargain's scope. 4 Gaps tend to be more numerous in bargains formed
43
through conduct (so-called "implied-in-fact contracts"); the lack of a
written document makes it likely the parties have not agreed, even
implicitly, about numerous topics. But gaps also exist in express
agreements (even express agreements that are evidenced by a written
document). 44 Although often unintended,45 gaps can even be intentional.
For example, an intentional gap includes the so-called "agreement to
agree," which is when the parties to a bargain agree to work out the details
46
of a particular matter within the bargain's scope at a later time. In such a
situation, a~~ exists at the bargain's formation regarding the term to be
agreed upon.
1. Types ofgaps

Gaps are of two types. The first type-more significant but less common
than the second type-is when the parties do not address at the time of the
bargain's formation something that must be known for one or both of the
parties to perform. 48 Such a term may be called an "essential term." The
42
Even if the bargain's language appears to cover a particular matter, there is a gap if
"neither party intended the language to cover the case." Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 875.
43
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 370 (defining an implied-in-fact
contract as "[a] contract that the parties presumably intended as their tacit understanding, as
inferred from their conduct and other circumstances").
44
See id. at 369 (defining an express contract as "[a] contract whose terms the parties
have explicitly set out").
45
See infra Part III, for a discussion of why parties enter into bargains with indefinite
terms.
46
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 78 (defining an agreement to agree
as an agreement that "leav[es] some details to be worked out by the parties"). For example,
an agreement for the lease of an apartment might include a provision giving the tenant an
option to extend the lease term upon a rate to be agreed upon by the parties.
47
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 53.
48
These gaps are less common than the first type because parties tend to pay more
attention to the requirements of performance than other matters when forming a bargain.
See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 870-71 ("The most likely expectations to be selected for
reduction to contract language are those that describe the performance of each party in the
usual course of events. [Professor Stewart] Macaulay concluded that 'businessmen pay
more attention to describing the performances in an exchange than to planning for
contingencies or defective performances or to obtaining legal enforceability of their
contracts."' (quoting Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
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second type-less significant but more common than the first type-is
when the parties do not address at the time of the bargain's formation what
the consequences will be if a particular fact exists (or does not exist) or if a
49
particular event occurs (or does not occur). Such a term may be called a
"non-essential term."
Examples of a gap regarding an essential term include a failure to address
the services, land, or goods (or the amount of goods) to be exchanged for a
. 1or
c
. d services,
.
1an d , or goo d s; 51 or
. d pnce;
. 50 th e pnce
promise
t h e promise
the time, place, or manner for performance (such as the time or place for
52
delivery of goods).
These gaps are more serious than the second type
because, as a result of the gap, it is certain that a party will not know how to
perform at least part of his or her end of the bargain. These gaps will be
53
apparent at the time the bargain is formed.
The second type of gap (a gap regarding a non-essential term) tends to
involve a failure to qualify a party's duty to perform if an unknown fact
exists at the time of the bargain's formation or a particular unanticipated
event occurs after formation. Examples include the following: a bargain to
buy and sell a cow believed to be infertile that does not address what will
54
happen if the cow is in fact fertile; a bargain for the use of a music hall
that does not address what will happen if the hall bums down before the

Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 60 (1963))).
49
See Eric A. Posner, The Paro/ Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533 (1998) (stating that a
gap exists when "the terms are silent with respect to a contingency").
50
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 cmt. b (1932) (noting that "[p]romises
may be indefinite ... in the work or things to be given in exchange for the promise");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 201 ("Simple examples of agreements that do not meet the
requirement are those in which the description of the subject matter is inadequate, as where
the description or quantity of goods to be sold is lacking."); 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS§ 37, at 56-57 (1920) ("A lack of definiteness in an agreement may concern
the ... work to be done, [or the] property to be transferred .... ").
51
See WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56-57 ("A lack of definiteness in an agreement
may concern ... the price to be paid ... ").
52
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. d (1981) ("Valid contracts are
often made which do not specify the time for performance."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 32 cmt. b (1932) (noting that "[p]romises may be indefinite in time or in
place ... "); WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56-57 ("A lack of definiteness in an
agreement may concern the time of performance .... ").
53
See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 796 (1982) ("Some failures of agreement are apparent from the
time the parties conclude the bargain. For example, the bargain may say nothing about price
or may explicitly leave the price 'to be agreed' upon by the parties.").
54
Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), overruled in part by Lenawee Cnty.
Bd. ofHealth v. Messerly, 331N.W.2d203, 208 (Mich. 1982).
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date for its use; 55 a bargain to use an apartment to watch the king's
coronation procession that does not address what will happen if the
56
procession is cancelled because the king falls il1; a bargain that fails to
specify whether the parties are required to correct an obvious mistake by
the other party regarding the bargain's terms; 57 and a bargain that does not
specify the remedy for a breach,58 including whether the non-breaching
party will be excused from performing. 59
All bargains are incomplete in this second (non-essential term) sense
because the future events that might have some impact on the parties'
60
bargain are limitless, and foresight is imperfect. This type of gap will not,
however, necessarily have an effect on the parties' abilities to perform the
bargain because the facts are probably as believed, and the unanticipated
future event that is not addressed will likely never occur. The cow is
probably barren (as believed); the music hall will probably not burn down
before the concert; the king will probably not fall ill; the parties will
probably not make a mistake about the bargain's terms; and the bargain will
probably not be breached. Often, it will not even be apparent at the time
61
the bargain is formed that there is a gap of this type. The older view was
that in these situations there was not even a gap, based on the notion that a
duty not expressly qualified is unqualified. 62
2. Situations in which it appears the bargain has a particular gap, but it
55

Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.).
Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (appeal taken from Eng.).
57
Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387
(N.J. 2005).
58
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358,
1386 (1992) ("[A]lthough it is relatively easy for contracting parties to specifythe
performances they want, it is often extremely difficult to specify remedies in advance of
knowing the nature of the breach and the circumstances of the world at the time of the
breach.").
59
Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
60
Scott, supra note 10, at 1641 ("All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states
of the world and the capacities of contracting parties to condition their future performance
on each possible state are finite."); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 956 (1967) ("The parties may simply not have foreseen the
problem at the time of contracting."); FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 5.11, at 289 ("Even in large
transactions, with both parties adequately represented, the parties and their lawyers might
fail to successfully anticipate every matter upon which an agreement might be useful.").
61
See Speidel, supra note 53, at 796 ("[Some failures of agreement] become apparent as
performance unfolds, new information is discovered, or circumstances change.").
62
See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEA TH OF CONTRACT 49-53 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., Ohio
State Univ. Press 1995) (1974) (describing the idea of absolute contractual liability in
England and in the United States).
56
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does not (either in fact or in law)

There are three situations in which it might appear that a bargain has a
particular gap, but it does not (either in fact or in law): a written document
has a particular gap but the parties' bargain does not; the parties' express
bargain has a particular gap but the gap is filled with an implied-in-fact
term; and the parties' bargain in fact (including express and implied-in-fact
terms) has a particular gap but the gap is filled by the court with an impliedin-law term. Each of these situations is discussed below.

a. Gap in written document only
First, the parties might make an effort to reduce the bargain's terms to a
written document, yet fail to include in the document all of the terms that
are part of the bargain. 63 As long as such terms are not excluded from their
64
bargain under the parol evidence rule, those terms are part of it and their
exclusion from the written document would not mean the bargain has gaps
regarding those matters; it would mean only that the written document is an
incomplete expression of the bargain, a so-called "partially integrated
agreement." 65 The term "agreement" (which is part of the definition of
"bargain")66 is not limited to the express terms in a written document;
67
rather, it extends to all of the terms to which the parties manifested assent.
Thus, when referring to a bargain having a particular gap, one is referring to
the parties' entire bargain, and not simply a written document providing
evidence of the bargain.
63

CORBIN, supra note 2, § 95, at 145.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 213(1)-(2) (1981) (providing that "[a]
binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent
with them" and "[a] binding completely integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to
the extent that they are within its scope").
65
See id. § 210(2). When the parties reduce their agreement to a written document but
mistakenly omit a term agreed upon (a so-called mistake as to expression or mistake in
integration), see JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 421 (10th ed.
2013) (referring to a drafting error as a "mistake in expression" or "mistake in integration"),
"the court, at the request of a party, may reform the writing to express the agreement actually
reached." FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 430-31; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 155 (1981). Reformation is also available if the parties mistakenly included a
term not agreed upon or incorrectly stated a particular term. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
at 431.
66 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981) ("A bargain is an agreement to
exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange
performances.").
67
See id. ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons.").
64
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b. Implied-in-fact terms
68

Second, the terms of a bargain include those that are implied in fact.
An implied-in-fact term is one upon which the parties impliedly manifested
assent, as opposed to expressly manifesting assent, through the use of oral
69
or written words.
Such terms are inferred by logical deduction from
71 . 1 d.
70
d
.
express terms an fr om the surround.mg circumstances,
me u mg
"standard terms, trade or local usages, a course of dealing between the
. pnor
. to the agreement, an d a course of perfiormance aft er it.
. " 72
parties
Similarly, the Second Restatement provides that "the word 'promise' is
commonly and quite properly ... used to refer to the complex of human
relations which results from the promisor's words or acts of assurance,
including the justified expectations of the promisee and any moral or legal
73
duty which arises to make good the assurance by performance."
For
example, in the celebrated case of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the
court, in an opinion by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, found that an agreement
providing one party with the exclusive privilege to market the fashion
designs of the other included an implied promise by the former to the latter
74
to make reasonable efforts to market the designs.
A bargain's express silence on a topic might mean, however, that the
parties manifested an intention that the existence (or non-existence) of a
particular fact or the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a particular event
would not have an effect on the parties' legal rights and duties as expressed
in the bargain. Because "contracts generally are a device for allocating
risks," 75 the issue will be whether a reasonable person would believe the
68

See id. § 4 ("A promise ... may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct."); id. § 33
cmt. a ("Terms may be supplied by factual implication .... "). It was not always so. See
Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 862-63 ("Courts in the seventeenth century, with a literalism
characteristic of their time, sought to confine themselves to the bare framework provided by
the parties through the letter of their contract language.").
69
See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865 (stating that an implied-in-fact term is one that
"was 'intended' by the parties and the intention [is] reasonably inferable from conduct other
than words ... ").
70
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. c (1981 ).
71
See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 46-47.
72
Id. at 47; see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836 (1964) (noting that under the doctrine of "practical
construction," the parties' "conduct during the course of performance may support
inferences ... as to their intentions with respect to gaps and omissions in the contract").
73
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2 cmt. a (1981).
74
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also Laclede
Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that a buyer impliedly
promised to purchase all of its propane gas requirements from the seller).
75
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 59
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parties' silence on the topic meant they manifested an intention that the
bargain's expressly stated rights and duties be left undisturbed by the fact or
event.
The more likely it is that the particular fact exists or that the particular
event will occur, the more likely a reasonable person would believe the
parties impliedly manifested an intention that their expressly stated rights
and duties be left undisturbed, and vice versa. For example, "[i]n a contract
for future delivery [of goods] the seller takes on himself the risk that the
goods will rise in price or that for some other reason it will become more
76
burdensome for him to perform, and the buyer assumes reciprocal risks."
In this sense, the parties' silence regarding the consequences of the fact
existing or the event occurring is no gap at all. But whether there has been
an implied manifestation of an intention that a particular risk has been
assumed is always a matter of interpreting the bargain, taking into account,
along with any other relevant evidence, the bargain's language, whether the
event was discussed duri~f negotiations, the bargain's context, and how
foreseeable the event was.

c. Implied-in-law terms
Third, even when there is a gap "in fact," the omitted term, if essential to
78
a determination of the parties' rights and duties is supplied by the court.
79
80
These terms are called implied-in-law terms, constructive terms, or
(1981).
76 Id.
77
For example, in the well-known case of Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich.
1887), "the court found that the seller [of a cow] had not transferred nor had the buyer paid
for the chance that [the] apparently barren prize cow was in fact pregnant." FRIED, supra
note 75, at 59. But see Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42, 45 (Wis. 1885) (holding that the
seller of a stone that the parties thought was probably a topaz assumed the risk that it was an
uncut diamond).
78
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 (1981); see also id. § 33 cmt. a ("[I]n
recurring situations the law often supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the
contrary."); id. ch. 9 intro. note ("[R]ules of law must fill the gap when the parties have not
provided for the situation which arises."); Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 864 ("Gradually,
courts began to go beyond the parties' actual expectations as well as their contract language,
and came to read into the contract what they themselves thought was fair or just, on the
pretext that it was the parties' 'intention."'); id. at 866 ("It was admitted that the agreement
of the parties was not an exclusive source, but only one to be deferred to when it could be
established.").
79
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 823 (defining "implied in law" as
"[i]mposed by operation of law and not because of any inferences that can be drawn from
the facts of the case").
8
° Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865.
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81

As stated by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, "A court,
default rules.
having determined that there is a contract, cannot refuse to decide a case on
the ground that the parties failed to provide for the situation."82 Courts may
even supply a term when the gap is the result of a so-called "agreement to
agree," which is when the parties agree to work out the details of a
particular matter at some point after the bargain is formed. 83 Although
"[t]he traditional rule is that an agreement to agree as to a material term
84
under both the Second
prevents the formation of a contract[,]"
Restatement and the U.C.C., courts are to fill these gaps as well. 85
Professor Edwin W. Patterson aptly called gap-filling terms "aids for the
ai·1·mg agreement. ,,86
The court will supply a term as directed by a particular statute (such as
the U.C.C.) or, in the absence of a statutory directive, a term that is
87
"reasonable in the circumstances." In the absence of a statutory directive,
81
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1446 (defining "default rule" as "[a]
legal principle that fills a gap in a contract in the absence of an applicable express provision
but remains subject to a contrary agreement"). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 5 (1981) (referring to such a term as a "term of a contract" as opposed to a
"term of a promise or agreement"-the latter phrase referring to express and implied-in-fact
terms).
82
Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 860 n.2; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW 67 (!st ed. 2004) ("Despite some decisions to the contrary, courts should
make every effort to fill gaps and enforce agreements when the parties intended to
contract."); id. at 253 ("[C]ourts are inclined to fill gaps for the parties, rather than give up
on the contract."); Rego v. Decker, 482 P.2d 834, 837 (Alaska 1971) ("[C]ourts should fill
gaps in contracts to ensure fairness where the reasonable expectations of the parties are fairly
clear. The parties to a contract often cannot negotiate and draft solutions to all the problems
which may arise.").
83
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at78 (defining "agreement to agree" as
an agreement "leaving some details to be worked out by the parties").
84
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 53 (emphasis omitted); see also Walker v. Keith, 382
S.W.2d 198, 205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (refusing to enforce an agreement to agree upon the
rental price of a parcel ofland).
85
See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 illus. 8 (1981) (providing that when
there is an agreement to agree on price and the parties do not ultimately agree on a price, but
manifest an intent to be bound, the court should supply a reasonable price term); see also
u.c.c. § 2-305(1)(b) (2013).
86
STATE OF NEW YORK, I REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, STUDY
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 275 (William s. Hein & Co. 1998) (remark by
Professor Edwin W. Patterson).
87
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 (1981); see also MURRAY, supra note
2, § 91, at 485 ("When an omitted term is supplied by a court, it is not interpreting the
contract, i.e., it is not discovering such a term by discerning the meaning of the parties'
expression of agreement. The process is one of judicial construction, in which courts supply
an omitted term which is fair and reasonable under the circumstances." (emphasis in
original) (internal citations omitted)).
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there are two different ways courts will decide which term to supply. First,
88
under the traditional approach, which has been referred to as the
"hypothetical model of the bargaining process,"89 the court supplies a term
that it believes the parties would have agreed to had they considered the
90
matter when forming the bargain.
Second, under the Second Restatement's apfiroach (which rejects the
1
hypothetical model of the bargaining process) a term is supplied that
"comports with community standards of fairness and policy."92 This
approach considers principles and policies, such as seeking "substantial
equivalence in commercial exchanges[,]" "discourag[ing] litigation by
promoting certainty[,]" "plac[ing] the risk in a way that is thought desirable
93
from the point of view of a particular market or of society in general[,]"
encouraging due care by not having a prudent party pay for the loss of a
careless party, and reducing problems of administration (including having
default rules that will avoid the judicial expense involved with a systematic
94
An example of using policy reasons to fill in a gap (and
legal inquiry).
the antithesis of the hypothetical model of the bargaining process) is the socalled "penalty default," under which the term selected is "purposefully set
at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to
reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts)."95
In most cases, the distinction between the hypothetical model of the
bargaining process and supplying a term that "comports with community
standards of fairness and policy" is likely insignificant because courts will,
one expects, probably conclude that the parties would have agreed to a term
that turns out to be consistent with community standards of fairness. The

88

Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 891.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981).
90
See PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 47; Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 865; see
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 98 (8th ed. 2011)
(advocating for such an approach to gap filling based on the belief it results in efficient
terms).
91
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981) ("[W]here there is in
fact no agreement, the court should supply a term which comports with community
standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining
process.").
92
Id.; see also id. § 5 cmt. b ("Much contract law consists of rules which may be varied
by agreement of the parties. Such rules are sometimes stated in terms of presumed intention,
and they may be thought of as implied terms of an agreement. They often rest, however, on
considerations of public policy rather than on manifestation of the intention of the parties.").
93
Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 878-79 (citations omitted).
94
FRIED, supra note 75, at 62-63.
95
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989).
89
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distinction would be relevant, however, if the court considers policy matters
when supplying a term.
An important example of an implied-in-law term is the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 96 When a party engages in conduct the legal
consequences of which the parties did not expressly or impliedly agree
upon (i.e., conduct that was not anticipated at the time of the bargain's
formation), the court will consider such conduct a breach if it is not
consistent with "community standards of decency, fairness or
97
reasonableness. "
Courts will usually only refuse to fill a gap when the omitted term is
important98 and relates to a matter that is particularly subjective (such that it
is difficult or impossible to say what would be "reasonable in the
circumstances"). Examples include, "where the parties have omitted from
their agreement the kind or quantity of goods or the specifications of a
99
Unfortunately, however, because "[it] cannot be
building contract .... "
said that the legal system has adopted any ... criteria [for gap filling] as
exclusive ... it is difficult to know, without research, when the courts will
or will not supply a gap-filler, and, if they will, how the gap will be
100
filled. "
The legislatures and the courts have, though, established default rules for
certain recurring gaps. For example, if the parties fail to agree on a price
for a service or for goods, "a court will hold that the parties intended that a
101
Similarly, if no time is
reasonable price should be paid and received."
specified for performance, performance is due within "a reasonable
96

RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
Id. cmt. a.
98
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 212 ("[A] court may be more willing to supply a
term if the court regards the term as relatively unimportant."). In deciding the importance of
a missing term, the Second Restatement encourages courts to take into account the dispute
that has arisen. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981) ("It is less
likely that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by construction as to a matter which
has been the subject of controversy between the parties than as to one which is raised only as
an afterthought."). Such an approach seems inconsistent with classical contract law's focus
on the time of formation.
99
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 48 (internal citations omitted).
100
Id. § 2.9, at 47.
IOI Id. See also RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981); U.C.C. § 2305 (2013). For an argument that such a term is an implied-in-law term based on the policy
against unjust enrichment, at least when goods have been delivered and accepted (or services
provided and accepted), and not an implied-in-fact term, see Patterson, supra note 72, at 835
("Yet if goods have been delivered and accepted, the context may show that no gift was
intended, as the recipient knew, and the court will construe (imply) a duty to pay the
reasonable value of the goods. The policy seems to be to prevent unjust enrichment, yet the
duty construed is contractual, not quasi-contractual.").
97
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102

time."
If the parties fail to agree on a place for the delivery of goods, the
103
place for delivery is the seller's place of business.
If the parties fail to
agree on a time for payment for goods, payment is due when the buyer
104
receives them.
If the parties fail to specify the consequences of a party's
non-performance, the other party is entitled to suspend its own performance
105
if the non-performance is material,
and if the non-performance is a
breach, it is entitled to recover damages to protect its expectation
106
The courts have also established default rules for situations
interest.
107
involving
involving a mistake of fact at the time of contract formation,
an unanticipated event occurring after contract formation that makes a
party's performance impossible or much more difficult than expected, 108
!OZ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981); u.c.c. § 2-309(1)
(2013); PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 48.
IOJ U.C.C. § 2-308(a).
104
Jd.§2-310(a).
!OS See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 237 (1981). Under the U.C.C.'s perfect
tender rule, a buyer has the privilege to suspend performance under a non-installment
contract ifthe goods fail to conform in any respect to the contract. U.C.C. § 2-60l(a).
6
!0
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981). A party's expectation
interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract been performed." Id. § 344(a).
107
See id. § 152(1) ("Where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless he
bears the risk of the mistake .... "); id. § 153 ("Where a mistake of one party at the time a
contract was made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is
voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake ... and (a) the effect of the
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or (b) the other
party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake."). Of course, if the
parties have expressly or impliedly agreed about the consequences of a mistake of fact, the
default rule does not apply. See id. § 154(a) (providing that a party bears the risk of mistake
when "the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties").
ws See id. § 261 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance
is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."). The fact
that the default rule regarding impracticability is considered an implied-in-law term and not
an implied-in-fact term is shown by the Second Restatement's Introductory Note to the
relevant Second Restatement chapter. See id. ch. 11, intro. note ("The rationale behind the
doctrine[] of impracticability ... is sometimes said to be that there is an 'implied term' of
the contract that such extraordinary circumstances will not occur. This Restatement rejects
this analysis .... "); see also id. § 204 cmt. a (indicating that the default rule regarding
impracticability is an implied-in-law term). Of course, if the parties have expressly or
impliedly agreed about the consequences of an event making performance impracticable, the
default rule does not apply. See id. § 261 (noting that discharge of the duty does not occur
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and involving an unanticipated event occurring after contract formation that
makes one party's performance meaningless (or virtually meaningless) to
109
the other party.
As a result of implied-in-law terms, it is unusual that a bargain will be
unenforceable because of a gap. As discussed above, such a result will
occur only when there is no statutory or judicially-recognized default rule
to fill the gap and the gap relates to an important and particularly subjective
matter, such that it would be difficult or impossible to determine what
110
would be a reasonable term in the circumstances.
Importantly, however, it should be recognized that gaps might mean that
a reasonable person would conclude that the varties did not even reach an
11
As the Second Restatement
agreement (and thus did not form a bargain).
provides, "[t]he fact that one or more terms of a proposed bargain are left
open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended
112
to be understood as an offer or as an acceptance."
"The more terms the
parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a
113
And gap filling with implied-in-law terms does not
binding agreement."
occur until it is determined that the parties have manifested assent to a
bargain. If, however, the parties have manifested assent to a bargain, under

under the default rule if"the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary").
109
See id. § 265 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to
render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary."). Like the impracticability doctrine, the fact that the default rule regarding
frustration of purpose is considered an implied-in-law term and not an implied-in-fact term
is shown in the introductory note of chapter 11 in the Second Restatement. See id. ch. 11,
intro. note ("The rationale behind the doctrine[] of ... frustration is sometimes said to be
that there is an 'implied term' of the contract that such extraordinary circumstances will not
occur. This Restatement rejects that analysis ... .");see also id. § 204 cmt. a (indicating that
the default rule regarding frustration of purpose is an implied-in-law term). Of course, if the
parties have expressly or impliedly agreed about the consequences of an event that
substantially frustrates a party's principal purpose, the default rule does not apply. See id.
§ 265 (noting that discharge of the duty does not occur under the default rule if "the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary").
110
See notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
111
See PERILLO, supra note 2, at 43 ("Indefiniteness in a communication is some
evidence of an intent not to contract. The more terms that are omitted in an agreement the
more likely it is that the parties do not intend to contract." (internal citations omitted));
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. d (2011) ("A
transaction resulting in an indefinite [bargain] must not be confused with a failed negotiation
producing no [bargain] at all.").
112
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33(3)(1981).
113
Id.§ 33 cmt. c.
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modem contract law, a gap will rarely result in the bargain not being a
contract because of indefiniteness.

B. Misunderstandings
The second type of indefiniteness-a misunderstanding---occurs when
the parties to a bargain have expressly or impliedly addressed a particular
matter (thus, there is no gap in the sense of an omitted term), but what each
party intends the agreement to mean is different from what the other party
intends it to mean, or the parties disagree about how the agreement is to
114
In other words, the parties have attached
apply to a particular situation.
different meanings to some of the words or conduct that formed the bargain
(thus there is a gap in understanding).

1. When language causes a misunderstanding
When a misunderstanding results despite the parties' agreement to use
particular words as evidence of their bargain, it is often because of the use
115
of either vague language or ambiguous language.
Each is discussed
below.

a. Vague language
A vague word is one that is "best depicted as forming not a neatly
bounded class but a distribution about a central norm." 116 It describes
something that can be imagined on a continuum and covers a range of
possible meanings, but with the range's boundary being unclear. 117 Thus,
"[a] word that may or may not be applicable to marginal objects [or events]
is vague." 118 For example, the word "red" is vague because a person might
114

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1093 (defining "misunderstanding"
as "[a] situation in which the words or acts of two people suggest assent, but one or both of
them in fact intend something different from what the words or acts express").
115
See Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 860 ("Sometimes, because of vagueness or
ambiguity in the language they have used, the parties will disagree over the meaning of what
they said or over how their language applies to a situation for which they have provided.");
see also Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 952-57 (explaining vagueness and ambiguity in the
context of contract disputes).
116
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953 (quoting W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 85 (1960));
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1689 (defining "vague" as
"[i]mprecise; not sharply outlined; indistinct; uncertain").
117
See FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 330 (noting that vague words cover "a range of
possible meanings").
118
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953.
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or might not intend her use of that word to include crimson (i.e., exactly
where red starts and stops is unclear). 119 A party might promise to "take
care of' another party, but it is unclear what tasks are encompassed with the
range of that phrase. 120 A party might promise to make a "prompt"
shipment, but it is unclear after exactly how many days the shipment is no
longer prompt. 121 Or a party might promise to deliver "chickens," but it is
unclear what kind of chickens are to be delivered. 122

Vague words, which are more common than ambiguous words, 123
also include those that form a distribution about a central norm
because they are based on individual value judgments. The adjective
"reasonable," which is defined as "fair, proper, or moderate under the
circumstances[,]" 124 is perhaps the most obvious example, but there
are others. An employer might promise to Ray an employee "a fair
share of my profits" in addition to a salary. 1 5 As the court noted in
that case, a "fair" share was "pure conjecture" and "may be any
amount from a nominal sum to a material part accordin5 to the
particular views of the person whose guess is considered." 6 Or a
person mi9ht promise a "generous" reward for the return of lost
property. 12 Of course, whether (or the extent to which) such words
are vague depends upon what they are modifying. As previously
noted, gaps are often filled with terms including the adjective
"reasonable," 128 presumably because such things as a reasonable

119

Id. at 952-53.
See Dombrowski v. Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the
phrase "take care of' was too vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102
A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917) (enforcing an agreement to maintain and care for one of the parties).
121
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956-57 (citing Kreg1inger & Femau Ltd. v. Charles J.
Webb Sons Co., 162 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1958)).
122
See Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'! Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 118
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 441, 451 (providing Frigaliment as
an example of vague language); Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953.
123
FERRIELL, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 331 ("Misunderstandings involving true ambiguity
are rare; those involving a range of possible meanings are more common.").
124
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,supra note 36, at 1379.
125
Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 823-24 (N.Y. 1916).
126
Id. at 824.
127
See Greene v. Heinrich, 300 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238-39 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (enforcing
the promise of a "generous" reward and concluding that 10% of the value of the returned
property would be "generous"), afj"d, 319 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. App. Term 1971), aff'd, 327
N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
128
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 cmt. d (1981) (reasonable
price); u.c.c. § 2-305 (2013); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981)
(reasonable time for performance); U.C.C. § 2-309(1).
120
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price or a reasonable time for performance would not be subject to a
wide range of disagreement among reasonable persons.
Although parties reduce their bargains to written documents to decrease the
likelihood of a misunderstanding, the inherent indefiniteness of most words
means this risk can usually not be entirely eliminated. In a certain sense, all
words are indefinite because "it is men who give meanings to words and
129
[thus] words in themselves have no meaning .... "
As stated by Justice
130
Roger Traynor, the "most prominent state court judge of his generation," If
words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to discover
contractual intention in the words themselves and in the manner in which they
were arranged. Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents.
'A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a
symbol of algebra or chemistry .... ' The meaning of particular words or
groups of words varies with the ' ... verbal context and surrounding
circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience
of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges) .... A word
has no meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an objective
meaning, one true meaning.' Accordingly, the meaning of a writing ' ... can
only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal
131
the sense in which the writer used the words.'

Importantly, "the context of words and other conduct is seldom exactly
the same for two different people, since connotations depend on the entire
past experience and the attitudes and expectations of the person whose
. . .
. ,,132
un derstandmg 1s m question.

b. Ambiguous language
Ambiguous language comes in three varieties: ambiguity of term,
ambiguity of syntax, and conflicting language. Each presents essentially
the same problem: the bargain's language is capable of being interpreted in
two entirely different ways.
133
A
Ambiguity of term occurs when the parties use an ambiguous word.
word is ambiguous if it has "two [or more] entirely different connotations
so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly
129

Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Paro! Evidence Rule, 50
CORNELLL.Q. 161, 164 (1965).
130
Benjamin Field, Traynor, Roger J.' in THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 548, 549 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
131
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45
(Cal. 1968) (ellipses in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Pearson v. State Soc. Welfare
Bd., 353 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1960)); See also Corbin, supra note 124, at 187).
132
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 201 cmt. b (1981).
133
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954.
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appropriate and inappropriate .... " 134 An example is the word "light,"
135
which can refer to either color or weight,
or the word "ton," which can
136
refer to either a long ton (2,240 pounds) or a short ton (2,000 pounds).
Or a general contractor and a subcontractor might agree that the
subcontractor will paint an apartment "unit," but it is unclear whether the
word "unit" was intended to refer to only the apartment's interior or to both
137
the interior and the exterior.
A type of ambiguity of term is proper name ambiflity, which is when
13
two or more persons or things share the same name.
A famous example
was involved in Raffles v. Wichelhaus, where the parties agreed to buy and
sell cotton to be delivered on the ship Peerless sailing from Bombay, but
139
there were two ships with that name sailing from that city.
Another
example is Kyle v. Kavanagh, in which the parties agreed to buy and sell
land on Prospect Street in Waltham, Massachusetts, but there were two
140
streets in that city with that name.
An ambiguity of syntax, which is probably more common than an
ambiguity of term, is an ambiguity caused by grammatical structure. 141 An
example is an insurance policy that covers any "disease of organs of the
body not common to both sexes." 142 Does "not common to both sexes"
qualify "disease" or "organs"? Thus, is it the disease or the organs that
must not be common to both sexes to be covered (for example, is a fibroid
tumor of the womb covered)? 143 Or the parties to a marriage settlement
agree to "equally pay for the cost of [their] minor child's college tuition,

134

Id. at 953; see also MERRJAM-WEBSTER, INC., MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
39 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "ambiguous" as "capable of being understood in
two or more possible senses or ways").
135
See Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 953 (stating that an example of an ambiguous word
is the use of the word "light" when referring to a feather; the speaker might use the word to
refer to the feather's color or its weight).
136
Id. at 954.
137
See Flower City Painting Contractors v. Gumina Constr. Co., 591 F.2d 162 (2d Cir.
1979).
138
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954.
139
See Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.).
14
Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356, 356-57 (1869). A similar ambiguity can result
when there is no person or thing with the specified name, but two or more persons or things
with names similar to the specified name. For example, the parties might refer to "the ship
Lady Adams that is sailing from Nantucket," when there is no ship with that name sailing
from Nantucket, but one ship sailing from Nantucket named Abigail Adams and another
sailing from Nantucket named Mrs. Adams.
141
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 954.
142 Id.
143 Id.
DICTIONARY
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books, supplies and any and all other related expenses." 144 Does "related
expenses" refer to "college" or to just "tuition, books, [and] supplies"?
Thus, are "related expenses" all those related to college or simply those
related to "tuition, books, [and] supplies"? 145 Ambiguity caused by the use
of the words "and" and "or" is also an example of ambiguity of syntax. 146
Another source of ambiguity is the use of conflicting language. 147 For
example, a written document might provide in one provision that a buyer
agrees to pay a specified rate per item provided; in another, the number of
items the seller will provide; and in another, the total price to be paid. The
amount owed according to the first two provisions might, however, conflict
with the amount specified in the third. 148 Or the price to be paid might be
identified in both words and numbers, with the amounts specified being
different. 149 Many of these conflicts appear in form contracts that have
conflicting language added by the parties. 150
2. When a misunderstanding is rendered irrelevant under law-the effect of
the objective theory of contract and other aids to interpretation and
construction

Just as the law will often supply omitted terms and, thus, render bargains
sufficiently definite in law despite the inevitable gaps, under the so-called
"objective theory of contract," the court will give vague or ambiguous
language the meaning attached to it by one of the parties if the other party
151
Thus, ifthe first party knew
was more at fault for the misunderstanding.
or had reason to know of the meaning attached by the second party, and the
second party did not know or have reason to know of the meaning attached
152
by the first party, the second party's meaning is used.
This process is
144

Riera v. Riera, 86 So. 3d 1163, 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
s Id. at 1167.
146
Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 955.
147
Id. at 956.
148
See id.
149
See WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 401 (Arthur L. Corbin
ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).
iso Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956.
ISi RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 201(2)(a) (1981).
is 2 Id. In deciding whether a party had reason to know of a meaning attached by the
other party, courts disagree on the type of evidence that should be admitted when the parties
have reduced their bargain to a written document and the language used is unambiguous on
its face. There is the more restrictive plain meaning rule, which is the majority rule, and the
more liberal "contextual" approach. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 463-69
(explaining the difference between the restrictive view and liberal view). See also PERILLO,
supra note 2, § 3.10, at 129-30 (explaining that, under the plain meaning rule, "if a writing,
14

2014 I REASONABLYCERTAINTERMS

197

really no different from the court filling a gap by supplying a term that is
reasonable in the circumstances. The parties did not agree on the term's
meaning, but the court will select one of the parties' meanings if that party
was less at fault for the misunderstanding because it is reasonable to do so
in the circumstances (recall that encouraging due care is a policy considered
when filling gaps). Imposing liability on the party who was more at fault
for the misunderstanding induces parties to learn what most persons mean
when they use particular language, thereby reducing future
. derstan d"mgs. 153
m1sun
Various guides to interpretation and construction have been recognized to
implement this fault standard and to implement other policies. For
example, one is that "[o]rdinarily a party has reason to know of meanings in
general usage." 154
Thus, "[u]nless a different intention is
manifested, ... where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is
155
Also, specific terms
interpreted in accordance with that meaninf: .... "
56
are given greater weight than general terms, and terms that are negotiated
or a term is plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be determined from the
four comers of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind[,]" though
some plain-meaning jurisdictions admit evidence of surrounding circumstances) Thus, if the
court follows the plain meaning rule and the language is unambiguous on its face, no
extrinsic evidence (other than perhaps surrounding circumstances) is admitted to determine
which party was more at fault for the misunderstanding (the party who attached a meaning
different from the plain meaning is deemed more at fault). This is true even if the extrinsic
evidence would show that the parties attached the same meaning to the word, a meaning that
is different from its plain meaning. Under the Second Restatement and U.C.C. approach,
any relevant evidence is admitted to determine the meaning of contract language.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 200-204 (1981); u.c.c. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (2013).
There is considerable tension between the plain meaning rule and the rule followed in some
jurisdictions that extrinsic evidence is admissible to give meaning to a latent ambiguity. See,
e.g., 21 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, 21 TENN. PRACTICE: CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE§ 8:56
(2012) ("A major problem in Tennessee contracts jurisprudence, unacknowledged in the
decisions, is the tension between the plain meaning rule and the latent ambiguity principle.
When the contractual text contains no clue that the words might mean more than they say,
the parties' litigation positions will be predictable. One party will say that the terms should
receive their usual, ordinary, and plain meaning, limited by the four corners rule, and no
need exists for further construction. The other party will respond that the rule of latent
ambiguity entitles the party to present extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning, even though
the words are clear on their face. Many decisions support both viewpoints; some courts and
commentators have acknowledged the difficulty ofreconciling these principles.").
153
POSNER, supra note 90, at 126.
154
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 201 cmt. b (1981). Professor Perillo refers
to this as a "watered-down version of the plain meaning rule[.]" PERILLO, supra note 2,
§ 3.13, at 137.
155
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 202(3)(a) (1981).
156
Id. § 203(c).
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between the parties are given greater weight than standardized terms.
158
Under the ejusdem generis canon (Latin for "of the same kind or class"),
"where a contractual clause enumerates specific things, general words
following the enumeration are interpreted to be restricted to things of the
159
same kind as those specifically listed."
Similarly, under the noscitur a
sociis canon (Latin for "it is known by its associates"), "the meaning of an
unclear word or ~hrase should be determined by the words immediately
1
surrounding it."
Under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon
(Latin for "expression of one thing is exclusion of another"), "to exclude
161
one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative."
Another canon provides "that if two terms in a writing conflict, the first
162
Also, under the "last antecedent rule," when it is unclear
term controls."
which word a qualifying phrase refers to, it is construed as applying to the
163
Because the party who chooses vague or ambiguous
last antecedent.
language is "more likely than the other party to have reason to know of
164
uncertainties of meaning,"
vague or ambiguous language is usually
165
construed against the party who chose it.
And "consistent with a policy
166
of avoiding forfeiture and unjust enrichment,"
doubts are generally
resolved in favor of construing the occurrence of an event as a promise and
. . 167
not an express con ditlon.
Because courts apply a fault standard and other policies to determine
meaning in the case of a misunderstanding and do not require that the
parties attach the same meaning to the term, "the meaning of the words or
other conduct of a party is not necessarily the meaning he expects or
168
understands."
Thus, as a result of the objective theory of contract and
157

Id. § 203(d).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 594.
159
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.13, at 137.
160
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 1160-61.
161
Id. at 661.
162
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 3.13, at 136.
163
Wohl v. Swinney, 888 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 (Ohio 2008).
164
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (I 981 ).
165
Id. § 206. "[T]he rule is in practice a makeweight rather than a tie breaker."
Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
Most jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule when the non-drafting party is a
sophisticated party who was represented by an attorney during the drafting process. Id. at
858.
166
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 227 cmt. b (1981).
167
See id. § 227(1 ).
168
Id. § 200 cmt. b (1981). The party whose meaning does not apply might, however,
avoid the contract under the doctrine of mistake. Id. § 20 illus. 4; § 153 illus. 5, 6. In such a
situation, however, the mistaken party would have to demonstrate that "the effect of the
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable," since the
158
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other aids to interpretation and construction, most misunderstandings in fact
will not result in indefiniteness in law.
Also, where the evidence shows that "the parties have attached the same
meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof [a so-called mutual
169
And
understanding], it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."
importantly, part performance after the bargain is formed may show a
shared meaning of an indefinite term. 170 "The parties to an agreement
know best what they meant, and their action under it is often the strongest
evidence of their meaning." 171 Thus, an alleged misunderstanding by one
party might turn out, according to the fact finder, to have not been a
misunderstanding at all.
Similarly, conflicting language in a written document might simply have
been a drafting error by the parties in reducing the bargain's terms to
written form (a so-called "mistake in expression" or "mistake in
integration"). 172 In such a situation, there is no misunderstanding regarding
the bargain's actual terms, just a drafting error, and if such an error is
proven by clear, strong, and convincing evidence, the court may reform the
173
written document to reflect the parties' actual bargain.

mistake is considered a unilateral mistake, not a mutual mistake. Id. § 153(a); see also id.
cmt. b.
169
Id. § 201(1); see also Berke Mcore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 A.2d 150, 156
(N.H. 1953). The Second Restatement uses the phrase "mutual understanding" for when the
parties attach the same meaning to a term. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 201 cmt. c (1981). As previously discussed, in those jurisdictions that follow the plain
meaning rule, extrinsic evidence showing that the parties attached the same meaning to a
particular word might never be admitted into evidence, and the meaning used by the court
might, therefore, be different from the meaning attached by the parties. See PERILLO, supra
note 2, § 3.10, at 130.
170
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 34 cmt. c (1981).
171
Id. § 202 cmt. g; see also U.C.C. § 2-208 cmt. 1 (1978) (repealed 2001) ("The parties
themselves know best what they have meant by their words of agreement and their action
under that agreement is the best indication of what that meaning was."); Patterson, supra
note 72, at 836 (noting that under the doctrine of "practical construction," the parties
"conduct during the course of performance may support inferences as to the meaning of
language in the contract").
172
See DAWSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 421 (referring to a drafting error as a "mistake
in expression" or "mistake in integration").
173
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 155 & cmt. c (1981); Benyon Bldg.
Corp. v. Nat'! Guardian Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Hoffman v.
Chapman, 34 A.2d 438, 439 (Md. 1943).
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III. WHY PARTIES ENTER INTO INDEFINITE BARGAINS

There are many reasons why parties enter into bargains with indefinite
terms. First, the parties might not have thought about a particular matter,
particularly because it is difficult if not impossible for the parties to foresee
all of the problems that might arise. 174 Second, the parties might not want
to spend the time addressing particular matters, especially about events
unlikely to occur or that seem unimportant at the time. 175 Even for
problems that are foreseeable or even foreseen, persons have limited
attention and "give [this] 'limited attention' only to a limited number of
situations which they choose by some initial process of selection." 176 In
particular, time might be of the essence and the parties do not have the
opportunity to address all of the issues that they otherwise would. Third,
the parties might not want to raise a troublesome issue that might cause
delay or the deal to collapse, "perhaps in the hope that the problem may
never arise or that if it does it can be better dealt with on a business basis
after a specific dispute has arisen." 177 The parties might, therefore, not
address the topic at all or agree upon a vague term, comfortable to let the
matter be decided by the appropriate forum if necessary. 178
174
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981) ("The parties to an agreement may entirely fail to foresee
the situation which later arises and gives rise to a dispute .... "); Farnsworth, supra note 40,
at 871 ("Fate may outstrip even the most sybilline [sic] draftsman, with a probability that
increases with the life of the contract.").
175
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981) (noting that the parties might not address a matter because
"the situation seems to be unimportant or unlikely" to occur); Ayres & Gertner, supra note
95, at 92-93 ("Scholars have primarily attributed incompleteness to the costs of contracting.
Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a
given contingency are greater than the benefits. These transaction costs may include legal
fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether
a contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of
contractually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the probability
of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that contingency even if
transaction costs are quite low." (citations omitted)).
176
Farnsworth, supra note 40, at 869.
177
Id. at 872; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 202 ("Another common cause of
indefiniteness is the parties' reluctance to raise difficult issues for fear that the deal might
fall through."); Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956 ("[O]ne or both [of the parties] may have
foreseen the problem but deliberately refrained from raising it during the negotiations for
fear that they might fail-the lawyer who 'wakes these sleeping dogs' by insisting that they
be resolved may cost his client the bargain."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204
cmt. b (1981) ("[D]iscussion of it might be unpleasant or might produce delay or impasse.").
178
See Farnsworth, supra note 60, at 956. This often occurs when an employer and a
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Fourth, the parties might raise the issue but not be able to agree on a term
179
to cover the matter and, thus, leave a gap or agree to use a vague term.
Fifth, the parties might "have expectations but fail to manifest them, either
because the expectation rests on an assumption which is unconscious or
180
only partly conscious."
Sixth, "it may be difficult to formulate orally or
write down a term that would properly reflect" the parties' agreement about
. 1ar event occurrmg.
. 181
the consequences of a part1cu
Seventh, the parties might reach an oral agreement or prepare a draft
written agreement with the intention of preparing a more detailed written
document, but before do in~ so, one of the parties repudiates, leaving behind
1 2
Eighth, it might be advantageous to avoid
an agreement with gaps.
specificity, particularly when dealing with long-term agreements that might
183
require flexibility.
Ninth, the drafters of a written contract might simply
184
.
be c1umsy or mept.
Tenth, the parties might not realize that they each attach a different
· to a part1cu
. 1ar term. 185 El eventh, a party wit. h more m1ormatton
. ;:
.
meamng
about a particular matter (a situation of so-called "asymmetric
186
information")
might strategically withhold that information to avoid
having to pay a higher contract Jrice that would result if the information
1
Twelfth, an offeror might intentionally
were known to the other party.
union draft a collective bargaining agreement. See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1491 (1959) ("The pressure to reach agreement is so
great that the parties are often willing to contract although each knows that the other places a
different meaning upon the words and they share only the common intent to postpone the
issue and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required.").
179
Societe Franco Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1961] 2 Q.B. 278, 299
(1960); see also Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 37 n.128 (2007) (noting that the parties
might have chosen a vague term because they could not agree on a more precise term).
180
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. b (1981).
181
Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 107 (2000).
182
A contract can be formed even though the parties manifested an intention to prepare a
written document evidencing the bargain and then failed to do so. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 27 (1981).
183
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
114-15 (6th ed. 2010).
184
Id. at 101. This is the most likely cause of ambiguities of syntax and conflicting
terms.
185
See Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Paro/
Evidence and Use of the "Just Result" Principle, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 649-50 (1998)
("Parties may sometimes attach different meanings to the very same words or phrases,
ignoring the other party's understanding.").
186
Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 109.
187
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 94. An example would be a consumer who
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make the offer's terms vague to render the bargain unenforceable, while
requiring the offeree to perform first, and, thus, potentially obtaining the
188
benefit of the offeree 's performance without having to himself perform.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF THE REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS REQUIREMENT
Despite the various rules of law that help make those bargains that are
indefinite in fact become definite in law (such as through gap filling and the
objective theory of contract), some bargains will remain indefinite in law.
Thus, it is necessary for the law to have rules regarding the effect of
indefiniteness on a bargain's enforceability.
The Second Restatement provides that "[e ]ven though a manifestation of
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain." 189 Similarly, there is no manifestation of mutual assent if the
parties attach materially different meanings to the bargain's terms (a
misunderstanding) and neither party is more at fault than the other for the
190
misunderstanding.
The Reporter's Note to the Second Restatement's misunderstanding
section states that "[i]f a term is so vague that the court cannot interpret it,
the court should decide enforceability as an issue of the requirement of
reasonable certainty in contracts," and that "[a] contract should be held
nonexistent under this Section only when the misunderstanding goes to
conflicting and irreconcilable meanings of a material term that could have
either but not both meanings." 191 Accordingly, the reasonably certain terms
requirement applies to indefiniteness caused by gaps and vague words, and
demands a warranty, signaling to the other party that the consumer places a high value on
the requested performance. Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 109.
188
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 105-06 (referring to this as the "perverse
incentive" to offer an intentionally unenforceable bargain).
189
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981).
190
Id. § 20(1); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (Mark
DeWolfHowe ed., Belknap Press 1963) (1881) ("[E]ach [party] said a different thing. The
plaintiff offered one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another."). Under the
Second Restatement's test, the bargain fails to be a contract if neither party knew of the
meaning attached by the other, but each had "reason to know" of the meaning attached by
the other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 20(1) (1981). Thus, the Second
Restatement adopts a contributory negligence standard, not a comparative negligence
standard, which seems inconsistent with the Second Restatement's general preference for
saving bargains. When there is no manifestation of mutual assent because of a material
misunderstanding, the court does not replace the term that was the subject of the
misunderstanding with what it considers a "reasonable term" in the circumstances. Speidel,
supra note 53, at 802-03.
191
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 20 reporter's note (1981).
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the misunderstanding doctrine applies to indefiniteness caused by
ambiguous language. 192 Thus, this Article (which deals with the reasonably
certain terms requirement) will not further address, in detail, the issue of
ambiguous language.
The Second Restatement comment explains that the reasonably certain
terms requirement "reflects the fundamental policy that contracts should be
made by the parties, not by the courts .... " 193 But "[w]here the parties
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
granting a remedy, the same policy [that contracts should be made by the
parties] supports the granting of the remedy." 194 Thus, the doctrine is
premised on the related ideas that contract law should enforce agreements
made by the parties, but avoid imposing duties upon them that were not
voluntarily assumed. This statement of the reasonably certain terms
requirement's policy is, however, somewhat misleading (and not
particularly helpful) because of the Second Restatement's position that
courts should aggressively fill gaps with implied-in-law terms. 195
Under the Second Restatement's test, a bargain's terms are "reasonably
certain" as long as "they provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 196 As noted by Professor
Joseph Perillo, "an agreement must be sufficiently definite before a court
Although the First
can determine if either party breached it." 197
192

Although the reporter's notes are not approved by the council or ALI, see Wechsler,
supra note 13, at 150-51, reporter's notes to uniform laws are given substantial weight. See
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities:
The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 629, 669 n.272 (2001) ("Reporters' notes for uniform
laws ... receive great weight.").
193
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981).
194
195

Id.
See id. § 204 ("When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have

not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and
duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."). Although
this black letter rule suggests that gap filling does not occur until after it is determined that a
contract was formed, the comments to the Second Restatement's section on reasonably
certain terms suggests otherwise. See id. § 33 cmt. a ("[I]n recurring situations the law often
supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the contrary."); id. cmt. b ("It is less likely
that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by construction as to a matter which has been
the subject of controversy between the parties than as to one which is raised only as an
afterthought.").
196
Id. § 33(2). A comment to the Second Restatement refers to this as a "minimum
standard ofcertainty." Id. § 362 cmt. a.
197
PERILLO, supra note 2, § 2.9, at 44; see also CORBIN, supra note 2, § 95, at 143 ("A
court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. a (1981) ("If the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no
basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract.").
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Restatement required that the terms of an offer be sufficiently definite, 198
the current view is that the bargain, not the offer, must be sufficiently
definite, which takes into account that some offers permit the offeree to
select among different terms. 199 The Second Restatement's test was
modeled after the U.C.C.'s reasonably certain terms provision,200 which
provides that "[ e]ven though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy." 201
The tolerated degree of indefiniteness has grown over time. 202 Classical
contract law (the law that developed in the nineteenth century and that
198

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 34(1) (1981); PERILLO, supra note 2,
§ 2.9, at44.
200
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note l, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code." (remark by Reporter Robert
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's
terms be reasonably certain)).
201
u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (2013).
202
The indefiniteness doctrine dates to at least the late sixteenth century. See A.W.
BRIAN SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION
OF AssUMPSIT 532 (1975) (referencing the 1594 decision of Sackford v. Phillips, Moo. K.B.
689 (1594)). By the seventeenth century, one of the recognized defenses to an assumpsit
action was that the contract was not "clear and certain." KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 81, 83 (1990). In 1641, in William
Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances, which was an attempt "to impose some
order upon the development of assumpsit[,]" it was stated that a requirement of a contract or
a promise was that it be "clear and certain." SIMPSON, supra, at 506 (internal citation
omitted). This requirement was related to the need to have certainty in the issue to be tried
by the jury. See TEEVEN, supra, at 83 ("The requirement is associated with the need to plead
to the issue in trial by jury by averring the promise with certainty."); SIMPSON, supra, at 532
("If in the action of assumpsit this certainty in the issue was to be achieved, the promise
must itself be averred with certainty .... "). Importantly, though, "[t]he principle applied
both to the promise sued upon and to a promise averred as a consideration, for the latter was
not a good consideration unless itself actionable, and to be actionable it must be certain." Id.
Thus, the definiteness requirement was premised on both the practical need to determine a
breach as well as the requirement of mutuality. Early English decisions applying the
definiteness requirement were somewhat inconsistent. For example, a promise to pay £100
within a "short time" in return for a promise to deliver two oxen within a "short time" was
held too indefinite to enforce as was a promise to forbear from suing for a "little time." See
TEEVEN, supra, at 83 n.74, (citing Tolhurst v. Brickenden, Cro. Jae. 250, 1 Rolle Rep. 5; 1
Buist. 91 (1610)); see also SIMPSON, supra, at 532. In contrast, promises to forbear from
suing for a "reasonable time" and a "great time" were held sufficiently definite. Id. (citing
Treford v. Holmes, Hutton 108 (1628), and Mapes v. Sir Isaac Sidney, Hutton 46, Cro. Jae.
683 (1621)). Also, even when a promise to forbear was not limited to any time, the court
would provide that it "be a total forbearance, or at least a forbearance for a convenient
199
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dominated into the early twentieth century)203 was particularly concerned
with a court not creating a bargain for the parties or creating the bargain's
terms, as evidenced by rules making it difficult to form a contract while at
the same time refusing to infer terms excusing non-performance. 204
Classical contract law, therefore, also exhibited intolerance for
indefiniteness. 205
But in the twentieth century it was generally accepted that contract law
went beyond merely implementing the parties' intentions and necessarily
involved making policy choices. 206 With such a concession, courts became
more willing to risk error in determining the terms of the parties' bargain,
and made saving the bargain a priority. Thus, so-called modem contract
law, 207 or neoclassical contract law, 208 liberalized the formal rules regarding
time .... " SIMPSON, supra, at 451 (quoting Mapes v. Sir Isaac Sidney, Hutton 46, Cro. Jae.
683 (1621)). Similarly, "[a]ssumpsit permitted market values or a reasonableness standard
to be read into a promise [to pay for services]." TEEVEN, supra, at 83. For example, "[i]n
the late sixteenth century it came to be settled that the action of assumpsit would lie where
the plaintiff averred a promise to pay an uncertain sum .... " SIMPSON, supra, at 65. Thus,
even though "[w]ell before the nineteenth century, the common law had a certainty
requirement associated with the need to plead a promise with certainty in trial by
jury, ... this did not stand in the way of market values and reasonable standards being read
into promises in Assumpsit actions." TEEVEN, supra, at 238.
203
See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 855 n.2
(1978) ("Classical contract law refers ... to that developed in the 19th century and brought
to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920) and in
the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).").
204
GILMORE, supra note 62, at 49-53.
205
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law ofRelational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 805, 817 (2000).
206
See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 577 (1933)
("When courts ... proceed to interpret the terms of the contract they are generally not
merely seeking to discover the actual past meanings (though these may sometimes be
investigated), but more generally they decide the 'equities,' the rights and obligations of the
parties, in such circumstances; and these legal relations are determined by the courts and the
jural system and not by the agreed will of the contesting parties."); Jay M. Feinman, The
Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1990) ("The problems of
classical contract law quickly became apparent to judicial and scholarly commentators.
Contractual liability, like all other legal liability, did not arise solely from the individual's
choice but came from the court's imposition oflegal obligation as a matter of public policy;
a contract was binding because the court determined that imposing liability served social
interests, not because the individual had voluntarily assumed liability through his
manifestation of assent.").
207
See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract
Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 766 (2002) ("It has become a commonplace observation
among contract writers and teachers that American contract law underwent a major
evolution during roughly the middle half of the last century, from the 'classical' contract law

206

University ofHawai'i Law Review I Vol. 36:169

formation and construction. For example, the U.C.C. provided that "[a]
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract[,]"209 and provided that "[a]n agreement
sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the
moment of its making is undeterrnined."210 The U.C.C. even rejected "one
of the sacred rubrics of classical contract law,"211 the mirror-image
rule, 212 which required that an acceptance match the offer's terms in order
to form an agreement. 213
Likewise, the rules applicable to definiteness were liberalized214 with
indefinite bargains to be enforced if at all possible, as long as the parties
had intended to make a contract (presumably still determined
objectively). 215 As previously indicated, the U.C.C. provided that "[e]ven
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for
indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."216 The general
purpose of this provision was "to prevent the courts from requiring strictly
that everything be clearly and definitely settled before the Court will find
that a contract was formed." 217 In fact, a "major innovation of Article 2
[was] its abandonment--0r at least its minimization--0f the common law
requirements of certainty."218 As stated by Chancellor Murray, "The Code
standard, in effect, is indefiniteness be damned, as long as two critical

exemplified by the teaching and writings of Professors Langdell and Williston to what some
of us at least are accustomed to calling 'modern' contract law.").
208
See Feinman, supra note 31, at 738 (referring to the law of the U.C.C. and the Second
Restatement as neoclassical contract law "because it addresses the shortcomings of classical
law rather than offering a wholly different conception of the law").
209
u.c.c. § 2-204(1) (2013).
210
Id. § 2-204(2).
211
John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise ofNeoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869, 888 (2002).
212
u.c.c. § 2-207.
213
See Eggleston et al., supra note 181, at 114 ("The common-law mirror image
rule holds that a contract is not formed unless the offer and acceptance are identical.").
214
TEEVEN, supra note 202, at 261.
215
The Official Comment to the U.C.C. recognized, however, that "[t]he more terms the
parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding
agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter despite omissions."
U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (2013).
216
Id. § 2-204(3).
217
STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 86, at 274 (remark by Professor Edwin W.
Patterson).
218
Snyder, supra note 179, at 36.
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elements are present: a manifested intention to make a contract and a
reasonably certain basis from which a court may afford a remedy."219
The Second Restatement followed suit, stating in a comment that if "the
actions of the parties ... show conclusively that they have intended to
conclude a binding agreement, even though one or more terms are missing
or are left to be agreed upon ... courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a
sufficiently definite meaning to the bargain." 220 As noted by Professor
Robert Braucher (the Reporter for the Second Restatement section dealing
with formation), 221 the Second Restatement's test, "harmonizing with the
Uniform Commercial Code and with a growing body of authority, tends
toward greater toleration of indefiniteness and more readiness to enforce
agreements where the parties intended to be bound."222
However, because the line between enforcing the parties' bargain and
creating a different bargain will often be fuzzy, "it will always be difficult
to draw lines between definite and indefinite promises."223 Of course, if
there is a gap that relates to an important matter, and the gap relates to a
particularly subjective matter for which there is no statutory or judiciallyrecognized default rule to fill in the gap, then the contract is too indefinite
to enforce.
With respect to vague language, "uncertainty as to incidental or collateral
matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract."224 Thus, vague
language threatens to prevent the formation of a contract only when the
language relates to an important term of the bargain. It appears likely that
the Second Restatement implicitly adopts the approach it takes to contracts
that have a term that is against public policy: that the rest of the bargain
would remain enforceable as long as the promise that is too indefinite to
enforce "is not an essential part of the agreed exchange."225
Promises will usually be considered too vague to enforce when they are
"subject to a broad range of equally-plausible interpretations" such "that the
219
John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 742 (1982).
220
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. a (1981).
221
Professor Braucher served as the Reporter from 1962 to 1971, at which time he was
appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Herbert Wechsler,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS foreword ( 1981 ).
222
Braucher, supra note 8, at 307.
223
ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 119 (2011); see also PERILLO, supra
note 2, § 2.9, at 44 ("The rule does not supply a precise standard. Indefiniteness is a matter
of degree.").
224
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. a (1981); see also id§ 201 cmt. d
("There may be a binding contract despite failure to agree as to a term, if the term is not
essential .... ").
225
Id. § 184(1).
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intention of the parties cannot be ascertained."226 Stated another way, a
promise will be considered too indefinite because of vagueness if the
language chosen makes it a meaningless expression of what the parties
intended. 227 Or, to take account of the objective theory of contract, a
promise will be considered too indefinite because of vagueness if the
language chosen makes it too difficult to determine what a reasonable
person would believe it to mean.
The difficult question, of course, is how broad the range of plausible
meanings must be before one cannot ascertain, within an acceptable margin
of error, what a reasonable person would believe the vague language
means. Deciding when the range is too broad necessarily involves: (1)
deciding how broad the usual range may be (the typical acceptable range),
which requires the court to decide whether to err on the side of overenforcement or under-enforcement (the Second Restatement erring on the
side of over-enforcement); (2) adjusting the typical acceptable range based
on the importance to the bargain of the particular term (the adjusted
acceptable range); 228 and (3) then comparing the adjusted acceptable range
to the court's view on how broad a reasonable person would consider the
range of plausible meanings to be in the particular bargain based on the
bargain's language and context (the bargain's range of vagueness). If the
bargain's range of vagueness exceeds the adjusted acceptable range, the
bargain should be considered too indefinite to enforce. If the bargain's
range of vagueness does not exceed the adjusted acceptable range, the
bargain should be considered sufficiently definite.
For example (and to take the cases at the far ends), if a court believes the
typical acceptable range is broad because it errs on the side of overenforcement, the court views the term as not particularly important, and the
vague language is not subject to a particularly broad range of plausible
meanings, the court will find that the bargain is not too indefinite. To the
contrary, if a court believes the typical acceptable range is narrow because
it errs on the side of under-enforcement, the court views the term as

226

Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 802 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
See Patterson, supra note 72, at 835 ("An action has been brought upon an alleged
contract which has vague and meaningless expressions of what would normally be important
terms; e.g., the quality and quantity of goods are vague, and so is the price. In such a case
the symbolic conduct will ordinarily be adjudged to be too indefinite to be enforced. 'The
court cannot make a contract for the parties,' is the basic policy.").
228
See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 3, topic 3, § 33 cmt. a (198l)("Where
the parties have intended to conclude a bargain, uncertainty as to incidental or collateral
matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract. If the essential terms are so uncertain
that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no
contract." (emphasis added)).
227
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important, and the vague language is subject to a particularly broad range of
plausible meanings, the court will find that the bargain is too indefinite.
Promises of vague services, or promises conditioned on the performance
of vague services, are often considered too indefinite. For example, a
promise to convey land "for services to be rendered" was held too
indefinite. 229 A promise to leave a business to the promisee if the promisee
would "attend" to it was held too indefinite. 230 A promise to provide
employment, without specifying its nature, is considered too indefinite to
enforce.231 Vague promises to care for or help out the promisee tend to be
too indefinite for the courts. For example, a promise to "help" the promisee
was found too indefinite. 232 Qualifying the type of service with a vague
adjective often does not help. For example, a promise to an employee of
"fair" treatment was considered too indefinite,233 as was a promise to give a
sibling "a good education."234 A promise to "take care of [the promisee] in
a very comfortable way" was held too vague to enforce.2 35 Whether a
promise to use "best efforts" is too indefinite depends largely on the
circumstances of the bargain. 236
Promised payments of an unspecified amount (which would be a gap) or
an amount qualified by a vague adjective (which would be the use of a
vague word) also tend to be too indefinite, if the court believes the range of
the possible amount under a reasonable interpretation would be too broad.
Thus, an employer's promise to an employee of "reasonable salary
increases" and "reasonable annual bonuses" was held too indefinite. 237 A
promise to another party for the opportunity to obtain more funds from the
promisor in the future without specifying an amount (or a time period
within which to provide them) was too indefinite. 238
Promises of

229
1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Sherman v. Kitsmiller, 17
Serg. & Rawle 45, 1827 WL 2754 (Pa. Oct. 19, 1827)).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232

Mooney v. Mooney, 538 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 607-08 (Mich. 1993)
234
l WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Bumpus v. Bumpus, 19
N.W. 29 (Mich. 1884)).
235
Cohn v. Levy, 725 N.Y.S.2d 376, 376 (App. Div. 2001); see also Dombrowski v.
Somers, 362 N.E.2d 257, 258 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that the phrase "take care of' was too
vague to be enforced). But see Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917)
(enforcing a promise to maintain and care for the promisee).
236
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in
Contract Law, 46 U. PIIT. L. REV. 1, 8 (1984).
237
Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 799 (1993), overruled on other
grounds by Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994).
238
Jensen v. Oliver, No. 97 C 1018, 1998 WL 673829, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1998).
233
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employment without identifying the compensation have also been held too
indefinite to enforce. 239 Although the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement
direct courts to supply a price term if the parties intended to conclude a
bargain (a reasonable price at the time the goods are to be delivered or the
services are to be provided), this only applies when "nothing is said as to
price," "the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree,"
or "the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard
as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or
recorded. "240
But presumably because the reasonable range for time for performance
tends to be narrow (and presumably not as an important matter as the
services to be provided or the price to be paid), vague references to the time
for performance tend not to be too indefinite to enforce. Thus, a promise to
perform "immediately," ''at once," "promptly," "as soon as possible," or "in
about one month" are not too indefinite. 241
The indefiniteness doctrine is narrowed somewhat by the doctrines of
cure-by-concession (a type of waiver) and modification. Under the cureby-concession doctrine, indefiniteness will be removed if one of the parties,
after the bargain's formation, concedes to the meaning attached by the other
party (or to the most favorable meaning possible for the other party). 242
239

I WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:26, at 787 (citing Lester v. Pet Dairy
Products Co., 246 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1957). But a promise to pay a "generous" reward for
the return of lost property was considered sufficiently definite. See Greene v. Heinrich, 300
N.Y.S.2d 236, 239 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) (enforcing the promise of a "generous" reward and
concluding that I 0% of the value of the returned property would be "generous"), afj"d, 319
N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Term), ajf'd, 372 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div. 1971).
240
U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2013); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt.
e (1981) (adopting rule set forth in U.C.C. § 2-305(1)).
241
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33 illus. 3 (1981).
242
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 212; see also Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to
Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 389, 393
("[T]here is a substantial line of cases in which the parties left the payment terms open 'to be
agreed upon,' where courts applied the doctrine of 'cure by concession' and allowed the
buyer to enforce the deal if she agrees to make a full payment in cash and with no delay,
namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller."). The cure-by-concession doctrine is
impliedly accepted by the Second Restatement's use of the doctrine in an illustration and its
reference in a comment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 illus. 2 (1981)
("A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract ofland for $10,000, $4,000 in cash and $6,000
on mortgage. A agrees to obtain the mortgage loan for B or, if unable to do so, to lend B the
amount, but the terms of loan are not stated, although both parties manifest an intent to
conclude a binding agreement. The contract is too indefinite to support a decree of specific
performance against B, but B may obtain such a decree if he offers to pay the full price in
cash." (emphasis added)); see also id. § 201 cmt. d. ("In some cases a party can waive the
misunderstanding and enforce the contract in accordance with the understanding of the other
party.").
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Similarly, "part performance ... may have the effect of eliminating
indefinite alternatives by ... modification."243
An indefinite offer of a bilateral contract might be construed as also
offering a unilateral contract that is incorporated within, but divisible from,
the offer of the bilateral contract. 244 The Second Restatement provides the
following illustration:
A says to B: "I will employ you for some time at $10 a day." An acceptance
by B either orally or in writing will not create a contract. But if B serves one
245
or more days with A's assent A is bound to pay $10 for each day's service.

Further, "[a]n express or implied promise may be found to reimburse
expenses incurred pursuant to the indefinite agreement." 246 The Second
Restatement provides the following illustration:
A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific house and lot for $10,000, mortgage
terms to be agreed. At B's request, reinforced by a threat not to perform, A
makes certain alterations in the house, which add nothing to its value. B then
repudiates the agreement without reference to mortgage terms. A may recover
the cost of alterations. 247

Recovery could presumably be had under a bargain theory, based on an
offer of a unilateral contract that was accepted by making the alterations.

243

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34 cmt. c (1981).
Id. cmt. d.
245
Id. illus. 4 (emphasis added).
246
Id. cmt. d.
247
Id. illus. 5 (emphasis added). The illustration was based on the well-known case of
Kearns v. Andree, 139 A. 695 (Conn. 1928), a case that permitted recovery under quasicontract (not an actual contract). See id. reporter's note, cmt. d ("Illustration 5 is based on
Keams v. Andree, 107 Conn. 181, 139 A. 695 (1928) ... .");see also Kearns, 139 A. at 698.
Professor Braucher believed that a restitution remedy would not be appropriate in such a
situation, presumably because no benefit was received by the promisor, and thus the remedy
had to flow from a promise. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note I, at 326-27 ("We
have tried to distinguish in the new [section on "certainty"] between those cases where the
part performance of the contract eliminates the uncertainty and thus forms a contract and
those cases, of which there are some, where the part performance does not eliminate the
uncertainty, but nevertheless makes a contractual remedy appropriate, particularly in cases
where there would be unjust enrichment otherwise. In such cases the Restatement of
Restitution provides that there may be recovery of benefits conferred under a contract which
is too indefinite to be enforced, but the restitutionary remedy is not always the appropriate
remedy, and we have stated that in subsection (3), and the illustrations drawn from actual
cases make it clear that courts do sometimes give contractual remedies after part
performance, even though the contract would be too indefinite if it were entirely executory
on both sides." (rema~k by Reporter Robert Braucher regarding the "certainty" section of the
Second Restatement) (emphasis added)).
244
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Also, the Second Restatement takes the position that a promisee can
assert a claim under promissory estoppel when a bargain did not result in
the formation of a contract because it lacked reasonably certain terms. 248
Of course, if it is the defendant's promise that is indefinite, and such
indefiniteness prevents the plaintiff from proving a breach, the claim would
fail. 249 Also, even if the plaintiff can establish a breach, she would have to
establish promissory estoppel's demanding standards, including the
requirement of reliance and the requirement that "injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. " 250 If a plaintiff is suing for breach of
contract, the plaintiff does not have to show actual reliance on the bargain
to prevail. 251
Under promissory estoppel, not only does the promisee have to establish
reliance on the promise,252 the reasonableness of the reliance and whether it
was of a definite and substantial character are factors to be considered in
deciding whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. 253
Also, the promise's formality is taken into account. 254 Thus, whereas
promises made as part of a bargain usually do not require any particular
form to be enforceable, a promise's informal nature could result in the court
refusing to enforce it under a promissory estoppel theory.
Further, when the promise is enforced under promissory estoppel, "[t]he
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."255 Thus,
although full-scale enforcement by protecting the promisee's expectation
interest is often appropriate in a promissory estoppel case, the same factors
that bear on whether the promise should be enforced will be considered by
the court in deciding whether a lesser remedy is appropriate. 256
Accordingly, in some instances the court will decide that protecting the

248

See Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (D. Mass. 2011)
("[T]he Restatement 'has expressly approved' promissory estoppel's use to protect reliance
on indefinite promises." (citing Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory
Estoppel and Reliance on Illusory Promises, 44 Sw. L.J. 841, 842 (1990))).
249
See Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Seif-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REv.
1397, 1440 n.178 (2009) ("[I]n some jurisdictions, a promissory estoppel claim is available
to recover expenses made in reliance on an indefinite agreement if the indefiniteness does
not preclude a finding of breach.").
250
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
251
See id. § 19 cmt. c ("[N]o ... change of position ... is necessary to the formation of a
bargain . . . . [T]he law must take account of the fact that in a society largely founded on
credit bargains will be relied on in subtle ways, difficult or incapable of proof.").
252
Id. § 90( 1).
253
Id. § 90 cmt. b.
254 Id.
255
256

Id.§ 90(1).
Id. § 90 cmt. d.
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promisee 's reliance or restitution interest is justified in lieu of protecting the
.
,
.
.
257
prom1see s expectation mterest.
V. REMOVING THE UNCERTAINTY FROM THE SECOND RESTATEMENT'S
TEST FOR REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS

Despite trying to spell out what is really meant by the reasonably certain
terms requirement,258 the Second Restatement fails to expressly address two
important questions about its test: (1) must the plaintiffs promise be
sufficiently definite; and (2) what is an "appropriate" remedy? The answers
to these questions depend primarily on whether the Second Restatement
directs the court to assess indefiniteness as of the time of the bargain's
formation (thus directing courts to ignore post-formation events) or at the
time of the lawsuit (thus directing courts to consider such events).
If assessed as of the time of formation, both parties' promises must be
sufficiently definite because at the time of formation it would not have been
known which party would breach. Also, only an award protecting the
parties' expectation interests would be an appropriate remedy because at the
time of formation neither party would have yet relied on the bargain. In
such a case, the Second Restatement would treat the reasonably certain
terms requirement as a so-called "legal formality," which, as previously
noted, is a requirement that a bargain be in a particular form to be a contract
and which at times operates contrary to the parties' intentions.259
If assessed at the time of the lawsuit, it would not be a requirement that
the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite because the plaintiffs
promise will not always be relevant to resolving the dispute before the
court. Also, a remedy short of protecting the plaintiffs expectation interest
might be an appropriate remedy because the plaintiff might have relied on
the bargain and might be seeking only reliance damages. In such a case the
257

Id. The promisee's restitution interest "is his interest in having restored to him any
benefit that he has conferred on the other party." Id. § 344(c).
258
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note l, at 326 ("[W]e have tried to be a little
more helpful in spelling out what is meant by [the reasonably certain terms
requirement] .... " (remark by Reporter Robert Braucher regarding the Second
Restatement's provision on the requirement that a contract's terms be reasonably certain)).
259
See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-94 (discussing legal formalities and noting that
"they operate through the contradiction of private intentions" and that "the formality means
that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting their wishes, they will be
ignored"); id. at 1692, 1698 (referring to the "sanction of nullity''); Perillo, supra note 23, at
41 n.22 ("[T]he term 'form' or 'formality' means any manner of expressing or
memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual expression."); Klass, supra
note 23, at 1743 ("A legal formality is a type of act, such as the utterance of special words or
the production of a document in a certain form, that has no extralegal significance.").

214

University of Hawai 'i Law Review I Vol. 36: 169

Second Restatement would not treat the reasonably certain terms
requirement as a legal formality and would treat it as simply having a
practical aspect (i.e., its purpose would be to enable the court to resolve the
dispute before it).
The language of the Second Restatement's rule in section 33 (no contract
260
is formed),
along with the rule's placement in the chapter titled
"Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent," 261 suggests that the ALI intends
indefiniteness to be assessed as of the time of the bargain's formation. 262
This would mean the court should ignore post-formation events and that the
requirement has only a formal aspect. But the Second Restatement sends
mixed signals and thereby creates confusion because the supporting
comment b. and its illustrations suggest that indefiniteness should be
assessed at the time of the lawsuit and, thus, has a practical aspect. For
example, the supporting comment states that "the degree of certainty
required may be affected by the dispute which arises and by the remedy
sought. Courts decide the disputes before them, not other hypothetical
disputes which might have arisen."263
260
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981) ("Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis
added)).
261
See id. ch. 3 (titled "Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent").
262
The rule's language even suggests that an apparent offer without reasonably certain
terms is no offer at all. See id. § 33(1) (referring to "a manifestation of intention [that] is
intended to be understood as an offer .. .. "(emphasis added)).
263
Id. § 33 cmt. b. Leading contracts scholars generally accept that the Second
Restatement test has solely a practical purpose, and has lost any role as a legal formality.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel,
Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 475-76 (1987)
("Under both the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and more modem case law in some
jurisdictions [as well as the Second Restatement's test] it is sufficient that the terms have
been worked out with sufficient certainty to support a conclusion that the parties intended to
be bound provided that the indefiniteness is not relevant to the remedy requested by the
plaintiff." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract
to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 693 (1969) (describing the U.C.C. provision that the
Second Restatement's test was modeled on as posing the following question: "Is there a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy to this plaintiff, against this
defendant, in the circumstances of this breach of the agreement?"). Professor Edwin W.
Patterson's analysis of U.C.C. § 2-204(3) for the New York Law Revision Commission
reveals that he might have agreed with professor Knapp's analysis of the U.C.C. provision.
STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 86, at 275 (remark by Professor Edwin W. Patterson). He
provided three different possible interpretations of that provision, and for one of the
interpretations he provided a rephrased provision that would have, in his opinion, better
implemented that interpretation. Id. In the rephrased provision, he made reference to "the
remedy sought by the aggrieved party." Id. Different courts applying or referencing the
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In an attempt to remove the uncertainty created by the Second
Restatement's mixed signals, an analysis of the two requirements of the
Second Restatement's test-that the terms "provide a basis [1] for
determining the existence of a breach and [2] for giving an appropriate
remedy" 264-is undertaken below. The discussion relating to "determining
the existence of a breach" will focus on whether there are any clues in the
Second Restatement as to whether the bargain's terms must be sufficiently
definite such that a court would be able to determine the existence of a
breach by the plaintiff, even if that is not an issue in the lawsuit. The
discussion about an "appropriate remedy" will focus on whether there are
any clues in the Second Restatement as to whether the bargain's terms must
be sufficiently definite such that a court would be able to determine the
Second Restatement's test have suggested or hinted at different interpretations. For
example, some courts have addressed the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise. See Ass'n
Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 849-52 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Second Restatement section 33 and holding, under Illinois law, that the bargain's failure to
identify with specificity the plaintiffs obligations meant that a contract had not been formed
due to the reasonably certain terms requirement, but also referencing a "lack of mutual
assent"); Bus. Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 547 F.3d 882, 888-90 (7th Cir.
2008) (applying Illinois law and the Second Restatement's test and holding that a contract
had not been formed due to the reasonably certain terms requirement because it was not
clear what work plaintiff promised to do); Kottke v. Scott, No. 03-10-00071-CV, 2011 WL
1467194, at *4-5 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing the Second Restatement's test and ruling
that a promise by the defendants to sell their home to the plaintiffs did not result in a contract
because, among other reasons, the plaintiffs' promise to pay the purchase price was not
reasonably certain since "[t]he record contain[ed] no evidence as to whether or how often the
interest was to be compounded, how payments were to be made, or any other terms of a
purchase or financing agreement"). Other courts, while not explicitly addressing the
definiteness of the plaintiff's promise (or its lack of definiteness), have suggested the same
view by using phrases such as "each party's obligation" or "the promises made" when
discussing the terms needed to make the bargain reasonably certain. See, e.g., Big M, Inc. v.
Dryden Advisory Grp., No. 08-3567(KSH), 2009 WL 1905106, at *14 (D.N.J. June 30,
2009) (applying New Jersey law, and referencing the Second Restatement's test, and stating
that "[a] court must be able to accurately determine with reasonable certainty each party's
obligation to enforce the contract" (emphasis added)); McLinden v. Coco, 765 N.E.2d 606,
613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (referencing "the promises made" and citing the Second
Restatement's test within the discussion). At least one court refused to award reliance
damages for breach when the defendant's promise was too indefinite, which would suggest
the court believes the test is assessed as of the time of formation and is thus a legal
formality. Kottke, 2011 WL 1467194, at *6 (reversing the trial court's award of reliance
damages when the alleged bargain was too indefinite to create a contract). On the other
hand, another court that cited the Second Restatement's test suggested that the court might
be concerned only with the definiteness of the defendant's promise because the court's task
is "to ascertain the scope of the duty it is asked to enforce." Schwarzkopf v. Int'l Bus.
Machs., Inc., No. C 08-2715 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 1929625, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2010).
264
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) ( 198 l ).

University of Hawai 'i Law Review I Vol. 36: 169

216

plaintiffs expectation interest, even if the plaintiff is not seeking a remedy
that protects that interest (such as seeking only reliance damages).
A. Determining the Existence of a Breach

For a bargain to have reasonably certain terms under the Second
Restatement's test, the terms must provide a basis for determining the
existence of a breach. 265 Obviously, this means that at a minimum the
bargain's terms must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to
determine if the defendant breached,266 and in this respect the requirement
serves a purely practical purpose. But does it do so only incidentally? Is
there more to the requirement than simply enabling a court to resolve the
dispute before it? Specifically, must the plaintiffs promise also be
sufficiently definite such that a court would be able to determine a breach
by that party, even when the definiteness of the plaintiffs promise is not
relevant to resolving the dispute before it?
The first section of this Part will address classical contract law's position
(as set forth in the First Restatement) that the plaintiffs promise must be
sufficiently definite and discuss the possible reasons classical contract law
might have adopted such a position. The second section will address the
Second Restatement's confused treatment of this issue and conclude that
the best interpretation of the Second Restatement's test is that it rejects the
First Restatement's position, and that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs
promise be sufficiently definite if it is not an issue in the dispute before the
court.
1. Classical contract law's treatment of the plaintiff's promise

Classical contract law (the law that developed in the nineteenth century
and that dominated into the early twentieth century),267 as set forth in the
First Restatement of Contracts,268 required that for an offer to be valid, the
265
266

Id.

See, e.g., Schwarzkopf, 2010 WL 1929625, at *5 (citing the Second Restatement test
and stating that "[t]he court must be able to ascertain the scope of the duty it is asked to
enforce").
267
See Macneil, supra note 203, at 855 n.2 ("Classical contract law refers ... to that
developed in the 19th century and brought to its pinnacle by Samuel Williston in THE LA w
OF CONTRACTS ( 1920) and in the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).").
268
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) (stating that classical contract law found its central expression in the
First Restatement). The First Restatement has been described as the high-water mark of
classical contract law. See Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97
HAR.v. L. REV. 678, 678-79 (1984); see also Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern
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promises and performances to be rendered by each party must be
reasonably certain. 269 Professor Samuel Williston, the Reporter for the First
Restatement 270 and the "[a]rchitect of the fundamental concepts of classical
contract law,"271 provided the following rationale for the reasonably certain
terms requirement: "[T]he rule ... is one of necessity as well as of law.
The law cannot subject a person to a contractual duty or give another a
contractual right unless the character thereof is fixed by the agreement of
the parties."272 But this does not explain why the plaintiffs promise would
need to be sufficiently definite if its definiteness was not relevant to the
dispute before the court. There are three possible reasons, each of which
are discussed below.
a. Deduction from the requirement's status as aformation doctrine

Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be
sufficiently definite was likely deduced from the proposition that a contract
cannot be formed unless its terms are reasonably certain. 273 If this doctrinal
proposition is accepted, it can be deduced that both parties' promises must
be sufficiently definite because it would be illogical for a formation
doctrine to take account of post-formation events. As stated by Professor
Melvin Eisenberg, "The rules of classical contract law concerning
indefiniteness tended to be static, because generally speaking the
determination whether an agreement was sufficiently definite to be
enforceable focused on the terms of the agreement at the time that it was
made." 274
This basis for requiring both parties' promises to be reasonably certain is
not, of course, normatively sustainable unless the doctrinal proposition
Contract Theory, 67 Tux. L. REv. 103, 123 n.136 (1988) (noting that classical contract law
"reached its pinnacle in the early twentieth century with the Restatement (First) of
Contracts").
269
RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OF CONTRACTS§ 32 (1932).
270
See Wm. Draper Lewis, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS intro. (1932)
(identifying Professor Williston as the Reporter).
271
Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 208
(2005).
272
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 cmt. a (1932). In Williston's 1920
Contracts treatise, he simply wrote that "[i]t is a necessary requirement in the nature of
things that an agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite to enable a court
to fix an exact meaning upon it." WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 37, at 56.
273
Under the First Restatement, an indefinite offer was not a "valid offer," and thus
prevented a manifestation of mutual assent. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 &
cmt. a (1932).
274
Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1795.
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from which it flows-that a contract is not formed unless the bargain's
terms are reasonably certain-is itself normatively sustainable.275 And
classical contract law had a habit of deducing rules from propositions that
were taken to be axiomatic. 276
b. Mutuality of obligation

Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be
reasonably certain was likely also deduced from another doctrinal
proposition-the rule that neither party should be bound to a bargain unless
both parties were bound, the so-called requirement of mutuality of
obligation. 277 From this doctrinal proposition, it can be deduced that both
parties' promises must be sufficiently definite because if the plaintiffs
promise is too indefinite to enforce, then the plaintiff is not bound.
For example, at early English common law, the definiteness requirement
"applied both to the promise sued upon and to a promise averred as
consideration, for the latter was not a good consideration unless itself
actionable, and to be actionable it must be certain."278 Williston, in his
famous 1920 Contracts treatise, 279 stated that "[t]he indefiniteness of
promises is important not simply because of the inherent difficulty of
enforcing a promise to which no exact meaning can be attached, but also
because such a promise is insufficient consideration for another
promise."280 The First Restatement, with Williston as its Reporter, 281
adopted this view, providing that "a promise which is neither binding nor
capable of becoming binding by acceptance of its terms is insufficient
consideration" (except under limited circumstances). 282 Williston explained
that "[t]he ultimate basis of the legal requirement of sufficient consideration
275

Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW
206, 213 (Peter Benson ed., 200 l ).
276
Id. at 208.
277
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing the doctrine of mutuality of
obligation).
278
SIMPSON, supra note 202, at 532.
279
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Williston, Samuel, in THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN LAW 593 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (referring to Williston's four-volume
treatise, The Law of Contracts, as "one of the great textbooks of Anglo-American law").
280
WILLISTON, supra note 50, § 49, at 81. Unfortunately, Williston did not provide any
cases to support this proposition, and although he stated that the matter would be discussed
more in another section(§ 104), that section does not address the issue directly, discussing
only illusory promises. Id. at 81-83.
281
See Wm. Draper Lewis, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS intro (1932)
(identifying Professor Williston as the Reporter).
282
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 80 ( 1932).
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for promises is the belief not only that something should be given in
exchange for a promise in order to make it binding, but that what is given
should have value .... " 283 Even anti-classicist Professor Arthur Corbin
stated that "[a] promise can be so vague and indefinite in its expression that
it cannot be enforced and is therefore not a sufficient consideration."284
And this appears to remain the general rule. 285
Thus, classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be
sufficiently definite was likely based on notions of mutuality of obligation,
either as a formalistic deduction from that doctrine and the related doctrine
of consideration or based on the substantive concern that a promise should
usually only be enforced if given for something of value.
c. Plaintiff's inability to prove it was ready, willing, and able to perform

Some courts require that a plaintiff, to establish a claim for breach of
contract, prove that he either performed or that he was ready, willing, and
able to perform. 286 This requirement is presumably based on the notion that
if the defendant is held liable for breach despite a plaintiff not having been
ready, willing, and able to perform, the plaintiff will be put in a better
position than if the defendant had not breached. If the plaintiffs promise is
too indefinite, the plaintiff presumably could not establish that it was ready,
willing, and able to perform its end of the bargain, unless the indefiniteness
had been removed under cure-by-concession or modification. Classical
contract law's requirement that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently
definite might have been premised, at least in part, on the belief that a
plaintiff whose promise is indefinite cannot prove that he either performed
or that he was ready, willing, and able to perform.

283

Id. § 80 cmt. a.
CORBIN, supra note 2, § 143, at 208.
285
See 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 36, § 4:32, at 883-84 ("Indefinite promises give
rise not only to the inherent difficulty of enforcing a promise to which no exact meaning can
be attached but also to a problem of insufficiency of consideration. A promise too indefinite
to be enforced will, for that very reason, be insufficient consideration for a counterpromise.
If one promise of a bilateral agreement is too indefinite, neither promise will be enforceable.
The indefinite promise cannot be enforced because of its uncertainty, and the
counterpromise, even though in itself definite, cannot be enforced because of lack of
consideration.").
286
See Winkleblack v. Murphy, 811 So. 2d 521, 529 (Ala. 2001); Singarella v. City of
Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Mass. 1961 ).
284
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d. The requirement's status as a legal formality

Classical contract law's requirement that both parties' promises be
sufficiently definite can also be attributed to its status as a so-called legal
formality. Although it was not described as such at the time, Professor
Duncan Kennedy has recognized that the requirement was (and perhaps still
is) a legal formality. 287 In contract law, a legal formality is a rule providing
that a party's (or parties') failure to express or memorialize a bargain or
promise in a particular manner or form will have a specified legal
consequence, even if that consequence is contrary to the party's (or parties')
actual or manifested intention(s). 288 Requirements of form "operate
through the contradiction of private intentions."289 As explained by
Professor Kennedy:
[T]he formality means that unless the parties adopt the prescribed mode of
manifesting their wishes, they will be ignored. The reason for ignoring them,
for applying the sanction of nullity, is to force them to be self conscious and
to express themselves clearly, not to influence the substantive choice about
whether or not to contract, or what to contract for. 290

287

Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691-92.
See Perillo, supra note 23, at 41 n.22. Following Professor Perillo, this Article does
not consider the requirement of a manifestation of mutual assent to be a requirement of form.
See id. ("Even a simple oral contract made with no particular ritual words has a
'form.' .... Throughout this Article, however, the term 'form' or 'formality' means any
manner of expressing or memorializing an agreement other than oral or tacit non-ritual
expression." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Although a manifestation of mutual
assent must have a form in the sense that the assent must be manifested, the manifestation
need not take any particular form. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1)
(1981) ("The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken
words or by other acts or by failure to act."); id. cmt. a (1981) ("Where no particular
requirement of form is made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability of a
contract, there is no distinction in the effect of the promise whether it is expressed in writing,
or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways and partly in others. Purely negative
conduct is sometimes, though not usually, a sufficient manifestation of assent.").
Accordingly, this Article limits the term "legal formality" to a requirement that a particular
act have a certain form and does not extend it to an act simply because the act itself has a
form. To do so would expand the definition of "legal formality" to such an extent that it
would no longer be a useful concept. Also, this Article does not consider it to be a
requirement of form that an act be in a form sufficient to permit a fact finder to conclude,
based on a preponderance of the evidence, that the act occurred. To treat this as a
requirement of form would mean that every act that must be proven to establish a claim is a
requirement of form and would likewise expand the definition of "legal formality" to such
an extent that it would no longer be a useful concept.
289
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1691.
290
Id. at 1692.
288
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Although formalities "will lead to many instances in which the judge is
obliged to disregard the real intent of the parties,"291 the hope is that if
parties generally comply with the formalities, the benefits derived from
their use will outweigh the occasional miscarriages of justice.
Contract law has numerous legal formalities. For example, if the
relevant jurisdiction recognizes the seal as a basis for rendering a promise
enforceable,292 even when a party intends a promise of a gift to be legally
binding, if the promisor does not make the promise under seal, then the
failure to use the proper form might result in a legal consequence contrary
to the party's intention at the time of making the promise. Similarly, if a
promisor intends a bargain to be legally binding, but it is oral and within the
Statute of Frauds, 293 then the failure to evidence the bargain with the proper
form (a signed writing with the essential terms )294 might result in a legal
consequence contrary to the party's intention. The common law's mirror
image rule 295 is a legal formality2 96 because even if the parties intended to
conclude a deal, no contract was formed if the acceptance deviated from the
terms of the offer. 297
291

Id. at 1697.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 4, topic 3, statutory note (1981) ("In
many of the jurisdictions ... recognizing the seal there seems to be no statute or decision
depriving the seal of its common-law effect as a substitute for consideration."); Klass, supra
note 23, at 1762-63 ("While the seal is no longer a condition of contractual liability, many
jurisdictions still recognize it as a substitute for consideration or as triggering a longer statute
oflimitations.").
293
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 110 (1981) (describing which classes of
contract are covered by the Statute of Frauds).
294 Id. § l3 l.
295
Id. § 59. See also Weisz Graphics Div. v. Peck Indus., Inc., 403 S.E.2d 146, 149
(S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that restatement section 59 is known as the "mirror image"
rule).
296
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1982) ("[T]he mirror-image
rule was a paradigm oflegal formality .... ").
297
Id. at 1231-32. Even though Professor Lon Fuller famously argued that the
consideration requirement might be a legal formality, see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941), the modem view that sham consideration is not
consideration, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 71 cmt. b (1981) ("[A] mere
pretense of bargain does not suffice, as ... where the purported consideration is merely
nominal. In such cases there is no consideration .... "), means that the consideration
requirement can no longer be considered a legal formality, if it ever could have been. See
generally Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre
for Nominal Consideration is Not Binding, But Should Be, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1809, 1817-21
(2003) (surveying the cases purportedly holding that nominal consideration was sufficient
and concluding they can be explained on other grounds). Parties can no longer deliberately
make a transaction appear to be a bargain so as to render it legally enforceable. Also,
292
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It should be recognized that failure to use a legal formality does not
always mean the promise does not have any legal effect, despite Professor
Kennedy's reference to the "sanction of nullity" 298 and Professor Lon
Fuller's statement that the "sanction of the invalidity ... is the means by
which requirements of form are normally made effective ...." 299 For
example, even though it is often stated that a failure to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds' requirement of a signed writing renders a promise within one of the
Statute's categories unenforceable,300 this is not always true. There are
exceptions to the Statute's writing requirement, including detrimental
reliance (at least according to the Second Restatement and some courts). 301
Accordingly, the failure to use the Statute's required form is not
automatically a sanction of nullity. Rather, it simply means that an
exception to the Statute will have to be used. Likewise, for those
jurisdictions that still consider a promise under seal to be enforceable, the
failure to use the seal does not automatically render the promise
unenforceable. 302 Rather, it simply means that the promisee will have to
identify an alternative basis for rendering the promise enforceable. 303
whether the parol evidence rule is a legal formality depends on one's approach to the rule. If
it is simply used to determine whether the parties intended the promise to be part of the
bargain, then it is not a legal formality because its goal is to implement the parties'
intentions, not to operate (in some instances) contrary to their intentions. If, however, it is
designed to discharge promises that were not included in a subsequent written document,
even if it is believed the parties intended the prior promise to be legally enforceable, then it
is a legal formality. Similarly, with respect to interpreting the text of a bargain, the plain
meaning rule is a legal formality because it presumably operates contrary to the parties'
intentions in certain situations (the legal formality being the use of language that clearly
describes the parties' intentions), whereas the contextual approach to interpretation is not a
legal formality because any relevant evidence is admissible. In fact, many of the disputes
over how contract law rules should be applied are disputes over whether the rules should be
legal formalities.
298
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1692.
299
Fuller, supra note 297, at 803.
300
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 110(1)(1981).
301
See id. § 139(1) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action or forbearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."); Mcintosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 36-37,
469 P.2d 177, 181-82 (1970) (holding that the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's promise
of employment for a definite term was sufficient to overcome the Statute of Frauds). But see
Stearns v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72, 74-75 (Me. 1991) (rejecting the use of
detrimental reliance to overcome the Statute of Frauds with respect to promises of
employment). For a recent and thorough treatment of the issue, see generally Stephen J.
Leacock, Fingerprints of Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel on the Statute of
Frauds in Contract Law, 2 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 73 (2011 ).
302
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 95 cmt. a (1981) (noting that the
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Of course, there are some situations in which a legal formality truly is a
requirement of form in the sense that the failure to use it will result in the
sanction of nullity. For example, under the federal Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990,304 an employee's release of a federal age
discrimination claim is of no effect unless certain formalities are complied
with (including the release being written in a manner calculated to be
understood by the employee; having the waiver specifically refer to claims
under the federal age discrimination statute; having the employer advise the
employee in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the
release; and providing the employee at least twenty-one days to consider
the release), 305 and there are no exceptions. 306
A legal formality can serve a variety of functions. The most widely
recognized functions are the three identified by Professor Lon Fuller. 307
First, a legal formality can serve an evidentiary function, by providing
evidence of the bargain and its terms. 308 Although a court could determine
what occurred without the use of a legal formality (by admitting and
considering any relevant evidence, irrespective of its form), a requirement
of form (if complied with) reduces the time and expense involved in this
determination. Also, if the formality is well known, one would expect that
it will reduce the error rate involved in the court's factual determination (if
it is well known, a failure to use the form is good evidence that the alleged
transaction did not occur). The evidentiary function also benefits the
parties because it enables them to more reliably predict what the court will
conclude if the dispute is litigated, thereby giving them greater knowledge
of their legal rights, which in turn leads to better decision making.
nonexistence of one of the requirements for a sealed contract "does not preclude the
formation of a contract binding as a bargain").
303 id.
304

Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621626 (2006)).
305
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act§ 201(f)(l)(A), (B), (E), (F), 104 Stat. at 983,
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(A), (B), (E), (F) (2006)).
306
See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1998) (holding that an
employee's release that fails to comply with the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act is ineffective and cannot be ratified under common-law ratification
doctrines).
307
See Fuller, supra note 297, at 800-03.
308
See id. at 800 ("The most obvious function of a legal formality is ... that of providing
evidence of the existence and purport of the contract, in case of controversy." (internal
quotation omitted)); Perillo, supra note 23, at 64 ("A primary function of contractual
formalities is, of course, to supply and preserve evidence of the contract."); Kennedy, supra
note 6, at 1691 n.14 ("The evidentiary function includes both providing good evidence of the
existence of a transaction and providing good evidence of the legal consequences the parties
intended should follow.").
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Second, a legal formality can serve a cautionary function, in the sense of
"acting as a check against inconsiderate action," 309 and "making the parties
think twice about what they are doing and making them think twice about
the legal consequences."310 The requirement that a party formalize her
promise, by reducing it to a signed writing for example, will cause the
transaction to take more time, thereby increasing the likelihood of
deliberation and likely impressing upon the prornisor the seriousness of the
matter. For example, "[t]he seal in its original form fulfilled this purpose
remarkably well. The affixing and impressing of a wax wafer-symbol in
the popular mind of legalism and weightiness-was an excellent device for
inducing the circumspective frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his
future." 311 Thus, by inducing parties to spend more time thinking before
they act, the cautionary function helps reduce the number of inefficient
exchanges caused by hasty and inconsiderate action.
Third, a legal formality can serve a channeling function by offering "a
legal framework into which the party may fit his actions," 312 so that the
party knows how to accomplish a desired end. In other words, "it enables
the parties to search out and find the appropriate device to accomplish their
intent to create an obligation."313 For example, a seal permits a person to
accomplish the objective of making a promise legally enforceable. 314
In addition to the famous tripartite evidentiary, cautionary, and
channeling functions set forth by Fuller, Professor Joseph Perillo has
identified many other purposes a legal formality can serve. 315 Importantly
for this Article, Perillo recognized that a formality can serve a clarifying
function by leading parties to uncover points of disagreement during a
bargain's formation, which enables them to work the issues out prior to
finalizing the bargain. 316 By doing so, the parties will reduce the number of
post-formation disputes caused by gaps and misunderstandings. 317
Legal formalities do, however, have at least two harmful effects apart
from occasionally defeating the parties' expectations. First, because legal
formalities take time to comply with, they slow the pace of business. 318
309

Fuller, supra note 297, at 800; see also Perillo, supra note 23, at 53 (noting that one of
the functions of a legal formality "is to caution the promisor that he is entering into a binding
relationship").
310
Kennedy,supranote6,at1691 n.14.
311
Fuller, supra note 297, at 800.
312
Id. at 801.
313
Perillo, supra note 23, at 49.
314
See Fuller, supra note 297, at 802.
315
Perillo, supra note 23, at 43-69.
316
Id. at 56-58.
317
See id.
318
Id. at 70.
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Second, they enable a party to use noncompliance to avoid a bargain
because the deal has become undesirable. 319 The less well known a legal
formality is, the more often the latter effect is likely to occur.
The best legal formality is one that is adopted when the following
conditions exist: the transaction type to which it is applied is in the normal
course (i.e., without the legal formality) in some sense deficient in
accomplishing the goals of legal formalities (i.e., there is a need for the
formality); 320 compliance with the legal formality is not so time-consuming
that the transaction costs involved in complying with it outweigh the
benefits to be received from the bargain (and thus have the effect of
discouraging what would otherwise be a mutually beneficial exchange); 321
and the legal formality is well known so that it is made use of;322 and
miscarriages of justice (i.e., results contrary to the parties' intentions) are
kept to a minimum. 323
The consequence of treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as
a legal formality is that more bargains will fail to be contracts than if the
requirement was treated simply as a doctrine to implement the parties'
intentions, and as a restatement of other doctrines designed to enable the
court to resolve the dispute before it. Also, treating the requirement as a
legal formality has the strange effect of permitting a plaintiff to proceed on
a contract theory even though the plaintiff lacks evidence to prove
expectation damages to a reasonable certainty, 324 but prohibiting the
plaintiff from proceeding on a contract theory if the bargain's terms (as
opposed to the evidence) in regard to the plaintiffs expectation interest, are
not reasonably certain. 325 The question that needs answering, then, is why
319

Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 179, at 37 (referencing the possibility that a party will
rely on the indefiniteness doctrine to escape a bargain that is no longer beneficial to her).
320
See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("The need for investing a particular transaction
with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of
which the transaction arises .... "(emphasis omitted)).
321
See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("Forms must be reserved for relatively important
transactions. We must preserve a proportion between means and end; it will scarcely do to
require a sealed and witnessed document for the effective sale of a loaf of bread.").
322
If a formality is not well known, the benefits of the formality will be reduced, and its
harmful effects will be increased.
323
See Perillo, supra note 23, at 70 (noting that formalities enable a party to use them to
avoid a bargain that has become undesirable).
324
A party can only recover loss up to an amount that the evidence establishes with
reasonable certainty. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 352 (1981).
325
The former concept appears applicable to situations in which the contract terms are
sufficiently definite, but there is insufficient evidence to determine the amount ofloss caused
by the breach of the definite term. These tend to be situations in which the promised
performance (which is sufficiently definite) was simply a means to an end for the promisee,
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classical contract law might have considered contractual invalidity an
appropriate sanction for entering into a bargain with indefinite terms, even
when the court has before it all that is needed to implement the parties'
manifested intentions and to resolve the dispute that has arisen.

as opposed to being the end in itself. Although the promised performance is clear, the value
of the performance is not. An example would be a contract between a promoter and a boxer
for the boxer to fight a particular opponent and the parties to share the profits. See, e.g., Chi.
Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932). The boxing match is simply a means
to an end for the parties-the end being revenue. Accordingly, although the contract's terms
are sufficiently definite (it is clear what each party is to do), the loss from a breach of the
contract might be difficult to prove, and, thus, the value of the promise to box is uncertain.
Another example would be the breach of a contract to publish a novel. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 ·cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981); Freund v. Wash.
Square Press, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1974). The promise to publish the novel might be
definite, but the evidence might not permit the loss caused by the failure to publish
(including lost royalties and loss to reputation) to be established to a reasonable certainty.
As the court in Freund noted, "the value to [the] plaintiff of the promised performancepublication-was a percentage of sales of the books published and not the books
themselves." Id. at 422. A further example is a landowner who breaches a promise to sell
land to a prospective buyer, when the buyer plans to build a drive-in theater on the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981). In such a situation,
even though the parties' promises are sufficiently definite, the prospective buyer might not
be able to prove the lost profits to a reasonable certainty. Id. In these cases, it is simply the
loss that is uncertain and not any of the contract's terms.
The latter concept deals with a situation in which the difficulty of proving the
promisee's expectation interest is caused by the vagueness of the promise that was breached.
An example is the well-known case of Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973).
In that case, the patient alleged that a surgeon "promised to perform plastic surgery on her
nose and thereby to enhance her beauty and improve her appearance .... " Id. at 184. There
seemed to be little doubt that the promise was breached: the patient alleged that the result of
the surgeries was to leave her with a nose that "had a concave line to about the midpoint, at
which it became bulbous; viewed frontally, the nose from bridge to midpoint ws [sic]
flattened and broadened, and the two sides of the tip had lost symmetry." Id. at 185. One of
the reasons the court only awarded reliance damages was because, in cases involving a
doctor's promise to a patient regarding the results of a medical procedure, "to put a value on
the condition that would or might have resulted, had the treatment succeeded as promised,
may sometimes put an exceptional strain on the imagination of the fact finder." Id. at 188.
Presumably, it would be too difficult to prove with reasonable certainty the position the
plaintiff would have been in had the defendant performed as promised.
A related situation is when the promise is definite and the promised performance was
an end in itself, such that it is clear the position the non-breaching party would have been in
had there been performance, but it is difficult to put a dollar value on that position. For
example, in the famous case of Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929), what the doctor
promised the patient was arguably not vague ("a hundred per cent perfect hand or a hundred
per cent good hand"), id. at 643, but it might be difficult to put a dollar value on a 100%
perfect or good hand.
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To identify the purposes served, it is important to identify the harm
caused by bargains lacking reasonably certain terms, beyond making it
difficult for a court to resolve the dispute before it. Indefinite bargains
make it difficult for the parties to know their legal rights and duties arising
from the bargain, which increases the likelihood of misunderstandings, and
which in turn increases the likelihood of post-formation disputes. When the
bargain has a gap and the unanticipated event occurs, the parties might
disagree as to which gap-filling term is "reasonable in the circumstances"
or, more importantly, which gap-filling term a court will conclude is
"reasonable in the circumstances."326
Similarly, when the bargain has a vague term, and it is unclear whether
an event that occurs is within or outside the term's range of meaning, the
parties might disagree as to how a court would interpret the term. The
likelihood of these disagreements is increased by each party having an ex
post incentive to advocate for the meaning that is now most favorable to
itself. A post-formation dispute not only results in lost time and inefficient
expenditures during the dispute, it presumably also increases the likelihood
that the parties' post-formation, pre-dispute, reliance expenditures will be
wasted if the parties cannot resolve it. Also, such disputes would likely
disrupt the plans of third parties who relied on the expected performance of
the bargain.
Further, if one party's promise is not reasonably certain, and the other
party's performance is due first, one would expect that there is an increased
chance the latter party will repudiate the bargain before performing. The
latter party will understandably be reluctant to perform when the contours
of the performance to be received in exchange are uncertain and when there
is an incentive for the first party to construe the indefinite return
performance narrowly. Although the latter party entered into the bargain
even when the other party's promised performance was not reasonably
certain, the latter party might have done so without sufficient deliberation
or attention to the lack of certainty-and only at the time for its own
performance, came to recognize that it was unclear exactly what it had
bargained for. If the court requires a plaintiff, when seeking expectation
damages, to prove its cost or loss avoided from not having to perform, this
will provide a further incentive.
Misunderstandings arising from indefinite bargains also increase the
chance the exchange is not beneficial for one of the parties, and thus run
counter to one of contract law's principal aims, which is to encourage
326

See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
460-61 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
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mutually beneficial exchanges. 327 Indefinite bargains are also likely to have
been entered into without careful deliberation, further increasing the chance
the exchange is not mutually beneficial.
There is an increased chance these problems will be avoided if the
reasonably certain terms requirement is treated as a legal formality, is
applied at the time of the bargain's formation, and requires both parties'
promises to be sufficiently definite. A sanction of contractual invalidity
that applied only if the promise sought to be enforced is indefinite would
only enhance, at the time of the bargain's formation, each party's interest in
ensuring that the promise of the other party was sufficiently definite. The
promisee would have an incentive to ensure that the other party's promise
was sufficiently definite because if it was not, the promisee would not
acquire a contract right to performance by the promisor. A rule that did not
require the plaintiffs promise to be sufficiently definite would not itself
provide an incentive for a party to ensure that its own promise was
sufficiently definite because indefiniteness would not affect the party's
acquisition of a contract right to performance by the promisor. The other
party would, of course, have an incentive under the rule to make sure the
first party's promise was sufficiently definite, but for each promise there
would only be an incentive under the rule for one of the two parties to make
sure the promise is reasonably certain.
There would, of course, be incentives originating from sources other than
the rule for a party, at the time of the bargain's formation, to ensure its own
promise is sufficiently definite. A party whose promise is indefinite runs
the risk of a post-formation dispute with the other party, something the
party will want to avoid. 328 And worse still, the post-formation dispute
might lead to a lawsuit with the indefinite promise being construed against
the party. Also, if a party's promise is indefinite, it may be difficult for the
party to determine its cost of performance, which would thereby make it
difficult to determine if the exchange is beneficial to her.
These incentives to enter into bargains with reasonably certain terms
might suggest that there is no need for the reasonably certain terms
requirement to be treated as a legal formality. As previously noted, a legal
formality is best reserved for those situations in which the transaction type
is, in the normal course (i.e., without the legal formality), deficient in
accomplishing the goals of legal formalities (i.e., there is a need for the
formality). 329 These incentives, however, might be considered insufficient
327

See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REv. 781, 783 (1999) (noting that one of contract law's principal aims is to
promote mutually beneficial exchanges).
328
See Perillo, supra note 23, at 57.
329
See Fuller, supra note 297, at 805 ("The need for investing a particular transaction
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to avoid indefinite bargains. As previously discussed, there are a host of
reasons why the parties might enter into a bargain that lacks reasonably
certain terms. 330 These circumstances will lead to indefinite bargains
despite the incentives to avoid indefinite bargains, and in turn lead to all of
the problems caused by such bargains.
The court might, therefore, consider it advisable to add an extra incentive
for the parties to make the terms of their bargain reasonably certain.
Imposing the sanction of contractual invalidity when the plaintiffs promise
is indefinite might provide such an incentive. If the party is aware of the
rule, it will know that if a court determines its promise is not reasonably
certain, it will be unable to enforce (under a contract theory) the other
party's promise. 331 This increases the likelihood that both parties will have
an incentive to make sure that all of the promises in the bargain are
reasonably certain. Under this approach, the reasonably certain terms
requirement operates as a deterrent to entering into an indefinite bargain,
even if it turns out that the way in which the bargain is indefinite is
irrelevant to resolving the dispute that ends up before the court. 332
So what functions of form might the reasonably certain terms
requirement serve if it is treated as a legal formality and used as a sanction
for entering into an indefinite bargain? The evidentiary function would not
be served in the respect of providing the court with evidence of the bargain
and its terms because that function would already be served by treating the
requirement as nothing more than a restatement of other rules needed by the
court to resolve the dispute before it. 333 The evidentiary function would
also not be served with respect to gaps in the bargain. The evidentiary
function is designed to provide evidence of the bargain and its terms, 334 and
if there is a gap, there was no manifested agreement on a particular issue,
and thus, there is no term of which to provide evidence.
with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the situation out of
which the transaction arises .... "(emphasis omitted)).
330
See supra Part III.
331
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981)(1) ("Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so
as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.").
332
Cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 97 (discussing the Uniform Commercial
Code's zero-quantity default rule as a potential penalty for both parties).
333
The evidentiary function would, however, be served in this respect if the reasonably
certain terms requirement provided that the terms of the defendant's promise must be more
definite than simply enabling the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the defendant's promise was breached.
334
Fuller, supra note 297, at 800; see also Perillo, supra note 23, at 64; Kennedy, supra
note 6, at 1691 n.14.
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But the evidentiary function would be served by providing evidence to
the parties that they attached the same meaning to a vague term, preventing
one of the parties from later denying that shared meaning. 335 By offering an
additional incentive for a party to ensure its own promise is reasonably
certain, the parties are more likely to avoid vague terms and are more likely
to draft them in a way that reflects their mutual understanding of the term's
meaning. This will then eliminate the ability of a party, after the bargain's
formation, to take advantage of the vague term and deny that there was a
mutual understanding.
Treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality
also serves the cautionary function of form. Providing an additional
incentive for a party to ensure that its own promise is sufficiently definite
will increase that party's deliberation about her promise, thus encouraging
the party to think carefully about whether it desires to enter into the
bargain. 336 This will reduce the number of bargains that are not beneficial
to one of the parties.
And, perhaps most importantly, treating the reasonably certain terms
requirement as a legal formality serves the clarifying function of form.
Providing an additional incentive for a party to ensure that her own promise
is sufficiently definite will result in parties uncovering points of
disagreement during a bargain's formation, which thereby enables them to
work issues out prior to finalizing the bargain. 337
By treating the reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality,
the requirement would be, as argued by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, a "penalty default." 338 It would penalize the parties (or a party) for
not affirmatively specifying the details of the bargain, and thereby
encourage them to be more specific. 339 And although treating the
reasonably certain terms requirement as a legal formality was not a policy
referenced by Williston in the First Restatement, 340 it seems likely that this
rationale contributed, at least in part, to classical contract law's requirement
that both parties' promises be sufficiently definite to form a contract.

335
This would be important because where the evidence shows that "the parties have
attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof [a so-called mutual
understanding], it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981); see also Berke Moore Co. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98 A.2d
150, 155-56 (N.H. 1953).
336
See Perillo, supra note 23, at 53-56 (discussing the cautionary function of formalities).
337
See id. at 56-58 (discussing the clarifying function of formalities).
338
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 97.
339
See id. at 99.
340
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS § 32 (1932).
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2. The Second Restatement's treatment of the plaintiff's promise

The Second Restatement "completely reformulated" the First
Restatement's rule on reasonably certain terms, 341 and part of its
reformulation included replacing the First Restatement's reference to "the
promises and performances to be rendered by each party"342 in the black
letter rule with the requirement that "the terms of the contract [be]
reasonably certain."343 The Second Restatement then provided that the
"terms" are reasonably certain "if they provide a basis for determining the
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." 344
Intentionally or not, an express statement of whether the plaintiffs promise
must be sufficiently definite was left out of the black letter rule's
reformulation. 345
With respect to the doctrinal proposition that a contract is not formed
unless the bargain's terms are reasonably certain (a basis upon with the
First Restatement's position regarding the plaintiffs promise having to be
sufficiently definite was likely based), the Second Restatement's black
letter rule maintains the reasonably certain terms requirement as a
formation doctrine. 346 The rule expressly provides that unless the bargain's
terms are reasonably certain, an offer cannot be accepted "so as to form a
contract. "347
Though the doctrines of cure-by-concession and modification (which
focus on post-formation events and render an otherwise indefinite bargain
sufficiently definite )3 48 might suggest that the reasonably certain terms
requirement cannot possibly be a formation doctrine, a Second Restatement
comment states that in situations such as these "it may be impossible to
identify offer or acceptance or to determine the moment of formation." 349
Thus, subsequent action by one party removing the indefiniteness could be
viewed as an acceptance of the other party's original offer (which might
have been an acceptance, not an offer, at the time of formation of the first
unenforceable bargain), with the understanding that the otherwise indefinite
341

33 reporter's note (1981 ).
32 (1932).
343
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(1) (1981).
344
Id. § 33(2).
345
See id. § 33(1 )-(3).
346
See id. § 33(1) ("Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the
contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)).
347 Id.
342

348
349

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §

See supra Part IV.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

34 cmt. c (1981).
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offer would be construed by a reasonable person as impliedly including
within it an offer to contract on the terms most favorable to the offeror. 350
If both parties manifest assent to the subsequent action as a method of
performance, then the subsequent action would be a modification of the
bargain's terms with the bargain becoming enforceable upon formation of
the modified bargain. 351 Thus, the Second Restatement's reference to these
doctrines is not inconsistent with it treating the reasonably certain terms
requirement as a formation doctrine.
Its treatment of the requirement as a formation doctrine would logically
lead to the conclusion that under the Second Restatement's test, both
parties' promises must be sufficiently definite. 352
If the Second
Restatement's supporting comment points in the other direction, the
language of the Second Restatement's black letter rule and its supporting
comment must be in conflict.
In contrast to carrying forward classical contract law's treatment of the
reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine, the Second
Restatement does not appear to retain the mutuality of obligation rationale
as a basis for the reasonably certain terms requirement. For example,
concern for mutuality of obligation is not referenced in the Second
Restatement comment as a basis for the definiteness requirement. Instead,
the only policy referenced is the policy against a court making a contract
for the parties,353 which would only implicate the court's concern with
resolving the dispute before it. Also, mutuality of obligation is, in general,
downplayed in the Second Restatement. 354 For example, under the Second
Restatement, as long as an agreement has consideration, there is no
additional requirement of mutuality of obligation,355 and a promise 1s
consideration as long as it was bargained for and is legally sufficient. 356
350

The subsequent action would not be a counter-offer because a counter-offer proposes
"a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by the original offer." Cf id. § 39
(emphasis added). The offeror repudiating prior to the offeree's concession would, however,
terminate the power to accept the incorporated offer, see id. § 36(l)(c) (providing that
revocation terminates the offeree's power of acceptance), unless an option contract had
arisen, perhaps through reliance. See id. § 87(2) (offer rendered irrevocable as a result of
foreseeable and substantial reliance by offeree).
351 Cf id. § 39.
352
See id. § 33.
353
Id. § 33 cmt. b.
354
See Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1876, 1933 (2001) (noting that the Second Restatement
"relaxed the doctrine [of mutuality of obligation] in several areas of application").
355
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79(c) (1981). Clause (c) of Second
Restatement section 79, which expressly rejects a requirement of mutuality of obligation as
long as consideration exists, did not have a counterpart in the First Restatement. See id. § 79

2014 I REASONABLYCERTAJNTERMS

233

Importantly, the Second Restatement does not state that an indefinite
promise is legally insufficient (other than an illusory promise, of course,
which is no promise at all). 357 In fact, merely because one of the parties'
promises is voidable or unenforceable does not affect the enforceability of
the other party's promise. 358 Rather, the only bargained-for promises that
are legally insufficient are promises to perform a legal duty owed to the
promisee; 359 promises to forbear from asserting a clearly invalid claim or
defense when the promisor does not believe "the claim or defense may be
fairly determined to be valid" 360 conditional promises when the promisor
knows the condition cannot occur; 361 and promises where the prornisor
reserves a choice of alternative performances and one of the alternatives is
not consideration. 362
In fact, a Second Restatement comment strongly suggests that a
bargained-for indefinite promise (indefinite in the sense of being vague, not
illusory) is consideration by stating as follows:
The value of a promise does not necessarily depend upon the availability of a
legal remedy for breach, and bargains are often made in consideration of
promises which are voidable or unenforceable. Such a promise may be
consideration for a return promise. But it is sometimes suggested that a
promise is not consideration if it is not binding, or if it is "void." The
examples used commonly involve ... indefinite promises (see §§ 3334) .... 363

The comment goes on to state that the examples provided are not
exceptions to the Second Restatement's general rule that a promise is
consideration as long as it is bargained for. 364
Thus, whereas the Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably
certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine is evidence that it is
necessary that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite (even if not
reporter's note (1981) ("Clause (c) is new.").
356
Id. § 71(1) & cmt. b.
357
See id. § 77 (addressing the issue of illusory promises).
358
See id. § 78 (stating that a voidable or unenforceable promise can still be valid
consideration).
359
Id. § 73.
360
Id. § 74(1)(b).
361
Id. § 76(1).
362
See id. § 72 ("Except as stated in §§ 73 [legal duty rule] and 74 [settlement of claims
rule], any performance which is bargained for is consideration."); id. § 75 ("Except as stated
in§§ 76 [conditional promises] and 77 [illusory and alternative promises], a promise which
is bargained for is consideration if, but only if, the promised performance would be
consideration.").
363
Id. § 75 cmt. d (internal citations omitted).
364 Id.

234

University of Hawai'i Law Review I Vol. 36:169

relevant to the dispute), its apparent treatment of bargained-for indefinite
promises (again, indefinite in the sense of being vague, not illusory) as
consideration is evidence that it is not necessary that the plaintiffs promise
be sufficiently definite. This does not mean, of course, that a court could
not still consider the imbalanced nature of an exchange when the defendant
received an indefinite promise from the plaintiff that cannot be enforced. 365
The Second Restatement, however, does not appear to consider such
imbalance as a reason to always require that the plaintiffs promise be
sufficiently definite (which would, in fact, be in keeping with the Second
Restatement's famous shift from rules to standards). 366
Additional evidence points away from the Second Restatement requiring
that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite. As previously noted, the
Second Restatement comment states: "[T]he degree of certainty required
may be affected by the dispute which arises ... Courts decide the disputes
before them, not other hypothetical disputes which might have arisen."367
The comment's emphasis on the dispute brought before the court suggests
that the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise will not automatically
render the bargain unenforceable under the reasonably certain terms
requirement.
For example, with respect to determining whether the defendant
breached, it would only be relevant that the plaintiffs promise is too
indefinite if the defendant asserts that the plaintiff breached his promise
first and uses this as an excuse for the defendant's non-performance. 368 But
when the defendant was to perform first, or if the defendant repudiated
before the plaintiffs performance was due, the indefiniteness of the
plaintiffs promise is irrelevant to the court's ability to determine the
existence of a breach. There is also no suggestion within the Second
Restatement comment that the indefiniteness doctrine is premised, at least
in part, on the requirement that the plaintiff be able to prove that she
performed her end of the bargain or that she was ready, willing, and able to
perform. 369
365

To consider the First Restatement as having a greater concern than the Second
Restatement for imbalanced exchanges would, of course, be a surprising position.
366
See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to
Standards, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 634, 634-35 (1982) (discussing the Second Restatement's
move from rules to standards). For explanations of the differences between rules and
standards, see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1687-1701; Baird & Weisberg, supra note 296, at
1227-31.
367
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981).
368
See id. § 237 ("[I]t is a condition of each party's remaining duties to render
performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured
material failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.").
369
See id. § 33 cmts. a-f.
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Further, the Second Restatement comment states that when a court is
deciding whether to fill a gap in the bargain, it is more likely to do so if the
gap is one that is not important with respect to the dispute that has arisen. 370
If gap-filling takes into account the dispute that has arisen (as opposed to
assessing the perceived importance of a term as of the time of the bargain's
formation), it would be consistent to assess indefiniteness at the same point
in time, in which case a plaintiff's indefinite promise should be ignored if it
is irrelevant to resolving the dispute. The comment further states that
"[w ]here the parties have intended to conclude a bargain, uncertainty as to
incidental or collateral matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the
contract."371 Consistent with the Second Restatement's approach to gapfilling, the comment likely contemplates an assessment of whether a matter
is "incidental or collateral" based on the dispute that arises. 372
Considering the importance of a vague or omitted term to the dispute that
has arisen is likely designed to prevent parties from taking advantage of the
indefiniteness doctrine when their non-performance was due to other
reasons (such as wanting to avoid a bad bargain). For example, Professor
Franklin Snyder has recognized that this concern most likely caused the
U.C.C. drafters to relax the reasonably certain terms requirement, 373 and
also likely motivated (at least in part) the Second Restatement drafters. For
example, Professor Joseph Perillo has stated that:
The courts must take cognizance of the fact that the argument that a particular
agreement is too indefinite to constitute a contract frequently is an
afterthought excuse for attacking an agreement that failed for reasons other
than indefiniteness. In such instances, the court should not be too fussy to
determine how the gaps should have been filled. 374

This is consistent with Perillo' s assertion that the indefiniteness doctrine
"is designed to prevent, where it is at all possible, a contracting party who is
dissatisfied with a bargain from taking refuge in the doctrine to wriggle out
of an agreement." 375 And Perillo expressly links this concern to the Second
Restatement's statement that the degree of certainty required is affected by

370

See id. § 33 cmt. b ("It is less likely that a reasonably certain term will be supplied by
construction as to a matter which has been the subject of controversy between the parties
than as to one which is raised only as an afterthought.").
371
Id. § 33 cmt. a.
372
See id. § 33 cmts. a-b.
373
See Snyder, supra note l 79, at 37-38.
374
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, l CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 4.1, at 53536 (rev. ed. 1993).
375
PERILLO, supra note 2, at 55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt.
b (1981)).
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the dispute that arises. 376 This in tum suggests that the plaintiff's promise
being sufficiently definite is not a requirement because doing so would not
permit the court to consider whether the defendant is simply using the
requirement as an afterthought to avoid liability.
The first illustration in the Second Restatement's section on reasonably
certain terms provides further evidence that the indefiniteness of the
plaintiff's promise does not automatically render the bargain
unenforceable. 377 The illustration is loosely based on, and intended to
repudiate, the 1940 House of Lords decision in G. Scammell & Nephew,
Ltd. v. Ouston. 378 In that case, the House of Lords reversed the court of
appeal and the trial court and held that a bargain to sell a new motor-van on
hire-purchase terms over a two-year period379 was too indefinite to be
enforced by the buyers because the details of the hire-purchase terms were
not agreed upon. 380 There was no suggestion in Scammel/ that the
defendant's promise was too indefinite to enforce,381 and the defendant
apparently repudiated before any reliance by the plaintiffs on the bargain. 382
The defendant repudiated because he objected to the condition of a trade-in
van that the plaintiffs promised to give to the defendant as part of the
exchange383 (a position found to be unjustified), 384 and not because the hirepurchase terms had not J;>een agreed upon. 385
The decision included an opinion by Lord Wright, 386 who has been
described as an "innovative traditionalist,"387 and his opinion in the case has
been used as an example of his reluctance at times to "follow his argument
that courts should be willing, in commercial law matters, to see the law play
second fiddle to established business practices."388 Lord Wright believed
376

CORBIN & PERILLO,

supra note 374,

§

4.1, at 536 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b (1981)).
377
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b, illus. l (1981).
378
[1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.) (Eng.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

33
reporter's note cmt. b (1981) (stating that illustration l repudiates the reasoning of
Scammell).
379
G. Scammell & Nephew Ltd., [1941] A.C. at 251.
380
Id. at 254, 257, 261, 273.
381
There was apparently no dispute as to the type of motor-van the seller promise to
provide to the buyer. See id. at 258 (Lord Russell) (setting forth the specifications of the
motor-van); id. at 261-62 (Lord Wright).
382
See id. at 252.
383
Id. at 263 (Lord Wright).
384
See id. at 267.
385
See id.
386
Id. at 261-73.
387
Neil Duxbury, Lord Wright and Innovative Traditionalism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 265,
265 (2009).
388
Id. at 302. In this respect Lord Wright's opinion is reminiscent of Judge Benjamin
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that the defendant's unjustified motive in repudiating the bargain did not
prevent him from relying on the bargain's indefiniteness as a defense:
It is true that when the [defendant] broke off the affair [he] gave reasons for
doing so which [he] could not justify. But when [he was] sued for breach of
contract [he was] entitled to resist the claim on any good ground that was
available, regardless of reasons which [he] had previously given .... [I]f a
party repudiated a contract giving no reasons at all, all reasons and all
defences in the action, partial or complete, would be open to him. Equally
would this be so, I think, if he gave reasons which he could not substantiate.
If there never was a contract, they could not be made liable for breach of
contract. 389

The House of Lords' decision in Scammel/ was a model of classical
contract law's approach to indefiniteness (though decided during the time
classical contract law was waning). Because the vague term had nothing to
do with the reason the defendant repudiated, the court's focus was
necessarily on the definiteness of the bargain as of the time of formation,
and not at the time of the lawsuit. The plaintiffs promise was held too
indefinite to form a contract, without any discussion of whether such
indefiniteness would affect the ability of the court to determine the
existence of a breach by the defendant or to give an appropriate remedy to
the plaintiff (though its indefiniteness would presumably have made it
difficult to determine the cost avoided by the plaintiff from not having to
perform). 390 Also, the defendant's motive in repudiating the bargain was
Cardozo's controversial opinion in Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass 'n v. Remington Paper &
Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923), in which he held a bargain too indefinite to enforce.
Id. at 471-72. With respect to the controversial nature of the opinion, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1379
(1995):
Many have observed that it was peculiar for Cardozo, widely regarded as a "contract
maker," to have refused to find a contract worth enforcing in Sun Printing. For
example, Cardozo could have accepted the buyer's argument that the parties had
entered into one or more option contracts and enforced the contract in these terms very
easily. Accordingly, something else must have led Cardozo to act as a "contract
breaker." Corbin hinted at one possibility: "Was Cardozo less moved to cure defects
in the work of the well-paid lawyers of two rich corporations?"
Id. at 1394 n.77 (citations omitted). The Second Restatement and the U.C.C. each reject
Cardozo's rationale in Sun Printing (that the bargain was too indefinite because the parties
failed to agree on a price). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 204 cmt. d (1981)
(stating that the court should fill in the gap with a reasonable price); U.C.C. § 2-305 (2013)
(same); Cunningham, supra at 1407 (recognizing that "the received understanding of Sun
Printing-holding that a contract that does not fix a price term is unenforceable-had been
reversed by section 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code").
389
G. Scammell & Nephew Ltd., [1941] A.C. at 267-68 (Lord Wright).
390
See generally id.
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The House of Lords' permitted range of
considered irrelevant. 391
indefiniteness was also narrower than that used by the lower courts with the
House of Lords concluding that there were simply too many different terms
of the indefinite hire-purchase agreement that would be reasonable in the
circumstances. 392
The Scammell decision caught Professor Arthur Corbin's attention when
Professor Lon Fuller included it in a draft of the mutual assent portion of a
casebook they were collaborating on at the time. 393 In a December 1941
letter to Fuller discussing Fuller's selection of cases for that portion, Corbin
told him that "[m]y impression was generally good, although the opinion in
Scammell v. Ouston did not impress me very well."394 Fuller was
apparently not impressed by the opinion either (despite including it in the
draft casebook), referring to it in his famous 1958 Harvard Law Review
article, replying to H.L.A. Hart,395 as an "outstanding example"396 of the
British courts, in recent years in the field of commercial law, falling "into a
'law-is-law' formalism that constitutes a kind of belated counterrevolution
against all that was accomplished by Mansfield."397
In his famous 1950 Contracts treatise, Corbin explained that the Court of
Appeal's reasoning that the parties should "be bound to perform according
to some reasonable and customary 'hire-purchase' agreement" was one that
he believed "seem[ ed] reasonable."398 Thus, Corbin considered the House
of Lords' decision to be incorrectly decided because the terms of the hirepurchase agreement could be supplied by industry custom, and thus the
391
See id. at 267-68 (Lord Wright) (stating that if there was never a contract, the
repudiating party could not be made liable for breach, regardless of the reason given for the
repudiation).
392
See id. at 256 (Viscount Maugham) ("[A] hire-purchase agreement may assume many
forms and some of the variations in those forms are of the most important character, e.g.,
those which relate to termination of the agreement, warranty of fitness, duties as to repair,
interest, and so forth."); id. at 260-61 (Lord Russell) ("An alleged contract which appeals for
its meaning to so many skilled minds in so many different ways, is undoubtedly open to
suspicion. . . . [The contemplated hire-purchase agreement] could be brought about in
various ways, and by documents containing a multiplicity of different terms."); id. at 268
(Lord Wright) (basing his decision not only "on the actual vagueness and unintelligibility of
the words used, but ... the startling diversity of explanations, tendered by those who think
there was a bargain, of what the bargain was").
393
See generally Scott D. Gerber, Corbin and Fuller's Cases on Contracts (1942?): The
Casebook that Never Was, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (2003) (discussing the collaboration).
394
Id. at 622.
395
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 637 n.5 (1958).
396 Id.
397
398

Id. at 637.
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, l CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 293 n. l 0 (1950).
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buyer's promise was not too indefinite. 399 Corbin was a consultant on the
Second Restatement until his death in 1967 ,400 and his distaste for the
decision perhaps played a role in the inclusion of an illustration loosely
based on the case-an illustration that, according to Professor Braucher, the
Reporter, "repudiates the reasoning of G. Scammell & Nephew v.
Ouston ... .'.4° 1
If the illustration was designed simply to repudiate the House of Lords'
reasoning in Scammell, then the illustration would have little relevance to
determining whether the Second Restatement requires the plaintiffs
promise to be sufficiently definite. In such a case, the illustration would
simply stand for the unremarkable proposition that the Second
Restatement's tolerance for vague language is greater than classical
contract law's tolerance for such language. The illustration, however,
throws a curveball by including within the bargain's terms a liquidated
damages provision that did not exist in the bargain in Scammell and then
suggesting that it is the liquidated damages provision (not industry custom)
that results in the bargain's terms being sufficiently definite. The
illustration provides as follows:
A agrees to sell and B to buy goods for $2,000, $1,000 in cash and the
"balance on installment terms over a period of two years," with a provision
for liquidated damages. Ifit is found that both parties manifested an intent to
conclude a binding agreement, the indefiniteness of the quoted language does
not prevent the award of the liquidated damages. 402

Although the illustration does not indicate which party allegedly
breached, if the illustration is loosely based on Scammell, one can assume
that A, the seller, repudiated.
The strange inclusion of a liquidated damages provision in the bargain
suggests that the illustration's drafters considered the bargain's terms, in the
absence of that provision, to be too indefinite because important details of
the plaintiffs promise to pay off the balance were not agreed upon (e.g., the
number of installments, how much per installment, and how much interest).
The inclusion of a liquidated damages provision (and presumably a
plaintiffs request to be awarded the liquidated damages) is apparently what
399
Id. One wonders if Corbin also believed that a liberal approach to gap filling was
appropriate in the case because the defendant's motive for repudiating was not related to the
indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise.
400
Herbert Wechsler, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS foreword (1981); see
generally Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters from Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 755 (1993) (describing some of Corbin's work as a consultant on the
Restatement).
401
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 reporter's note cmt. b (1981).
402
Id. § 33 cmt. b, illus. 1 (emphasis added).
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makes the bargain's terms sufficiently definite (which, making things
stranger, would not, in fact, repudiate the House of Lords' reasoning in
Scammell, as stated by Braucher403 ). This in tum suggests that as long as
the plaintiff can prove that the defendant breached (which the plaintiff can
in the hypothetical if it is based on Scammell because there was a
repudiation not based on the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise), the
indefiniteness of the plaintiff's promise is irrelevant because it does not
affect the ability of the court to give an appropriate remedy (here, liquidated
damages).
This does not mean that the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs' promise
could not become relevant to the dispute before the court if the facts were
different; if, for example, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs breached
first, thereby excusing the defendant's non-performance; or if there were no
liquidated damages provision, and the plaintiffs sought expectation
damages and the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs' promise made it difficult to
determine the plaintiffs' cost avoided from not having to perform. But this
illustration suggests that the reasonably certain terms requirement does not
require that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite. Thus, it does
seem to repudiate the decision in Scammell to the extent the House of Lords
took the position that the plaintiffs promise must be sufficiently definite,
but not for the reason that made the decision objectionable to Corbin.
Further evidence in support of the conclusion that the Second
Restatement's "determining the existence of a breach'.404 requirement is
assessed at the time of the lawsuit is provided by the rule's requirement that
the terms be sufficiently definite to determine both the existence of a breach
and to give an appropriate remedy. If the time for assessing definiteness is
as of the time of formation, and if the terms are sufficiently definite to
determine the existence of a breach, they necessarily must be sufficiently
definite for purposes of giving an appropriate remedy. For example, if the
terms are sufficiently definite at the time of formation to determine the
existence of a breach, the court will necessarily be able to identify the
position the promisee would have been in had there been performance, and
thus will be able to protect the prornisee's expectation interest. There
would be no reason to have two requirements; a single requirement
providing that the terms must be sufficiently definite to determine the
existence of a breach would be sufficient.
Conversely, if the time for assessing definiteness is at the time of the
lawsuit, the two requirements could serve different functions. At the time
of the lawsuit, a court might be able to determine the existence of a breach
403
404

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

Id. § 33(2).

33 reporter's note cmt. b (1981).
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because the defendant's actions (or inaction) were beyond the scope of a
vague promise's range of plausible meanings, which would surely be the
case if there was a repudiation or no attempt at performance, as was the
case in Scammell. 405 Yet the terms of the vague promise might not be
sufficient to protect the promisee's expectation interest because, even
though it is clear there has been a breach (or repudiation), the promise's
vagueness makes it impossible to determine the position the promisee
would have been in had there been performance. The vagueness of the
plaintiffs promise might also make it impossible to determine the position
the plaintiff would have been in had there been performance because the
"cost or other loss" avoided by the plaintiff in not having to perform might
be impossible to determine. 406 Alternatively, a promised performance
might be sufficiently definite to protect the promisee's expectation interest,
but the duty to perform might be subject to a vague condition. In such a
situation, the terms would not be sufficiently definite to determine the
existence of a breach, though they would be sufficiently definite to
determine the position the promisee would have been in had there been
performance.
Also, in general, "[t]here has been movement to weaken or eliminate
formal requirements for contract."407 An interpretation that does not require
the plaintiffs promise to be sufficiently definite is in keeping with this
movement. Similarly, such an interpretation is consistent with a modem
desire, when assessing the indefiniteness of a bargain, to look past the time
the bargain was formed, even while paying homage to the requirement's
status as a formation doctrine. Professor Larry DiMatteo described this
tendency at work, relying on a 1979 California appellate decision and
quoting from the opinion:
The modem trend toward enforceability and the notion offaimess plays a role
in the court's "forward-looking" or result-oriented rationale. The formalism
of classical contract law is discarded in favor of the "norm of enforcement":
"The modem trend of the law is to favor the enforcement of contracts [and] to
lean against their unenforceability because of uncertainty .... " '"[I]f it is
possible [for a court] to reach a fair and just result,"' then the uncertainty
norm of classical contract should not hold sway. In place of the contract
voiding rationales of uncertainty, liberal rules of construction and gap-filling
405

See G. Scammell & Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston, [1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.) 264 (Eng.) (Lord
Wright) (stating that at trial there was found to have been a repudiation of the contract).
406
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (1981) (providing that in
measuring the plaintiff's expectation interest for purposes of awarding expectation damages,
the amount must be reduced by "any cost or other loss that [the plaintiff] has avoided by not
having to perform").
407
Gergen, supra note 249, at 1440 n.178.
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devices should be utilized to salvage contracts that show a reasonable
modicum of contractual intent. 408

In the end, what supports a conclusion that the Second Restatement's
reasonably certain terms requirement requires the plaintiffs promise to be
sufficiently definite is the inclusion of the requirement in the formation
section409 and the black letter statement that unless the bargain's "terms"
are reasonably certain a contract is not formed. 410 The reference to "terms"
is not, however, particularly significant. The requirement that the "terms"
be reasonably certain is defined in the black letter rule as requiring that
"they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for
giving an appropriate remedy,"411 and the supporting comment and
illustrations strongly suggest that being able to determine the existence of a
breach is assessed at the time of the lawsuit, not at the time of formation. 412
Although the Second Restatement retaining the requirement as a
formation doctrine is strong evidence that the "determining the existence of
a breach''4 13 analysis is assessed at the time of the bargain's formation, the
substantial evidence to the contrary leads, on balance, to the conclusion that
the requirement is assessed at the time of the lawsuit, and therefore does not
require that the plaintiffs promise be sufficiently definite. This in tum
suggests that the Second Restatement's requirement that a bargain's terms
be sufficiently definite to determine the existence of a breach serves a
purely practical purpose, and not a formal purpose.
A formal aspect would be retained, however, if the court required that the
terms' definiteness be greater than that which would be necessary to
establish the existence of a breach by a preponderance of the evidence.414 If
408

Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the "Law of
Satisfaction"-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 413 (1995) (quoting LarwinSouthem Cal., Inc. v. JGB Inv. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 52, 60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
409
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (which is placed in Chapter 3
titled "Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent").
410 Id. § 33(1 ).
411
Id. § 33(2).
412
See, e.g., id. § 33 cmt. b ("[T]he degree of certainty required may be affected by the
dispute which arises and by the remedy sought." (emphasis added)).
413
Id. § 33(2).
414
A somewhat similar issue is involved with respect to whether the Second
Restatement's requirement that "[d]amages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount
that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty." Id. § 352. The
Second Restatement does not make it clear whether this standard is designed to make it more
difficult to recover contract damages than under a preponderance of the evidence standard
that would apply irrespective of the black letter rule. See, e.g., MindGames, Inc. v. W.
Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.) (stating that the requirement in a
contract action that lost profits be proven to a reasonable certainty is simply the rule that is
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415
the court applied a narrow acceptable range for indefiniteness, the rule
would presumably result in decisions contrary to the manifested intentions
of the parties. For example, even though the evidence before the court was
sufficient to enable one to conclude, based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard, that the defendant had breached a vague promise, a court
applying a narrow acceptable range might consciously decide that the
reasonably certain terms requirement demands greater certainty for finding
a breach.
Although the Second Restatement does not address this issue, the use of
the phrase "provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach'.4 16
suggests that the court is not to apply a standard more demanding than
whether the terms are sufficiently definite to determine the existence of a
breach by the preponderance of the evidence standard. This is further
supported by the comment's statement that "[t]he test is not certainty as to
what the parties were to do ... .''4 17
A final argument against the conclusion that the Second Restatement's
requirement that the terms be sufficiently definite to determine the
existence of a breach serves a purely practical purpose must be
considered-namely, that if it serves a purely practical purpose, it is no
more than a restatement of the general requirement, that the plaintiff prove a
breach of contract by a preponderance of the evidence. 418 And if this is so,
why include it as a black letter rule?
It is likely that the drafters desired to have a black letter rule and a
section on "certainty" that encompassed various issues involving
indefiniteness. 419 And one of those issues is that the indefiniteness of a
bargain's terms (as opposed to the indefiniteness of what occurred after
formation, which is likely what one usually means when referring to
proving a breach by the preponderance of the evidence) might prevent the
plaintiff from proving that the defendant breached the bargain.
Although it might have been better to place this doctrine in Chapter 10 of
the Second Restatement (dealing with "Performance and NonPerformance"),420 there is evidence that the drafters included in the
"Certainty" section doctrines that are, in fact, simply restatements of other
applicable to the recovery of damages in general).
415
See supra Part IV.
416
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(2) (1981).
417
Id. § 33 cmt. b (emphasis added).
418
See Pisani v. Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 710, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the plaintiff in a breach of contract action has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached the contract).
419
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (titled "Certainty'').
420
See id. § § 231-260.
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doctrines. For example, the comment's discussion of the greater degree of
certainty needed to obtain an award of specific performance421 shows that
this doctrine, which is not a formation doctrine,422 is encompassed within
the Second Restatement's "Certainty" section and is within the black letter
rule's reference to the terms having to be sufficiently definite to give an
appropriate remedy. 423 Also, the "Certainty" section's third subsection
addresses the issue of whether indefiniteness means that the parties have
not manifested assent to a bargain,424 an issue that is analytically distinct
from the requirement that a bargain's terms be reasonably certain and is in
fact a particular application of the black letter rule on preliminary
negotiations. 425 Thus, the "Certainty" section, including its comment and
illustrations, although placed in the formation chapter, appears to be a
hodgepodge of analytically distinct issues (some of which have nothing to
do with contract formation) whose only commonality is that they involve
whether a bargain's terms are indefinite.
Further support for the conclusion that the "determining the existence of
a breach'.426 requirement is simply a restatement of the requirement that the
plaintiff prove a breach is the Second Restatement's downplaying of the
former requirement in favor of the "appropriate remedy" requirement. 427
Although the comment, when discussing the reasonably certain terms
requirement in general, states that "[i]f the essential terms are so uncertain
that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or

421
See id. § 33 cmt. b ("In some cases greater definiteness may be required for specific
performance than for an award of damages ... ").
422
See id. § 3 62 cmt. a:
One of the fundamental requirements for the enforceability of a contract is that its
terms be certain enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate remedy. See
§ 33. If this minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no contract at all. It
may be, however, that the terms are certain enough to provide the basis for the
calculation of damages but not certain enough to permit the court to frame an order of
specific performance or an injunction and to determine whether the resulting
performance is in accord with what has been ordered. In that case there is a contract[,]
but it is not enforceable by specific performance or an injunction.
Id.
423
See id. § 33(2) (referring to the need for terms to be sufficiently definite to enable the
court to give an appropriate remedy).
424
Id. § 33(3).
425
See id. § 33 cmt. c ("The rule stated in Subsection (3) is a particular application of the
rule stated in § 26 on preliminary negotiations."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 31 cmt. d (2011) ("A transaction resulting in an indefinite
[bargain] must not be confused with a failed negotiation producing no [bargain] at all.").
426
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 33(2)(1981).
421 Id.
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broken, there is no contract,"428 the comment heading for the discussion of
the subsection listing the two requirements is simply titled "Certainty in
basis for remedy."429 Also, there are no references in that particular
comment to the requirement that the terms be definite enough to provide a
Further, Professor
basis for determining the existence of a breach. 43
Braucher, when discussing the two requirements, simply referred to there
having to be "a reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy."431 The test
was also modeled after U.C.C. § 2-204(3),432 which refers only to "a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."433 All of this
suggests that the "determining the existence of a breach" requirement was
simply a restatement of the general requirement that a plaintiff prove a
breach of contract and that the "appropriate remedy" requirement was the
true test for the reasonably certain terms rule (at least to the extent it exists
as a rule separate from others). We will now tum to that requirement.

°

B. An "Appropriate" Remedy
For a bargain to have reasonably certain terms under the Second
Restatement's test, not only must the terms be sufficiently definite to
provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach, they must also
provide a basis for giving an "appropriate" remedy. 434 This language was
not used in the First Restatement, and was modeled after a U.C.C.
provision. 435 The Second Restatement does not indicate, however, which
remedies are "appropriate."436 In particular, the Second Restatement fails to
state whether protecting the plaintiffs reliance interest is an appropriate
remedy or whether appropriate remedies are limited to those protecting the
plaintiff's expectation interest.437
428

Id. § 33 cmt. a.
See id. § 33 cmt. b (titled "Certainty in basis for remedy").
430
See id.
431
Braucher, supra note 8, at 308.
432
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code.") (remark by Reporter Robert
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provisions on reasonably certain terms).
433
u.c.c. § 2-204(3) (2013).
434
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981 ).
435
Braucher, supra note 8, at 308 (noting that the test provided for the reasonably certain
terms requirement is based on U.C.C. section 2-204(3)).
436
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981) (defining
"expectation interest," "reliance interest," and "restitution interest"); id§ 33 (not explaining
what constitutes an "appropriate" remedy).
437
The promisee's expectation interest is "his interest in having the benefit of his bargain
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
429
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If the ability of a court to give an appropriate remedy is assessed as of the
time of the bargain's formation, an appropriate remedy is presumably
limited to the protection of the parties' expectation interests. If the
requirement is assessed as of this time, considering reliance damages to be
an appropriate remedy would be nonsensical because there cannot be
reliance on a bargain until after the bargain's formation. 438 One would
either have to take the position that the possibility of reliance means that the
bargain's terms are always sufficiently definite to provide a basis for giving
of an appropriate remedy (which would defeat the purpose of including an
"appropriate remedy" requirement) or that the possibility of reliance should
not be considered (which would defeat the purpose of concluding that
reliance damages are an appropriate remedy).
But if the ability of a court to give an appropriate remedy is assessed at
the time of the lawsuit, an appropriate remedy presumably could include the
protection of the plaintiffs reliance interest, provided the plaintiff has
relied on the bargain and seeks such a remedy. 439 Whether the bargain's
terms are sufficiently definite to provide an appropriate remedy for the
defendant would be irrelevant as long as the defendant is not asserting a
counterclaim for breach of contract.
The Second Restatement's comments include portions that suggest
partial enforcement of a promise, such as through an award of reliance
damages, might be considered an appropriate remedy for purposes of an
indefiniteness analysis. For example, the comments state that there must be
"a reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy," that "uncertainty may
preclude one remedy without affecting another," and that "the degree of
certainty required may be affected ... by the remedy sought. ,Mo Another
Second Restatement black letter rule states that "[a]ction in reliance on an
agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even though
uncertainty is not removed."441 The rule's reference to reliance making a

performed ...." Id§ 344(a).
438
Reliance damages protect the promisee's reliance interest. The promisee's reliance
interest is "his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been
made .... " Id. § 344(b).
439
See id. (defining the reliance interest).
440
Id. § 33 cmt. b. Even when a plaintiff has suffered no loss or cannot prove any loss,
the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages. See id. § 346(2). Because this is just "a
small amount," it would be difficult to argue that an award of nominal damages is an
appropriate remedy. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 36, at 447 (defining
nominal damages as "[a] small amount fixed as damages for breach of contract without
regard to the amount of harm"). Also, this would render the adjective "adequate" irrelevant.
441
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 34(3) (1981).

2014 I REASONABLY CERTAIN TERMS

247

remedy "appropriate" suggests that reliance damages are, in fact, an
"appropriate remedy" under the indefiniteness test.
This language is consistent with statements by Professor E. Allan
Farnsworth in his hombook that suggest that the plaintiff's choice of
remedy, including a request for reliance damages, could render an
otherwise indefinite bargain sufficiently definite. 442 He states that "[e]ven
where damages [as opposed to specific performance] are sought, the effect
of indefiniteness on the ability to estimate loss depends on the measure of
damages involved. It is usually easier to estimate damages based on the
443
reliance interest than on the expectation interest."
But another portion of the Second Restatement suggests otherwise. With
respect to the Second Restatement's black letter rule stating that "[a]ction in
reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even
though uncertainty is not removed,"444 the supporting comment suggests
that the reliance might not make an award of reliance damages an
appropriate remedy. 445 The comment states that because of a promisee's
reliance, "partial or full enforcement through an award of damages for
breach of contract or a decree of specific performance may become
appropriate," and then cites to section 90 for support,446 which is the section
dealing with promissory estoppel. 447 Here, it is important to remember that
the Second Restatement considers a promise enforceable as a result of
reliance to be a contract,448 thus showing that the reference to a remedy for
"breach of contract" could have been intended to refer to a claim for
promissory estoppel. Professor Joseph Perillo seems to agree that the claim
here would be under promissory estoppel and not for breach of contract. 449
Further, the premise that any award protecting less than the expectation
interest is not an appropriate remedy is supported by any such award being
an inadequate remedy at law for purposes of obtaining an equitable
remedy. 450

442
443

444

See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 207.
Id. (emphasis added).

34(3)(1981).
See id. § 34 cmt. d.
446 Id.
447
See id. § 90.
448
See id. § l (defining contract as "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes
as a duty").
449
PERILLO, supra note 2, at 56 & n.112 (stating that a discussion of Restatement section
34 comment d and detrimental reliance on an indefinite bargain is discussed in the
hombook's chapter 6, which deals with promissory estoppel).
450
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 359(1) (1981).
445

RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS §
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Similarly, Professor Farnsworth, in his hornbook, uses Kearns v.
Andree451 and Wheeler v. White452 as examples of courts protecting the
reliance interest when the terms are too indefinite to give an expectation
damages award. 453 The former was based on an implied-in-law contract
theory454 and the latter a promissory estoppel theory. 455 Also, Professor
Farnsworth, when explaining the rationale for the definiteness requirement,
stated that the requirement:
[I]s implicit in the premise that contract law protects the promisee's
expectation interest [because] [i]n calculating the damages that will put the
promisee in the position in which the promisee would have been had the
promise been performed, a court must determine the scope of that promise
with some precision. 456

Professor Kevin M. Teeven suggests the same, stating that "[i]n order for
a court to decide on expectation damages, a court must know the scope of
the promise ... .'.457 One court also explained that the reason a claim for
promissory estoppel does not require reasonably certain terms is because
the usual remedy (according to that court) is not expectation damages:
The reason for the distinction between the contract requirement of reasonable
definiteness and the promissory estoppel requirement of reasonable and
foreseeable reliance is the nature of the remedy available. Promissory
estoppel only provides for damages as justice requires and does not attempt to
provide the plaintiff damages based upon the benefit of the bargain. The
usual measure of damages under a theory of promissory estoppel is the loss
incurred by the promisee in reasonable reliance on the promise, or "reliance
damages." Reliance damages are relatively easy to determine, whereas the
determination of "expectation" or "benefit of the bargain" damages available
in a contract action requires more detailed proof of the terms of the
contract.458

451

139 A. 695 (Conn. 1928).
398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
453
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 214-15.
454
See Kearns, 139 A. at 698.
455
See Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 96-97.
456
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 108 (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted); see
also id. at 201 ("We have seen that the requirement of definiteness is implicit in the principle
that the promisee's expectation interest is to be protected.").
457
TuEVEN, supra note 202, at 238.
458
Rosnick v. Dinsmore, 457 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Neb. 1990). Many jurisdictions award
expectation damages in promissory estoppel cases if such damages can be proven to a
reasonable certainty. See also Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 99, 147 (2000) ("[C]ourts today often award expectation damages even in promissory
estoppel cases, at least when the expectation damages are measurable.").
452
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Also, considering reliance damages to be an appropriate remedy under
the Second Restatement's test would render "appropriate" a virtually
meaningless qualification to "remedy" because most contracts will induce
reliance. 459 Also, considering reliance damages to be an appropriate
remedy would leave only the restitution interest and nominal damages as
candidates for the label "inappropriate." Further, if a remedy was
appropriate as long as it was sought by the plaintiff, all remedies would be
appropriate, and the Second Restatement, rather than referring to
"appropriate remedy," would have stated that that the bargain's terms are
sufficiently definite as long as they enable the court to give the remedy
sought by the plaintiff.
The Second Restatement section on certainty provides only two
illustrations with respect to the definiteness necessary to enable the court to
give an appropriate remedy, and neither deals with a plaintiff seeking
reliance damages. 460 The first illustration is loosely based on Scammell and
Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston 461 and shows that an award ofliquidated damages is
an appropriate remedy. 462 The second is used to show that a plaintiff
seeking specific performance can waive or remove the indefiniteness within
the plaintiffs promised performance (which would be relevant to the
remedy sought because an order of specific performance will make the
plaintiffs performance a condition of the remedy) by offering to perform in
the manner most favorable to the defendant. 463 These illustrations do,
however, suggest that a bargain's indefiniteness is only relevant if it
precludes an award of the specific remedy sought by the plaintiff. This in
turn would suggest that a request for reliance damages would be an
appropriate remedy as long as the indefiniteness of either party's promise
does not make it difficult to determine whether a particular act was in
reliance on the bargain.
But such a conclusion drawn from these two illustrations is contradicted
by the previously discussed citation to section 90 (the promissory estoppel
section) in the Second Restatement comment, when it states that in many
cases reliance on an indefinite bargain will make partial or full enforcement
appropriate. 464 So how can the differing treatment be reconciled?
459

See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT4 (1979) (stating that
except for situations in which the promisor has made some mistake and quickly attempts to
withdraw the promise, "the probability is that some action in reliance (or some payment)
will soon be performed by the promisee").
460
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 cmt. b, illus. 1, 2 (1981).
461
[1941] A.C. 251 (H.L.)(Eng.).
462
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981 ).
463
See id. § 33 cmt. b, illus. 2.
464
See id. § 34 cmt. d.
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The Second Restatement's rule is that the bargain's terms must "provide
a basis for ... giving an appropriate remedy,"465 and the supporting
comment explains that the requirement "reflects the fundamental policy that
contracts should be made by the parties, not by the courts, and hence that
remedies for breach of contract must have a basis in the agreement of the
parties.''466 With respect to a party conceding to a meaning that is most
favorable to the opposing party via the cure-by-concession doctrine,467 or
the court granting liquidated damages, 468 the bargain's terms provide a basis
for giving the requested remedy.
The cure-by-concession doctrine
essentially alters the terms and permits full enforcement of the promise.
The liquidated damages provision is part of the original bargain.
A remedy of reliance damages, however, has no basis in the parties'
agreement. 469 Also, when it is a party's reliance that makes an agreement
enforceable, the plaintiff is usually required to proceed under a promissory
estoppel theory. 470 Thus, the comment's citation to section 90 and the
illustrations can be reconciled by recognizing that reliance does not result in
the bargain's terms enabling the court to provide an appropriate remedy,
whereas the cure-by-concession doctrine and a liquidated damages
provision do result in the bargain's terms enabling the court to provide an
Of course, part performance can remove
appropriate remedy.
uncertainty,471 but the issue here is whether mere reliance is sufficient to
make an award of reliance damages an appropriate remedy, even if the
reliance does not remove the indefiniteness. In fact, the black letter rule's
reference to reliance making a contractual remedy appropriate "even though
uncertainty is not removed,''4 72 suggests that the bargain remains too
indefinite to be enforced as a contract.
For those who find such reconciliation objectionable as being based
solely on word parsing, the different treatment of the cure-by-concession
doctrine and liquidated damages on the one hand, and reliance damages on
the other, makes practical sense. The first two situations are ones that
Rewarding a cure-byinvolve conduct that should be encouraged.
465

Id. § 33(2).
Id. § 33 cmt. b (emphasis added).
467
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 242, at 421 ("Under the doctrine of 'cure by concession,'
when the contract is silent over a material term the indefiniteness is overcome by granting
the plaintiff the option to concede the missing term in accordance with the defendant's most
favorable arrangement.").
468
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 356 (1981).
469
Reliance damages are defined as an "interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract .... " Id. § 344(b) (emphasis added).
470
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
471
Id. § 34(2).
472
Id. § 34(3).
466
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concession by permitting a claim on the contract encourages a party to
resolve a dispute by conceding to the meaning of a bargain that is most
favorable to the other party. Rewarding the inclusion of a liquidated
damages provision encourages parties to use such clauses, and such a
provision "saves the time of courts, juries, parties and witnesses and
reduces the expense of litigation. ,,.473 In contrast, reliance on indefinite
bargains (at least to the extent the reliance does not remove the bargain's
uncertainty) should be discouraged because it will often be inefficient
behavior. Indefinite bargains often lead to disputes with the result being
that one or both of the parties' reliance expenditures are wasted.
Also, if a bargain's terms simply had to be sufficiently definite to provide
the plaintiff with the remedy being sought (and assuming, as previously
discussed, that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs promise to be
sufficiently definite if not relevant to the dispute), the reasonably certain
terms requirement would be designed solely to enable the court to resolve
the dispute before it. While this might not be objectionable from a
normative standpoint, it would render irrelevant a separate doctrine
involving reasonably certain terms, and thus destroy it. By treating the
plaintiffs expectation interest (or liquidated damages) as the only
appropriate remedies, it explains the survival of the reasonably certain
terms requirement as a separate doctrine.
Accordingly, the Second Restatement's comments and illustrations
support the conclusion that an "appropriate" remedy is only one that
permits full enforcement of the parties' bargain (i.e., an award protecting
the expectation interest or an award of liquidated damages) as opposed to
partial enforcement (e.g., an award protecting the reliance interest or the
restitution interest, or an award of nominal damages). 474
What then, is to be made of the comment's statement that "the degree of
certainty required may be affected by ... the remedy sought"?475 The most
likely explanation is that the comment refers to the higher degree of
certainty needed to award specific performance as opposed to expectation
damages. Shortly after this statement, the first. statement after two
sentences addressing how the degree of certainty required may be affected
by the dispute which arises (as opposed to the remedy sought), in the
473

Id. § 356 cmt. a.
If protecting the reliance interest is not an appropriate remedy, an award protecting
the restitution interest would not be an appropriate remedy because the restitution interest is
usually smaller than the reliance interest. See id. § 344 cmt. a ("Although [the restitution
interest] may be equal to the expectation or reliance interest, it is ordinarily smaller because
it includes neither the injured party's lost profit nor that part of his expenditures in reliance
that resulted in no benefit to the other party.").
475
Id. § 33 cmt. b.
474

252

University ofHawai 'i Law Review I Vol. 36: 169

comment notes that "[i]n some cases greater definiteness may be required
for specific performance than for an award of damages ... .'"'76 Shortly
thereafter, a citation is given to the Second Restatement sections on specific
performance and injunctions. 477 The statement might also be referring to a
plaintiff who is only seeking liquidated damage. Although the comment
includes a statement that "[p ]artial relief may sometimes be granted when
uncertainty prevents full-scale enforcement through normal remedies,'"' 78
this statement most likely refers to the following section dealing with
reliance on an indefinite bargain, which, as previously discussed, cites to
section 90, the promissory estoppel section. 479
Thus, on balance the evidence supports the conclusion that the Second
Restatement's test only considers a remedy to be appropriate if it has a
basis in the parties' agreement, which means either a remedy protecting the
plaintiff's expectation interest, including an award of specific performance
or expectation damages, or an award of liquidated damages (i.e., so-called
full enforcement).480 Anything less, such as reliance damages, restitution,
or nominal damages (so-called partial enforcement),481 would not be
considered an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, if one assumes parties
intend bargains to be enforceable in the sense of protecting the parties'
expectation interests, then the appropriate remedy requirement (by not
considering partial enforcement to be an appropriate remedy) has a formal
aspect to it, and thus, at least in part, serves the various functions of form
that were served by classical contract law's requirement that the plaintiff's
promise be sufficiently definite, even if not relevant to the dispute.
Before moving to the next topic, the effect this conclusion has on the
previously discussed issue-whether the plaintiffs promise must be
sufficiently definite even if it is not relevant to the dispute-must be
recognized. By concluding that the bargain's terms must be sufficiently
definite to enable the court to fully enforce the defendant's promise, the
indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise, although not a requirement under

476

Id.

477

Id. (citing id. §§ 357-62).
Id.

478
479

See supra notes 444-45 and accompanying text.
See Edward Yorio & Steve Tuel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J.
111, 114 n.16 (1991) (stating that expectation damages constitute a full enforcement of the
promise); Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 630 (2001) (stating that if a liquidated damages
clause is part of the bargain, then full enforcement of the clause will be consistent with the
parties' intentions).
481
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. d (1981) (discussing "partial
enforcement").
480
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the reasonably certain tenns test, will often make the court unable to fully
enforce the defendant's promise. 482
If the plaintiff's promise is indefinite (and that indefiniteness has not
been removed under the cure-by-concession doctrine or by modification),
and the plaintiff's cost or other loss avoided from not having to perform is
too difficult to determine as a result of the indefiniteness of the plaintiff's
promise, then the bargain's terms are too indefinite for the court to give an
appropriate remedy unless the bargain included a liquidated damages
provision. The court cannot award specific performance because an order
directing the plaintiff to perform cannot be framed. The court cannot award
expectation damages because it cannot determine the position the plaintiff
would have been in had the bargain been performed. 483
Thus, if the only appropriate remedy is full enforcement of the
defendant's promise, the indefiniteness of the plaintiffs promise (though
irrelevant to the "determining the existence of a breach" analysis) often will
render the bargain too indefinite under the "appropriate remedy" analysis.
This would be the case even if the court, after concluding that a contract
had been formed, places the burden on the defendant to prove the plaintiff's
savings from not having to perform. 484
VI. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT'S TEST: NEOCLASSICAL CONTRACT LAW
(TOA FAULT)

With the help of supporting comments and illustrations, a drawing of the
Second Restatement's vague black letter rules on the definiteness doctrine
has been sketched above, bringing the rule's contours more into focus. And
482

See, e.g., Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965), discussed infra notes 520-25
and accompanying text.
483
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(c) (1981) (providing that in
measuring the plaintiff's expectation interest for purposes of awarding expectation damages,
the amount must be reduced by "any cost or other loss that [the plaintiff] avoided by not
having to perform").
484
See generally Kearsarge Computer, Inc. v. Acme Staple Co., 366 A.2d 467, 470 (N.H.
1976).
The general rule is:
If the plaintiff's required expenditures are of cash or material, the tendency is to put the
burden of allegation and proof of the amount thereof on him, but if his expenditures
would be of time or labor, the burden is normally placed on the defendant. The court
usually decides whether the plaintiff's performance requires an outlay of money or
material from the nature of the contract, without a specific raising of the point by the
parties.
Id. at 470 (quoting R.F. Martin, Annotation, Burden of Proving Value of Relief From
Performing Contract in Suit Based on Defendant's Breach Preventing or Excusing Full
Performance, 17 A.L.R.2d 968, 972 (1951 )).
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the image revealed is unmistakably that of a work of neoclassical contract
law.
Neoclassical contract law is the name given to the law that started to
develop in the 1920s in response to classical contract law, and which
produced the U.C.C. in the middle of the century and the Second
Restatement in the latter part of the century. 485 Whereas classical contract
law was the law of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston,486 neoclassical
contract law is the law of Corbin and Llewellyn. 487 "[T]he rules of classical
contract law were centered ... on a single moment in time, the moment of
contract-formation,"488 whereas neoclassical contract law is willing to take
account of post-formation events to ensure a just outcome. 489 Neoclassical
contract law has been described as follows:
[It] attempts to balance the individualist ideals of classical contract with
communal standards of responsibility to others. The core remains the
principle of freedom of contract, distinguishing contract from tort and other
areas, but this principle is "tempered both within and without [contract's]
485

See Curtis Nyquist, Single-Case Research and the History of American Legal
Thought, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 594 (2011) ("Neoclassical contract law begins to come
into focus in the 1920s and 1930s and still dominates the practice of law."); Hillman, supra
note 268, at 123 n.136 (noting that "[n]eoclassical contract law [is] evidenced by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code").
486
See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1749 ("In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the school of thought now referred to as classical contract law, which found its
central inspiration in Langdell, Holmes, and Williston, and its central expression in the
Restatement (First) of Contracts ... held virtually absolute sway over contract theory.").
487
Knapp, supra note 207, at 766-67.
488
Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1748. See generally Macneil, supra note 203, at 863-65
(describing classical contract law's focus on the moment of formation with respect to the
rights and duties that arise between the parties).
489
See generally Murray, Jr., supra note 211, at 881-82 (explaining neoclassical contract
law's willingness to consider post-formation events); Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise
of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity ofJudgment, 48 S.C. L.
REV. 293, 320 (1997). On the other side of neoclassical contract law (i.e., moving further
away from classical contract law and its emphasis on the time of formation) is so-called
relational contract theory, which places more emphasis on post-formation events than
neoclassical contract law. See generally Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and
the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139 (1988) (describing the characteristics
of relational contract theory). Relational contract theory has not, however, had a significant
impact on the rules of contract law. See Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 805.
The identification of relational contracts as a critical construct and an important field
of study has led to important insights concerning the economics and sociology of
contracting. It has not, however, led to a body of relational contract law: that is, we do
not have a body of meaningful and justified contract law rules, either in place or
proposed, that apply to, and only to, relational contracts.
Id.
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formal structure by principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, that
focus on fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on parties'
actual agreements." In deciding the scope of contractual liability, courts
weigh the classical values ofliberty, privacy, and efficiency against the values
of trust, fairness, and cooperation, which have been identified as important by
post-classical scholars. 490

Also, whereas classical contract law favored inflexible, abstract rules that
did not take into account the particular parties involved or the
circumstances (beyond determining if the rule applied),491 neoclassical
contract law is more willing to adopt flexible standards to enable a court to
reach what it believes is a fair result based on the particular facts before
it.492
The Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably certain terms
requirement is quintessentially neoclassical contract law. It keeps one foot
in the formalism of classical contract law by maintaining the reasonably
certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine493 and by seemingly
rejecting reliance damages (and anything less) as an "appropriate"
remedy. 494 It puts the other foot squarely in modem contract law by
modeling its test for reasonably certain terms on the U.C.C.'s provision, by
stating that "the degree of certainty required may be affected by the dispute
which arises and by the remedy sought"495 and by stating that "[c]ourts
decide the disputes before them, not other hypothetical disputes which
might have arisen"496 (and by apparently not requiring the plaintiffs
promise to be sufficiently definite).

° Feinman, supra note 206, at 1287-88 (internal footnote omitted).

49

491

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CASE STUDY 20 (1965) ("[T)he 'pure' law of contract [of the nineteenth century] is an area
of what we can call abstract relationships. 'Pure' contract doctrine is blind to details of
subject matter and person."); Macneil, supra note 203, at 863 ("[Classical contract law]
treats as irrelevant the identity of the parties to the transaction.").
492
See James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54
CASE W. REs. L. REv. I, 6 (2003) ("[W]here classical contract law was rule-based,
neoclassical contract law is more willing to adopt standards."). For explanations of the
differences between rules and standards, see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1687-1701; Baird &
Weisberg, supra note 296, at 1227-31.
493
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33 (1981) (placed in the chapter on
"Formation of Contracts-Mutual Assent"); id. § 33(1) ("Even though a manifestation of
intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a
contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain." (emphasis added)).
494 See id. § 34 cmt. d ("In some cases partial or full enforcement through an award of
damages for breach of contract or a decree of specific performance may become appropriate.
See § 90 [promissory estoppel].").
495
Id. § 33 cmt. b.
496 Id.; see also Macneil, supra note 203, at 873 (discussing neoclassical contract law's
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The drafters seemed unwilling to let go of the past and jettison the idea of
the reasonably certain terms requirement being a formation doctrine, while
at the same time wanting to take account of and apparently approve of
courts' propensities to take into consideration post-formation events so that
justice can be done in individual cases. 497 Unlike classical contract law, the
Second Restatement's test seems to encourage courts to peek at postformation events when deciding if a contract was formed at an earlier time:
Did the indefinite term tum out to be unimportant to the dispute that arose?
Is the defendant simply using indefiniteness as an afterthought to avoid
what turned out to be a bad bargain?
But this compromise approach comes at an intellectual price. The
reasonably certain terms requirement cannot be both a formation doctrine
and a doctrine that assesses definiteness based on the dispute that arises. It
is either a formation doctrine, or it is not. If it is a formation doctrine, no
peeking should be permitted: The only conceivable way to make these
positions consistent would be to maintain that a contract-defined as "a
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty"498-is never really formed until a court gives a remedy or recognizes
a duty between specific parties. But the Second Restatement rejects this
approach, indicating that a legal duty to perform as promised arises from
operative acts occurring prior to a court recognizing such a duty. 499
How and why the Second Restatement's treatment of the reasonably
certain terms requirement ended up lacking clarity and containing apparent
inconsistencies is unclear, but it was perhaps due to one or more of the
following: a belief that the reasonably certain terms requirement is rarely
invoked by modem courts and was thus not worthy of substantial
attention; 500 the combining of related, yet analytically distinct, concepts
within a single Second Restatement section dealing with "certainty,"
resulting in perfunctory and unfocused treatment of the reasonably certain

treatment of the reasonably certain terms requirement).
497
See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 203, at 870 (stating with respect to neoclassical contract
law's treatment of the reasonably certain terms requirement that the "system may be seen as
an effort to escape partially from such rigorous [focus on the time of formation], but since its
overall structure is essentially the same as the classical system it may often be ill-designed to
raise and deal with the issues").
498
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § l (1981 )(emphasis added).
499
See id. cmt. d (discussing the operative acts necessary to create a legal duty to
perform).
500
See Scott, supra note l 0, at 1651 ("The contemporary presumption toward filling gaps
in incomplete contracts has led commentators to assume that the common law indefiniteness
doctrine is no longer a serious impediment to legal enforcement.").
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terms requirement; 501 an apparent desire to deemphasize classical contract
law's focus on the moment of contract formation, 502 even with respect to
the reasonably certain terms requirement 503 without recognizing the
confusion this might cause; simply relying on the reasonably certain terms
provision in the U.C.C., 504 which was itself not explained in any detail and
refers only to gaps, not vague terms; 505 a desire to have the requirement left
501

Second Restatement section 33 is simply titled "Certainty" and incorporates the
related, yet analytically distinct, concepts of whether a reasonable person would construe an
apparent offer with gaps as mere preliminary negotiations and not a manifestation of assent,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 33(3) & cmt. c (1981), the requirement that a
bargain have reasonably certain terms to be a contract, see id. § 33( I )-(2), and the
requirement that greater definiteness is usually required for an order of specific performance
than an award of damages. See id. § 33 cmt. b ("In some cases greater definiteness may be
required for specific performance than for an award of damages ....").
502
See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 1749 ("[T]he rules of classical contract law were
centered .... on a single moment in time, the moment of contract-formation.").
503
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 cmt. b (1981) ("[T]he degree of
certainty required may be affected by the dispute which arises and by the remedy sought.").
504
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 326 ("[T]hese subsections are drawn
from the language found in the Uniform Commercial Code.") (remark by Reporter Robert
Braucher regarding the Second Restatement's provisions on reasonably certain terms).
505
See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2013) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a
contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."). All that
the Official Comment provides regarding the reasonably certain terms requirement is the
following:
Subsection (3) states the principle as to "open terms" underlying later sections of the
Article. If the parties intend to enter into a binding agreement, this subsection
recognizes that agreement as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any
reasonably certain basis for granting a remedy. The test is not certainty as to what the
parties were to do nor as to the exact amount of damage due the plaintiff. Nor is the
fact that one or more terms are left to be agreed upon enough of itself to defeat an
otherwise adequate agreement. Rather, commercial standards on the point of
"indefiniteness" are intended to be applied, this Act making provision elsewhere for
missing terms needed for performance, open price, remedies and the like. The more
terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a
binding agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter
despite the omissions.
U.C.C. § 2-204 cmt. (2013); see also PERJLLO, supra note 2, at 55 ("What is not clear is
when a court will find that 'there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.'"). Professor Edwin W. Patterson, as part of his analysis of§ 2-204(3) for the New
York Law Revision Commission, stated that while the section's "general purpose
[was] ... to prevent the courts from requiring strictly that everything be clearly and
definitely settled before the Court will find that a contract was formed[,]" then provided the
following cautionary note: "[T]he ways in which this general purpose is to be implemented
are not clear. While the comment to this subsection indicates that only 'a reasonably certain
basis for granting a remedy' is requisite, no illustrations are given." STATE OF NEW YORK,
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vague so that courts would be able to apply it flexibly; 506 a desire to
completely strip the reasonably certain terms requirement of its formal
aspect without wanting to say so explicitly; or simply describing what they
saw (courts considering the requirement as a formation doctrine, but often
unable to bite the bullet and ignore post-formation events). 507
No matter the reason, the result is unfortunate. As stated by Herbert
Wechsler, ALI director from 1963 to 1984,508 the Restatements are
"essential aid[s] in the improved analysis, clarification, unification, growth
and adaptation of the common law."509 It is well known that the
Restatements often seek to move the law in a particular direction, 510 but the
result should not be a black letter rule and supporting comments and
illustrations that cause confusion and create inconsistencies. If the ALI
desired to jettison the reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation
doctrine, it should have done so expressly. And if it desired to retain it as a
formation doctrine, it should have removed comments referencing post-

supra note 86, at 274 (remark by Professor Edwin W. Patterson). The leading treatise on the
U.C.C. does not provide much explanation of the Code's reasonably certain terms
requirement, simply stating that Article 2 "makes contracts easier to form," then setting
forth, as one example, the text of§ 2-204(1) and lastly noting that "Article 2 itself helps
provide this 'reasonably certain basis' through numerous provisions which fill gaps in an
agreement that might otherwise fail for indefiniteness." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 29 (6th ed. 2010). The authors direct the reader to
chapter 4 of the book, which deals with filling in gaps in an incomplete contract. Id. at ch. 4.
It is clear that Professors White and Summers consider the reasonably certain terms
requirement to be a dead letter under the U.C.C.
506
My thanks to Professor Stephen Leacock for suggesting this motive.
507
The official comment to the U.C.C. provision on unconscionability recognized the
tendency of courts to manipulate unfavorable doctrines to reach just results. See U.C.C. § 2302 cmt. 1 (2013).
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against
the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. In the past such
policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation
of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to
public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract.
Id. Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Article 2 of the U.C.C., see Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2 's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 712 (1999), famously referred to this as the use of "covert tools."
K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939). Professor Grant Gilmore
colorfully referred to this as "courts avoid[ing] practicing on weekdays what they so
eloquently preached on Sundays." GILMORE, supra note 62, at 52.
508
Silber, supra note 13, at 578.
509
Wechsler, supra note 13, at 150.
510
See Anita Bernstein, Restatement Redux, 48 V AND. L. REV. 1663, 1665 (1995) (book
review) ("[A] restatement seeks improvement of the law through simultaneous ordering and
change.").
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formation events, except with respect to cure-by-concession and
modification. What it left us, however, is a treatment of the reasonably
certain terms requirement that provides something for everyone and that
permits a reader to construe it whichever way she wants.
Also, the ALI's apparent desire for courts to consider post-formation
events when assessing indefiniteness is puzzling when one considers that
promissory estoppel is available as an alternative claim. Under the Second
Restatement, the sanction for failing to have a bargain with reasonably
certain terms is not the sanction of nullity, but the sanction of contractual
invalidity. 511 By making the requirement one for contract formation, a
promisee is not precluded from seeking to enforce an indefinite bargain
under an alternative theory. Importantly, the Second Restatement, like the
513
First Restatement, 512 expressly recognizes promissory estoppel, and the
Second Restatement even recognizes promissory estoppel as an alternative
514
claim when a bargain's terms are too indefinite to form a contract.
This
doctrine, with its emphasis on a promisee's reliance and its goal of avoiding
injustice, 515 enables a court to consider post-formation events to ensure a
just outcome in a particular case.
This does, of course, still operate as a sanction for entering into a bargain
with indefinite terms because it is more difficult for a promisee to enforce a
promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel than to enforce a
promise within a contract. 516 But relegating a promisee to a promissory
estoppel claim when the bargain's terms are too indefinite to form a
contract seems to be an appropriate compromise between enforcement of
the promise under a contract theory (no sanction) and automatic nonenforcement (the sanction of nullity). This is so because even though there
are benefits to encouraging parties to have their bargains include reasonably
certain terms, there might be situations in which the benefits of enforcement
outweigh the benefits of non-enforcement, reinforcing the requirement's
formal aspect. The flexibility given to the court by promissory estoppel's
injustice element makes it an ideal device for the court to weigh the

511

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981) ("[A manifestation of
intention] cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are
reasonably certain." (emphasis added)).
512
RESTATEMENT(FIRST)OFCONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
513
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1981 ).
514
See Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344 (D. Mass. 2011)
("[T]he Restatement 'has expressly approved' promissory estoppel's use to protect reliance
on indefinite promises." (quoting Metzger & Phillips, supra note 242, at 842)).
515
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) (1981).
516
See Hillman, supra note 29, at 580 (1998) (reporting a low success rate for
promissory estoppel claims).
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competing benefits of enforcement versus non-enforcement. As stated by
one court, promissory estoppel "supplies a needed tool which courts may
employ in a proper case to prevent injustice."517
For example, in deciding whether the injustice from not enforcing the
promise would outweigh the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality,
the court might take into consideration, among any other relevant
circumstances, the following, many of which are post-formation events:
how reasonable it was for the plaintiff to rely on the indefinite bargain
(which would presumably require a comparison of the amount of reliance to
the degree of indefiniteness and the bargain's informality); 518 whether the
plaintiffs reliance was definite and substantial; 519 whether the defendant
encouraged the plaintiff to rely on the bargain because the reliance
benefited the defendant; 520 the degree of fault on the part of the plaintiff in
failing to specify the bargain's terms with greater definiteness, including
the "relative competence and the bargaining position of the parties;"521
whether the defendant in the lawsuit is simply trying to take advantage of
the reasonably certain terms requirement to avoid what has become a bad
bargain; 522 and whether the defendant intentionally drafted indefinite terms
to have an excuse for non-performance. 523
Thus, an example of when the court might conclude that the benefit to
enforcement outweighs the benefit of reinforcing the legal formality
through the sanction of nullity would be when one party encourages the
other to take substantial action in reliance on the indefinite bargain because
such reliance benefits the promisor, then refuses to perform for a reason
unrelated to the bargain's indefiniteness, and then relies on the bargain's
indefiniteness as a defense to the lawsuit. 524 In fact, as previously
517

Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1965).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 cmt. b (1981) (noting that factors to
consider in deciding whether injustice will occur from not enforcing the promise include
"the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance" and "the formality with which the promise is
made").
519
See id. (noting that a factor to consider in deciding whether injustice will occur from
not enforcing the promise includes the "definite and substantial character [of the reliance] in
relation to the remedy sought").
520
See, e.g., Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011),
discussed infra notes 539-49 and accompanying text.
521
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 87 cmt. e (1981).
522
See CORBIN & PERILLO, supra note 374, § 4.1, at 535-36 ("The courts must take
cognizance of the fact that the argument that a particular agreement is too indefinite to
constitute a contract frequently is an afterthought excuse for attacking an agreement that
failed for reasons other than indefiniteness.").
523
See, e.g., Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 336, discussed infra notes 539-49 and
accompanying text.
524
The rule in the Second Restatement that provides that an option contract arises when
518
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discussed, parties taking advantage of indefiniteness to escape a bargain for
an unrelated reason was the most likely reason the U.C.C. relaxed the
reasonable certainty requirement. 525
The well-known cases of Wheeler v. White 526 and Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc. 527 are perhaps examples of such a situation. In those cases, the
plaintiffs' reliance on the indefinite bargain was substantial, and in each
case the defendant encouraged the plaintiff to rely on the indefinite bargain
and then used its indefiniteness as a defense.
In Wheeler, the parties entered into a bargain under which the defendant
promised to secure a loan for the plaintiff (or, if unable to secure it from a
third party, to provide the loan himself) so that the plaintiff could build a
commercial building or shopping center on his land, and in exchange he
promised to pay the defendant a specified sum of money. 528 The bargain's
terms with respect to the promised loan, however, "failed to provide the
amount of monthly installments, the amount of interest due upon the
obligation, how such interest would be computed, [and] when such interest
would be paid."529 The parties also agreed that the defendant would receive
a commission on the rent received from any tenants he obtained for the
Thus, the defendant
commercial building or shopping center. 530
presumably had an incentive for the plaintiff to proceed with the plans to
build the commercial building or shopping center before the defendant
secured the loan, so that it would be easier for the defendant to secure the
loan in the first place and so that the defendant could begin earning
commissions on rent sooner.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, before securing a loan from a
third party, urged the plaintiff to demolish the existing buildings on the land
and to otherwise prepare the land for the commercial building or shopping
center, which the plaintiff did, only to have the defendant then tell him
there would be no loan. 531 When the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach
of contract, the defendant argued that the bargain lacked reasonably certain

an offeree foreseeably and substantially relies on an offer and injustice would result if the
offeror were able to revoke the offer before acceptance, would not apply because this rule
results in the formation of a contract (though "[t]ull-scale enforcement of the offered
contract is not necessarily appropriate in such cases"). Id. § 87 cmt. e. No contract can be
formed ifthe terms are not reasonably certain. Id. § 33(1).
525
Snyder, supra note 179, at 37-38.
526
398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965).
527
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
528
See Wheeler, 398 S.W.2d at 94 n.l, 95.
529
Id. at 95.
530 Id.
531 Id.
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terms and therefore no contract was formed. 532 The court held that although
the complaint did not state a claim for breach of contract because the terms
of the promised loan were indefinite, the complaint stated a claim for
promissory estoppel. 533
In Hoffman, the plaintiffs (husband and wife) alleged that the defendant,
Red Owl Stores, promised the plaintiff husband that he only needed
$18,000 in capital to start up a Red Owl grocery store, 534 but the bargain (if
one had been reached)5 35 did not specify "the size, cost, design, and layout
of the store building; and the terms of the lease with respect to rent,
maintenance, renewal, and purchase options."536 The plaintiffs alleged that
after making this promise, the defendant encouraged them, among other
things, to sell their bakery building and business, to buy the inventory and
fixtures of a small grocery store to gain experience, to then sell the small
grocery store, and to obtain an option to buy land on which to build the Red
Owl store. 537 Professor Robert Scott has suggested that the defendant had
an incentive to encourage the plaintiffs to undertake these actions in
reliance on the defendant's promise of a Red Owl store: "All these actions
gave Red Owl some further indication of the kind of franchisee that
Hoffman was likely to be-was he enterprising and resourceful, or was he a
bit of a doofus?" 538
After these actions in reliance on the promise, the defendant raised the
required amount of capital investment to $34,000. 539 When the plaintiffs
sued the defendant for breaching the promise, the defendant argued that the
terms were insufficiently definite. 540 The court held, however, that the facts
supported enforcing the promise under promissory estoppel, even though
the promise was insufficiently definite to form a contract. 541
In these cases the defendant is perhaps primarily responsible for the harm
(the wasted reliance) caused by the indefinite bargain. Thus, permitting the
532

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 97.
534
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 268 (Wis. 1965).
535
It is unlikely that a bargain was entered into in Hoffman because there was likely no
offer and, if there was an offer, no acceptance. See id. at 274-75. The promise in Hoffman
seems to have been a promise by the defendant to make an offer to the plaintiffs and to have
the promise within the offer conditional on a promise by the plaintiffs of a capital
contribution ofnot more than $18,000. See id.
536
Id. at 274.
537
Id. at 268-70.
538
Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual
Reliance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 93 (2007).
539
Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 271.
540
See id. at 274.
541
Id. at 275.
533
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promise to be enforced under promissory estoppel in these instances will
have the beneficial effect of deterring such behavior. A party will no longer
have an incentive to encourage the other party to rely on the contract to the
benefit of the promisor and then use the indefiniteness of its own promise
as a defense. Of course, if, as argued by Professor Scott, the dispute in
Hoffman arose because of a misunderstanding regarding the amount of
financing, 542 then perhaps the sanction of nullity (as opposed to simply the
sanction of contractual invalidity) would have been warranted.
543
A recent example is Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which arose out
544
of the subprime mortgage crisis.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
promised to consider their eligibility for a mortgage loan modification if
they took certain steps, including defaulting on their mortgage loan
payments and submitting certain financial information to the defendant. 545
The plaintiffs alleged that they did these things, but that the defendant
refused to modify their mortgage loan and instead proceeded to foreclose
on their home. 546 The plaintiffs then sued the defendant, asserting a claim
for promissory estoppel. 547 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint,
asserting, among other things, that any promise it made was insufficiently
definite. 548
The court seemingly recognized that the defendant's promise to negotiate
a mortgage loan modification was not enforceable as part of a contract
because (in addition to not being supported by consideration) the parties
had not "elaborate[d] on the boundaries of that duty to negotiate" and the
duty was thus too indefinite. 549 The court held, however, that the complaint
stated a claim for promissory estoppel. 550 The court noted that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel is well suited for situations in which the defendant's
conduct was "designed to take advantage of the promisee,"551 and when
'"there has been a pattern of conduct by one side which has dangled the
542

See Scott, supra note 540, at 97; see also Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores
and the limits of the Legal Method, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 863 (2010) ("[T]he best inference
to be drawn from the record was that the breakdown in the negotiations between Joseph
Hoffmann [the court misspelled Hoffmann's name, see id. at 861 n.5] and Red Owl officials
was primarily attributable to a fundamental misunderstanding between the parties as to the
amount and nature ofHoffmann's capital contribution to the franchise operation.").
543
798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011).
544
See id. at 360.
545
Id. at 339.
546 Id.
547
548
549
550
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Id. at 338-39.
Id.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 344.
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other side on a string. "'
The court stated that "[w ]hi le there is no
allegation that its promise was dishonest, [the defendant] distinctly gained
the upper hand by inducing the [plaintiffs] to open themselves up to a
foreclosure action." 553
A particularly egregious form of this behavior (which would occur at the
time of formation) is when an offeror intentionally makes an indefinite
offer to induce reliance that benefits the offeror, planning from the outset
on refusing to perform based on the bargain's lack of certainty. For
example, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner argue that an exception
to the general rule that indefinite bargains should not be enforced should be
"[w ]hen the indefiniteness is clearly attributable to one party and induces
inefficient reliance from the other party .... " 554 They use the well-known
case of Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc. 555 as an example
of the suggested exception. 556
In Lefkowitz, the defendant published two advertisements in the
newspaper. 557 In the first, the defendant stated that it was selling three
brand new fur coats "[w]orth to $100" for one dollar, "[f]irst [c]ome [f]irst
[s]erved."558 In the second, published one week later, the defendant stated
it was selling a stole "[w]orth $139.50" for one dollar, also "[f]irst [c]ome
[f]irst [s]erved.". 559 The plaintiff was the first person at the appropriate
counter of the store on each day, but the store refused to sell to him because
he was a man. 560 The court held that the advertisements were offers and
561
that the defendant breached a contract to sell the stole for one dollar, but
held that the trial court properly disallowed the plaintiffs claim for breach
of contract to sell a fur coat because "the value of these articles was
speculative and uncertain."562 The court stated that "[t]he only evidence of
value was the advertisement itself to the effect that the coats were 'Worth to
$100.00,' how much less being speculative especially in view of the price
for which they were offered for sale."563
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Id. (quoting Pappas Indus. Parks, Inc. v. Psarros, 511 N.E.2d 621, 622 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1987)).
553
Id. at 346.
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Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 106.
555
86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
556
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 105-06.
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Lefkowitz, 86 N.W.2d at 690.
558 Id.
559 Id.
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Professors Ayres and Gertner argue that a situation like Lefkowitz should
be an exception to the general rule that indefinite offers will not be
enforced. 564 They argue that the penalty of non-enforcement will in fact
encourage sellers to create indefinite (and hence unenforceable) offers that
induce inefficient reliance by offerees because the inefficient reliance is in
fact beneficial for the offeror. 565 The seller in Lefkowitz was not interested
in the sale of the fur coats or the stole, he wanted to induce persons to come
to the store with the hope they would make other purchases. 566 Thus, there
will be some cases in which the offeror has an incentive to make indefinite
(and hence unenforceable) offers because the offeror will obtain the desired
performance from the offeree without having to himself perform. 567
The Lefkowitz problem, however, is solved not by relaxing the
reasonably certain terms requirement for the formation of a contract but by
permitting the plaintiff to proceed under a promissory estoppel theory. If
the offeror made an intentionally indefinite promise to obtain performance
from the offeree with the expectation of not having to perform his end of
the bargain (because no contract will be formed), that motive will support
the conclusion that "injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."568 Even if many cases like Lefkowitz (including Lefkowitz itself)
do not involve reliance of a definite and substantial character, reliance of
that character is not a requirement for a recovery under promissory
estoppel, 569 but is simply a factor that weighs in favor of enforcement. 570 If
the plaintiff could prove that the defendant made an intentionally indefinite
offer to encourage reliance that was beneficial to the defendant with the
expectation that he would not have to perform his end of the bargain, this
would be sufficient to conclude that injustice would result from nonenforcement irrespective of the character of the reliance.
Thus, because of situations like Wheeler, Hoffman (assuming it was not
simply a case of a misunderstanding), Dixon, and Lefkowitz (assuming the
defendant had a bad motive), the sanction of contractual invalidity, and not
564
565
566
567
568

Ayres & Gertner, supra note 95, at 106.
Id.
See id.
See id.

90(1)(1981).
Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) ("A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or
forbearance .... ") (emphasis added), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1)
(1981) ("A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promise ... and which does induce such action or
forbearance .... ").
570
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90(1) cmt. b (1981).
569

RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS §
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the sanction of nullity, would seem appropriate. The flexible nature of
promissory estoppel's injustice element will permit courts to balance the
benefits of enforcing the promise against the benefit of reinforcing the legal
formality. This flexibility will permit courts to conduct that balancing on a
case-by-case basis, and there will likely be situations other than those such
as Wheeler, Hoffman, Dixon, and Lefkowitz in which courts will conclude
that enforcement under promissory estoppel is warranted.
The flexible nature of promissory estoppel will also permit those courts
that favor legal formalities more than other courts to assign greater weight
to the benefits from reinforcing the legal formality. 571 Thus, a court would
be able to deny enforcement under promissory estoppel in a particular case
if it believes it would ultimately be more harmful to protect a party to a
commercial transaction who did not protect himself. 572 The court will also
be able to enforce the promise but only award reliance damages. For
example, in Wheeler, the court, although enforcing the promise under
promissory estoppel, concluded that an award of reliance damages, not
expectation damages, was appropriate because the plaintiff was partly at
fault for the bargain's indefiniteness. 573 If, however, the defendant's
behavior was egregious, an award of expectation damages might be
appropriate, assuming the bargain's terms and the evidence permit such an
award. Although punitive damages are usually not recoverable for the
breach of a contract,574 the character of the defendant's conduct is
sometimes taken into account when determining the amount of damages to
award. 575
Thus, a court has three options when confronted with a promissory
estoppel claim based on a promise within a bargain whose terms are too
indefinite to create a contract. These options are as follows: enforce the
promise under promissory estoppel and award expectation damages (for
those cases in which the injustice from not enforcing the promise
substantially outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality, and
571

See id. ("The principle of this Section is flexible.").
See, e.g., James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1933) (L.
Hand, J.) ("[I]n commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice
to ... aid ... those who do not protect themselves.").
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Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Tex. 1965).
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RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
575
See id. § 352 cmt. a (stating that with respect to the requirement that a plaintiff prove
damages to a reasonable certainty, "[a] court may take into account all the circumstances of
the breach, including willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of
certainty .... "); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 509 (2002) ("[I]n
construction contracts, the degree of willfulness of a contractor's breach helps courts
determine whether to grant expectancy damages measured by the cost of repair or the
diminution in value caused by the breach, the latter often a smaller measure.").
572
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the indefiniteness does not prevent the expectation interest from being
determined); enforce the promise under promissory estoppel but award only
reliance damages (for those cases in which the injustice from not enforcing
the promise substantially outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal
formality, but the expectation interest cannot be determined either because
the breached promise is indefinite or the evidence does not permit the
expectation interest to be proved to a reasonable certainty, and those cases
in which the injustice from not enforcing the promise only moderately or
slightly outweighs the benefit from reinforcing the legal formality); or
refuse to enforce the promise under promissory estoppel (when the benefit
from reinforcing the legal formality outweighs the injustice from not
enforcing the promise).
This flexibility provided by promissory estoppel makes it puzzling that
the Second Restatement's test encourages courts to consider post-formation
events when determining whether a bargain's terms were sufficiently
definite to form a contract. A solution to the ALI' s desire to maintain the
reasonably certain terms requirement as a formation doctrine while at the
same time encouraging courts to consider post-formation events to achieve
a just outcome in a particular case was just down the road in section 90. So
what happened?
One possibility for the ALI' s failure to rely on promissory estoppel as a
way to consider post-formation events was through an uncritical reliance on
the U.C.C. provision. The U.C.C. was drafted at a time when promissory
estoppel was not well received with respect to commercial transactions, 576
and it is, therefore, understandable that the U.C.C. would not have relied on
promissory estoppel as a device for relaxing the certainty requirement.
Another possibility is that the ALI itself believed the goal of relaxing the
certainty requirement and encouraging courts to focus on post-formation
events would suffer if relegated to the Second Restatement's promissory
estoppel section, a section setting forth a controversial doctrine. 577 In other
words, the ALI might not have wanted its goal of relaxing the certainty
requirement to be jeopardized by throwing its lot in with promissory
estoppel. Or perhaps the ALI was concerned that injustice would still occur
in some situations in which the plaintiff could not establish any reliance
576

The U.C.C. was drafted in the 1940s and 1950s. Robert Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799-804 (1958). During
this time, courts were reluctant to use promissory estoppel in commercial transactions.
Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel.· Justifiable Reliance and Commercial
Uncertainty Before Williston 's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 604-05 (2004).
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See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 V AND. L.
REV. 1003, 1039-40 (2010) ("[M]ost commentators have seen promissory estoppel as
controversial ....").
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(though without reliance it would seem unlikely injustice would occur). Or
maybe the ALI simply wanted to abolish the certainty requirement. In any
event, the suitability of promissory estoppel for taking into account postformation events makes it puzzling that the ALI incorporated such concerns
into a doctrine dealing with the formation of a contract.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ALI, in the Second Restatement of Contracts, sought to make the
reasonably certain terms requirement clearer, but its effort fell short.
Despite providing a test for reasonably certain terms-whether the terms
"provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy" 578-the ALI failed to make clear whether the
plaintiffs promise must be sufficiently definite and whether an award
protecting the plaintiffs reliance interest is an appropriate remedy.
This Article has shown that, though the answer is far from clear, the
better interpretation of the Second Restatement's test is that it is not
necessary that the plaintiff's promise be sufficiently definite, but (somewhat
paradoxically) only an award protecting the plaintiff's expectation interest
(or an award of liquidated damages) is an appropriate remedy. Thus, while
the Second Restatement retains the reasonably certain terms requirement as
a doctrine of contract formation, it also encourages courts to consider some
post-formation events (but not others, such as the remedy sought). Thus,
the test has a practical aspect but retains a formal aspect as well. In this
respect, it is a model of neoclassical contract law. But because a formation
doctrine cannot logically consider post-formation events, it is also
inconsistent. The drafters therefore failed in their goal "to be a little more
helpful in spelling out what is meant by [the reasonably certain terms
requirement]. " 579
The issue is, of course, just one piece of the larger struggle over
whether the better model for contract law is one where parties are
expected to comply with established rules and suffer the consequences if
they do not, or whether courts should seek a just outcome in individual
cases. An unwillingness to take a firm position on this issue, at least with
respect to the reasonably certain terms requirement, is perhaps what led
the ALI to give us a test for reasonably certain terms that is not only a
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) ( 1981 ).
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note I, at 326 (remark by Reporter Robert Braucher
regarding the Second Restatement of Contract's provision on the requirement that a
contract's terms be reasonably certain).
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model of neoclassical contract law, but a model of confusion and
inconsistency.

